Bill made, the following are some of the anomalies and inconveniences which would arise:

(I.) The Irish members would be entitled to take part in legislating on purely English, Scotch, and Welsh affairs.

(II.) The Irish members would inevitably form opinions and take sides on matters in dispute in the Irish legislative body; and the parties thus formed would probably insist on fighting out these matters at Westminster as well as Dublin.

(III.) Some Irish members would constantly endeavour to criticise the acts of the Irish Ministry in power for the time being, and the conduct of the Lord-Lieutenant on matters arising out of his relation to that Ministry, in order that party capital might be made out of the debates they might manage to provoke.

(IV.) The temptation to English parties to bargain for the votes of Irish members on English issues would probably be too strong to be resisted, and to secure these votes the interference of the English Cabinet in questions which might be wholly settled at Dublin would be induced, and the settlement of Irish affairs be made more difficult.

(V.) The evils of the excitement of double elections would be great, and their expense an unbearable burden to Ireland.

(VI.) The strength of the Irish legislative body would be seriously diminished, and its importance as the source of law in the eyes of the Irish voters

lessened ; for it would not be possible to secure the attendance of one hundred and three competent Irish representatives at Westminster without seriously reducing the number of fit members of the Dublin Legislature, and probably some of the men best qualified to sit in the latter body would prefer to come to the House of Commons.

On the other hand, if Irish representation entirely ceased, it is said that Ireland would lose all voice in regard to the sphere of legislation reserved to the Imperial Parliament and all control over the general affairs of the Empire. To this the reply is that the Irish members accept this loss with equanimity; that the condition of Ireland is such that her interests must and ought for years to be absorbed with her own local concerns; that the wishes of the Irish people would necessarily be taken into account by the English Cabinet in determining Imperial policy, and could always be ascertained with sufficient accuracy on the responsibility of the Dublin Cabinet; and that Ireland would be in no worse position than the colonies.

Again, it is urged that the retention of legislation as to customs and excise by the Imperial Parliament, and the collection of duties of that kind on its authority, infringe the principle that taxation and representation should go together. It must be admitted that principle is not adhered to by the proposed Bill. But the seriousness of the infraction is much diminished by the fact that the taxation

of

would be indirect and in the form least overt and oppressive; that the taxes in question are imposed by acts permanent in the sense that they are not reenacted every year; * that the liability would be in the nature of a fixed charge on Ireland, the continuance of which was one of the conditions of the grant of Home Rule and the justice of which could not therefore be fairly disputed by any Irish Ministry. That some politicians might try to make a grievance of it is very likely, but whether the bulk of the Irish people would think it worth while to sustain them in their objections depends on much the same conditions as the question briefly discussed above of the permanency a demand for independence. The probability is that Irish leaders would find it to their advantage to abstain from raising any cry about the matter; and even if they did not so abstain, a firm attitude on the part of the Imperial Government would be an answer the Irish Government would be forced to accept, unless they were willing to proceed into a hopeless struggle. It must not be forgotten too, that though the principle "that taxation and representation should go together," is as a rule sound, it has no necessary application to the relations of an Imperial and subordinate Government; and it is probable that if a federation of the British Empire is accomplished, its financial basis may rest on contributions in proportions levied by the federal administration on each state of the Union,

* See Customs Tariff Act, 1876. Stephen's Comm. ii. pp. 565 et seq.

settled by agreement, which a federal legislature might not have power to alter, and which might not depend on representation at all.

The argument that the loss of the right of sending members to the Imperial Parliament involves the degradation of Ireland, is one that finds little response from Irishmen, as the followers of Mr. Parnell clearly understand. To Englishmen of enlightened minds, with a knowledge of the past, the idea that they are directly assisting in the government of a vast empire surrounds the electoral franchise with a traditional halo, and to them the eloquent passage in which Dr. Dale urges the value of the privilege* would doubtless forcibly appeal, but not to the majority of the Irish voters. Indeed, to come nearer home, no one who knows Wales well will doubt that if a Welsh Parliament were offered to it in terms similar to those offered to Ireland, the majority of the Welsh voters would accept it, not so much because they undervalue the substantial advantages of connection with the Empire, but because they would regard the loss of such influence as twenty-eight or thirty members can exercise over Imperial affairs as a less evil than the continued neglect of their special legislative needs.

Upon the whole then, if the only alternatives are the complete cessation of Irish representation at Westminster, or the continuance of such representation in its present form, and if any proposed "Home Rule" is so *Contemporary Review, June, 1886. G

constituted as to give rise to responsible government, it is tolerably clear that the former would be the less objectionable course. One cannot help thinking that the excessive importance attached to the 24th clause has been due to the fallacy that the continued presence of Irish representatives is essential to the legal supremacy of Parliament over Ireland; and though the writer of the able articles in the Pall Mall Gazette, who first forcibly insisted on section 24 as a blot in an otherwise acceptable Bill, evidently knew that was not so, yet many public speakers have shown that they were labouring under this delusion, and made that section the main reason of their opposition to the Bill.

§ 8. THE LIMITED REPRESENTATION OF IRELAND.

It is, however, understood that Mr. Gladstone would be willing to entertain plans for securing such a representation as would avoid the graver evils of a continuance of the existing arrangements in case selfgovernment be granted to Ireland.

It has been suggested that the electoral arrangements of Ireland should remain unchanged, and the same number of members as heretofore should be returned to the Imperial Parliament, but that they should only have the right of taking part in affairs affecting the Empire generally or Ireland in particular. The difficulty of defining what are Imperial affairs or purely