alternative to coercion. The proof of this assertion would involve an essay upon it alone. I can now only indicate the three facts which seem to me to justify the statement, and which are too commonly neglected in the discussion of the subject.

The first is, that the principle of nationality which has played so large a part in recent European political history is the real and ultimate basis of the claim of Ireland to self-government. The strong national sentiment felt by the majority of Irish people, however it has been created, is strictly analogous to that passionate aspiration of Hungarian and Italian patriots which derived such support from the ardent sympathy of English Liberalism. It has been observed, "A portion of mankind may be said to constitute a nationality if they are united among themselves by common sympathies which do not exist between them and others—which make them co-operate with each other more readily than with other people, desire to be under the same government, and desire that it should be government by themselves or a portion of themselves exclusively." It is submitted that this is clearly true of Ireland.

The second fact to which I wish to call attention is the very large admission of the political capacity of the Irish people that is made by the maintenance of the Constitution as it now exists. The Irish people return representatives to the Imperial Parliament. If * Mill, “Representative Government,” c. 16.

they are so ignorant and degraded that they cannot be trusted to elect men fit to make laws affecting themselves alone, à fortiori they are too ignorant and degraded to be allowed to send members to Westminster to make laws for the whole empire. The arguments so glibly used, founded on the "profound incapacity" of the Irish people, prove, if they be true, not so much that Home Rule ought not to be granted, but that the Irish people should be deprived altogether of representative institutions.

Lastly, the existence of the national sentiment and the denial of its logical outcome, so long as the Irish representation is suffered to remain, must throw the whole machinery of government out of gear, for it results in the formation of a party strong enough to disorganise the working of the House of Commons. A party banded together for the purpose of making all government impossible strikes at the fundamental principle of a democracy; for self-government implies an agreement among those to whom the powers of the community are delegated that these powers shall be used for the good of all, for the defence of the whole empire from attacks from without, and the maintenance of the authority of law within its bounds, however much they may differ as to the principles by which these objects may best be maintained.

It follows, therefore, that unless representative institutions are taken away from Ireland, the demand of the Irish people must be complied with, and that the

concession made must be such as fairly meets the requirements of that party and affords satisfaction to the national sentiment. No half-and-half measure of local government will do. So also no half-and-half measure of coercion will do. To give the Irish members a place in the House of Commons and to expel them when they carry out the wishes of their constituents, to give the franchise to the Irish people and at the same time to pass for their governance Peace Preservation Acts and Coercion Acts affecting the primary constitutional rights, is illogical and absurd, and, as experience shows, is useless.

There is, however, a method of government which, so far as the mere preservation of order in Ireland is concerned, might be superficially successful. That method is the government of Ireland as a Crown colony. Let the legislature give to an Irish Council nominated by the Crown absolute powers of legislation for Ireland, let Irish representation in the Imperial Parliament be suspended, let the Council have the control of an army of 30,000 men, and it is probable that before long such a government might produce quiet in Ireland; but the quiet so produced would not be the peace of an orderly, progressive, and civilised people, but the peace of premature decay and national death. So far as one can see, that is the only policy of coercion which is likely to succeed. Such a policy is not openly advocated even by Lord Salisbury, and it has no practical chance of adoption

by the English people. Assuming then, as most thoughtful writers seem to do, that Home Rule in some form is inevitable, the first question that is asked about any suggested scheme is naturally, Does it impair the unity of the Empire?

Mr. Gladstone in introducing his Bill laid it down as an essential condition of any plan that Parliament could be asked or could be expected to entertain, that the unity of the Empire must not be placed in jeopardy; the safety and welfare of the whole, if there should be an unfortunate conflict, which he did not believe, must be preferred to the security and advantage of a part. Now it so happens that most of the speeches delivered by those who were opposed to the scheme of the Government mainly rested on an attempt to prove that this condition was not fulfilled. And it happened also, as might indeed have been expected, that much of the argument against the Bill depended on the legal and constitutional effect of its different clauses. I propose to inquire whether the scheme of Irish government disclosed in the Bill satisfied the test to which Mr. Gladstone voluntarily submitted it.

It may perhaps be objected that such an inquiry is useless because of the result of the general election. But very little consideration will convince any one who attempts to think in what form Home Rule can be granted, that any scheme which is likely to command the assent of the Irish members,

and at the same time does not involve very sweeping changes, not only in the relations of Great Britain and Ireland, but in the form and law of the whole constitution, must follow the "main outlines" of the Gladstone-Morley Bill. Stated very generally, the effect of the Bill would have been to create in Ireland a subordinate government for Irish affairs of the same type as the governments of those colonies which have representative institutions and responsible governments. It adopted the division of political powers into legislative, executive, and judicial; and seemed to intend that the relations of these powers in Ireland should be similar to those which exist in the Imperial government. If this type be departed from, it will be found that either the new Irish government will be little more than a mere local government, or that great changes in the constitutional law of the Empire must be made.

But in any case the Bill is a useful "draft for discussion," and the inquiry whether it did or did not impair the unity of the Empire illustrates the principles on which the solution of the same problem in regard to any other Bill or new scheme must depend.

§ 1. THE UNITY OF THE EMPIRE.

In making the inquiry which I have mentioned as the purpose of this essay, it is necessary to give to the