these provisions with the scheme of the rejected Bill, to understand Mr. Chamberlain's position. In some respects the power of the Imperial Government over Ireland, according to the proposed scheme, would be greater than that of the Dominion Government over the provincial governments under the Act of 1867; and why the former power should be said to be secured by "a paper guarantee" while the latter is "so defined and limited" that its "improper exercise" can be prevented by means "less violent, less extreme than an armed force," is not intelligible.

§ 10. LORD HARTINGTON'S CONDITIONS,

Lord Hartington has not put forward any definite scheme for the settlement of Irish affairs; and it is doubtful from his speeches whether he is prepared to assent to anything more than some extension of the sphere of local government in Ireland. He has, however, laid down four conditions to which any plan hẹ is prepared to accept must conform. They are as follows:

"1. Parliament ought to continue to represent the whole and not merely a part of the United Kingdom. 2. The powers which may be conferred on subordinate local bodies should be delegated-not surrenderedby Parliament. 3. The subjects to be delegated should be clearly defined, and the right of Parliament

to control and revise the action of subordinate legislative or administrative authorities should be equally clearly reserved. 4. The administration of justice ought to remain in the hands of an authority which is responsible to Parliament."

There is about this statement an air of precision, but very slight examination of the third and fourth conditions will show that they at any rate are ambiguous. The first of course was not complied with by Mr. Gladstone's Bill, as the entire exclusion of the Irish members was proposed. It is conceived that the distinction which Lord Hartington draws between the delegation and the surrender of powers is this-delegated powers may be revoked and lawfully resumed at any time by the Government conferring them, at its own sole pleasure, while surrendered powers can only be lawfully withdrawn with the consent of the authority to whom the surrender is made. Or, to put the opposition between delegation and surrender in another the effect of delegating powers is to create a subordinate government, and the effect of surrendering powers is to make the government to whom they are so given co-ordinate. If Lord Hartington's meaning is rightly seized, then on the principles explained above, this condition was fulfilled by the Bill brought forward in the last Parliament; and the legislature of Ireland would according to it have only possessed delegated powers, just as the legislature of Victoria has only a delegated authority.

way,

The third condition is really twofold; for the clear definition of the subjects to be delegated, and the clear reservation of the right of Parliament to control and revise the action of subordinate bodies, are distinguishable. The definition of the subjects to be delegated, so far as the legislative authority of a subordinate government is concerned, may be effected (i.) by excepting certain classes of subjects from its control, (ii.) by affirmative formulation of the subjects on which it may legislate, and (iii.) by providing that the laws which it may pass as to anything within its sphere shall not contradict some general principle or violate some condition, or (iv.) by a combination of these processes. By the Government of Ireland Bill, 1886, the limitation of the powers of the proposed Legislature was effected by the first and third of these methods. By section 3 a number of matters, classified under thirteen heads, were excepted from its authority; by section 4 the proposed Legislature was restricted from making laws even as to the subjects coming within the sphere of its power which might contravene the principles laid down in that section. If any one is willing to give to Ireland a Parliament which shall have power to deal with all exclusively Irish affairs, there seems little reason to object to the mode of limiting its powers adopted by the Bill already brought forward. Of course the method of the British North America Act, 1867, might be followed in drawing another Bill—that is, the subjects which are to

be dealt with by the proposed Legislature might be classified under divers general heads; but if the powers to be conferred are to be as wide as those given to the provincial legislatures of the Dominion, very little, if any, additional precision would be secured. Many people seem to imagine that it is possible to define with such clearness the powers of a subordinate lawmaking body, that there can be no dispute as to whether a certain law which may be passed by it is or is not ultra vires. In fact, language is not perfect enough to accomplish such a result. Besides, the further the process of definition is carried the more the discretion of the subordinate body is fettered, and if it is carried beyond a certain point the very object of delegating the legislative power is defeated by the practical withdrawal of all discretion from the subordinate body, and it would be better for the supreme -authority itself to undertake the work of making laws on the delegated subjects.

The strict definition of the subjects to be delegated is not, however, nearly so important as the choice of the subjects themselves, as to which Lord Hartington is silent. The determination of the matters to be delegated to the proposed Irish authority is the very first thing to be done by any one who wishes to form a consistent and practicable scheme. Upon the extent of the powers to be given depends the constitution of the authority, and the best way of drafting a Bill to give effect to the plan. If it is intended to create in

Ireland a council to which some of the subjects coming within the domain of administrative law (e.g., poorlaw, education, public works) are to be delegated, which is not to have power to alter its own constitution or the existing form of local government, then no doubt it would be well to define as specifically as possible the subjects devolved and the power of making laws. But if "Home Rule" in a wide sense is to be conceded, if the creation of a Government which is to have authority to carry on the central and local government of Ireland as to all domestic affairs, and to make laws as to property, contract, and the matters coming under the head private law is contemplated, then it is submitted it is better not to enumerate positively the powers of the Irish Government, but to limit them by the careful reservation of Imperial rights.

Let us now turn to the other branch of Lord Hartington's third condition. If he means, by the clear reservation of the "right of Parliament to control and revise the action of subordinate legislative or administrative authorities," that the Queen in Parliament, or the High Court of Parliament, should retain the power of controlling and revising the actions of an Irish Government by Act of Parliament, then this is simply a reiteration of the second condition, and would be secured in the case of an Irish Parliament established on the lines of Mr. Gladstone's Bill. But it is apprehended that the real signification of this part of the third condition is that Lord Hartington wishes