Irish affairs is not the main obstacle to the adoption of this plan, but the trouble that double elections would involve in the Irish constituencies, the number of the members to be returned, and the practical impossibility of the same members sitting at Dublin and Westminster. The session of Parliament is long enough as it is, and it may be called together at any time. The legislative body at Dublin would have to meet during a part at any rate of the time during which Parliament usually sits, and the conflicting claims of the two legislatures on the time of a man who had a seat in both would make the discharge of his duty impossible.

Another way of dealing with the question has been suggested, I believe for the first time in public by Mr. Yeo*-that the Imperial Parliament should delegate to a British Parliament the same power as to Great Britain that the Irish legislative body would have in Ireland. But this course would give rise here to the very same evils which the retention of the Irish members at Westminster would create. The inconvenience of double elections might no doubt be avoided by providing that the Imperial Parliament should be constituted by the joint assembling of the members of the Irish and British legislatures. But the still graver difficulty (which would be the necessary consequence of this plan) of separating the Imperial executive from the British executive, would *M.P. for the Gower Division of Glamorganshire.

remain. Unless we are prepared to revise the whole Constitution and reduce its principles to a code, either the attempt to carry on the government with one responsible Cabinet or with two Cabinets, one Imperial and the other British, would land us in confusion. If, indeed, we are ready to undertake this task, the better course would be to divide the United Kingdom into four states or provinces, and convert the Imperial Parliament into a Legislature with limited powers, either consisting of delegations from the provincial legislatures, or of members directly elected.

The only practical course for securing the attendance of members representing Ireland at Westminster that avoids the inconveniences mentioned above seems to be to provide for a delegation from the Irish legislative body to the House of Commons. It is submitted that such a delegation should be constituted on the following general principles :

(I.) Its numbers should not be so large as to give it a controlling voice when there is a very considerable disparity between the strength of the English parties.

(II.) Its members should be elected by the Irish Legislature, and not directly by the people. Whether they should or should not be members of the Irish body might be left to the discretion of that House.

(III.) In the mode of their election means should be provided for making it representative of the whole Irish Legislature, and not of a party only.

(IV.) The members of the delegation should not have the right of interrogating Ministers on matters relating solely to Great Britain; and the Speaker of the House of Commons (in case of any dispute) should decide whether a proposed question is or is not on a matter relating solely to Great Britain.

(V.) The members of the delegation should not have the right of taking part in any debate on matters relating exclusively to Great Britain, or voting in a division on any motion relating exclusively to Great Britain, or on any Bill applying only to Great Britain, except money Bills, as to which special rules should be settled.

(VI.) In case any dispute arose as to whether on a motion or resolution the members of the delegation had a right to speak and vote, the Speaker might be given power to decide it, subject to an appeal without debate to the House. As to Bills, no dispute could well arise as to whether they applied only to Great Britain. As to the financial votes and proceedings of the House, which follow each session in a fairly regular course, a list of the matters on which the members of the delegation should be allowed to intervene should be settled; and in case of any dispute the Speaker should decide it, subject to an immediate appeal to the House or the Committee of the whole House.

* Since the Act of Union, all Acts of Parliament extend to Ireland, whether expressly mentioned or not; unless that part of the Kingdom be expressly, or by necessary implication, excepted.-Dwarris, Statutes, second edition, p. 526.

It should also be provided that if the Speaker's decision on the right of a member of the delegation to speak or vote be challenged, and the majority of the House or Committee is against his ruling, such a reversal of his decision should not be deemed a vote of want of confidence.

The attendance of a delegation thus constituted would preserve an evident connection between the Imperial Parliament and the Irish Legislature, and effectually get rid of the notion that Ireland was no longer subject to its sovereignty, while the evils of the existing situation would probably be entirely remedied.

§ 9. ALTERNATIVE SCHEMES.

Many of the opponents of Mr. Gladstone's scheme have talked of it as if it were a plan sui generis-as if a government with very extensive powers could easily be created by a method totally different and on lines wholly distinct.

It is, of course, necessary to distinguish between local government and Home Rule. The true antithesis of local government is not supreme government, but central government, and such central government may or may not be supreme. A central government, whatever its form, cannot discharge all its functions itself, however small it makes the sphere of its interference; some of the business to be done must be delegated to

individuals or bodies of citizens, with power to transacit over a limited area. The bodies (whether elected or not) that transact the business of local government are of course always to some extent controlled by the central authority. The more numerous the duties devolved on the local bodies, and the less extensive the control exercised over them, the less centralised is the administration. In Ireland the control over local government is exercised by the Lord-Lieutenant, his Chief Secretary, a Local Government Board, a Board of Public Works, a Prison Board, a Board of National Education, and a staff of permanent officials. The executive work thus performed might be, no doubt, transferred to a national council elected by the Irish people; but that would not be giving Home Rule, and it would be open to all the objections that arise to any plan involving the appointing of executive functionaries by popular election. No reform of local government, and no transfer of the control over local government, amounts to Home Rule. By that term the Nationalist party obviously mean a central government subordinate to the Imperial Parliament, with powers of legislative control over all the matters that may be fairly described as not affairs of Imperial concern, including the subjects usually classified by lawyers as coming within the domain of private as opposed to public law.*

* See e.g. Holland, "Jurisprudence,” pp. 79 and 245 et seq., as to this distinction. Professor Holland places under the head Public Law, (1) Con