contrivance of the most ingenious man doth the conceptions of the most ignorant of rational creatures. Therefore we in vain pretend to range things into sorts, and dispose them into certain classes under names, by their real essences, that are so far from our discovery or comprehension. A blind man may as soon sort things by their colours, and he that has lost his smell as well distinguish a lily and a rose by their odours, as by those internal constitutions which he knows not. He that thinks he can distinguish sheep and goats by their real essences, that are unknown to him, may be pleased to try his skill in those species called cassiowary and querechinchio, and by their internal real essences determine the boundaries of those species, without knowing the complex idea of sensible qualities that each of those names stand for, in the countries where those animals are to be found. 10. Not substantial Forms, which we know less.-Those, therefore, who have been taught that the several species of substances had their distinct internal substantial forms; and that it was those forms which made the distinction of substances into their true species and genera, were led yet further out of the way by having their minds set upon fruitless inquiries, after substantial forms, wholly unintelligible, and whereof we have scarce so much as any obscure or confused conception in general. 11. That the nominal Essence is that whereby we distinguish Species, further evident from Spirits.-That our ranking and distinguishing natural substances into species consists in the nominal essences the mind makes, and not in the real essences to be found in the things themselves, is further evident from our ideas of spirits; for the mind getting only by reflecting on its own operations those simple ideas which it attributes to spirits, it hath or can have no other notion of spirit but by attributing all those operations it finds in itself to a sort of beings, without consideration of matter. And even the most advanced notion we have of God is but attributing the same simple ideas which we have got from reflection on what we find in ourselves, and which we conceive to have more perfection in them than would be in their absence; attributing, I say, those simple ideas to him in an unlimited degree. Thus, having got from reflecting on our selves the idea of existence, knowledge, power, and pleasure -each of which we find it better to have than to want; and the more we have of each the better-joining all these together, with infinity to each of them, we have the complex idea of an eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, infinitely wise and happy being. And though we are told that there are different species of angels; yet we know not how to frame distinct specific ideas of them: /not out of any conceit that the existence of more species than one of spirits is impossible, but because having no more simple ideas (nor being able to frame more) applicable to such beings, but only those few taken from ourselves, and from the actions of our own minds in thinking, and being delighted, and moving several parts of our bodies, we can no otherwise distinguish in our conceptions the several species of spirits one from another, but by attributing those operations and powers we find in ourselves to them in a higher or lower degree; and so have no very distinct specific ideas of spirits, except only of God, to whom we attribute both duration and all those other ideas with infinity; to the other spirits, with limitation Nor, as I humbly conceive, do we, between God and the in our ideas, put any difference by any number of simple ideas which we have of one and not of the other, but only that of infinity.* All the particular ideas of existence, knowledge, will, power, and motion, &c., being ideas derived from the operations of our minds, we attribute all of them to all sorts of spirits, with the difference only of degrees, to the utmost we can imagine, even infinity, when we would frame as well as we can an idea of the first being; who yet, it is certain, is infinitely more remote, in the real excellency of his nature, from the highest and perfectest of all created Hence the employment of angels as agents in poetry always proves a cold and lifeless contrivance, compared, at least, with the introduction of human actors. We can scarcely be made to sympathize with natures entirely unknown to us; and it is only by regarding God as the author of our existence, as our great parent, that we can be said actually to love him. He is to us what a father is to the child who has never seen him. Our own existence proves his-our intelligence his wisdom-our happiness his goodness-our afflictions the existence of sin, and the necessity of chastisement. We can therefore love God with an affectionate love, with a love which constitutes the purest bliss of all who feel it. But of angels we know nothing.-ED. beings, than the greatest man, nay, purest seraph, is from the most contemptible part of matter; and consequently must infinitely exceed what our narrow understandings can conceive of him. 12. Whereof there are probably numberless Species. It is not impossible to conceive nor repugnant to reason, that there may be many species of spirits, as much separated and diversified one from another by distinct properties whereof we have no ideas, as the species of sensible things are distinguished one from another by qualities which we know and observe in them. That there should be more species of intelligent creatures above us than there are of sensible and material below us, is probable to me from hence, that in all the visible corporeal world, we see no chasms or gaps.*/ All quite down from us the descent is by easy steps, and a continued series of things, that in each remove differ very little one from the other. There are fishes that have wings, and are not strangers to the airy region; and there are some birds that are inhabitants of the water whose blood is cold as fishes, and their flesh so like in taste, that the scrupulous are allowed them on fish-days. There are animals so near of kin both to birds and beasts that they are in the middle between both: amphibious animals link the terrestrial and aquatic together; seals live at land and sea, and porpoises have the warm blood and entrails of a hog, not to mention what is confidently reported of mermaids, or sea-men. There are some brutes that seem to have as much knowledge and * Pope has clothed this opinion with exquisite versification; and, in itself, it is not, though a mere conjecture, inconsistent with philosophy. It will, however, occur to every man, that between the highest of created beings and his Creator, there must always be an infinite gap. The very terms Creator and created suggest thus much. However, Pope escapes all difficulties by the brevity of his exposition, which will admit of more than one interpretation: VOL. II. "See, through this air, this ocean, and this earth, Beast, bird, fish, insect, what no eye can see, From thee to nothing."-ESSAY ON MAN, 1. § 8.-ED. E reason as some that are called men; and the animal and vegetable kingdoms are so nearly joined, that, if you will take the lowest of one and the highest of the other, there will scarce be perceived any great difference between them; and so on, till we come to the lowest and the most inorganical parts of matter, we shall find everywhere that the several species are linked together, and differ but in almost insensible degrees. And when we consider the infinite power and wisdom of the Maker, we have reason to think that it is suitable to the magnificent harmony of the universe, and the great design and infinite goodness of the Architect, that the species of creatures should also, by gentle degrees, ascend upward from us toward his infinite perfection, as we see they gradually descend from us downwards: which if it be probable, we have reason then to be persuaded that there are far more species of creatures above us than there are beneath: we being, in degrees of perfection, much more remote from the infinite being of God than we are from the lowest state of being, and that which approaches nearest to nothing. And yet, of all those distinct species for the reasons abovesaid, we have no clear distinct ideas. 13. The nominal Essence that of the Species, proved from Water and Ice.-But to return to the species of corporeal substances. If I should ask any one whether ice and water were two distinct species of things, I doubt not but I should be answered in the affirmative: and it cannot be denied but he that says they are two distinct species is in the right. But if an Englishman bred in Jamaica, who perhaps had never seen nor heard of ice, coming into England in the winter, find the water he put in his basin at night in a great part frozen in the morning, and, not knowing any peculiar name it had, should call it hardened water; I ask whether this would be a new species to him different from water? And I think it would be answered here, it would not be to him a new species, no more than congealed jelly, when it is cold, is a distinct species from the same jelly fluid and warm; or than liquid gold in the furnace is a distinct species from hard gold in the hands of a workman. And if this be so, it is plain that our distinct species are nothing but distinct complex ideas, with distinct names annexed to them. It is true every substance that exists has its peculiar constitution, whereon depend those sensible qualities and powers we observe in it; but the ranking of things into species (which is nothing but sorting them under several titles) is done by us according to the ideas that we have of them: which, though sufficient to distinguish them by names, so that we may be able to discourse of them when we have them not present before us; yet if we suppose it to be done by their real internal constitutions, and that things existing are distinguished by nature into species by real essences, according as we distinguish them into species by names, we shall be liable to great mistakes. 14. Difficulties against a certain Number of real Essences.To distinguish substantial beings into species, according to the usual supposition, that there are certain precise essences or forms of things, whereby all the individuals existing are by nature distinguished into species, these things are necessary : 15. First, to be assured that nature in the production of things always designs them to partake of certain regulated established essences, which are to be the models of all things to be produced. This, in that crude sense it is usually proposed, would need some better explication before it can fully be assented to. 16. Secondly, It would be necessary to know whether nature always attains that essence it designs in the production of things. The irregular and monstrous births, that in divers sorts of animals have been observed, will always give us reason to doubt of one or both of these. 17. Thirdly, It ought to be determined whether those we call monsters be really a distinct species, according to the scholastic notion of the word species; since it is certain that everything that exists has its particular constitution: and yet we find that some of these monstrous productions have few or none of those qualities which are supposed to result from, and accompany the essence of that species from whence they derive their originals, and to which, by their descent, they seem to belong. 18. Our nominal Essences of Substances not perfect Collections of Properties.-Fourthly, The real essences of those things which we distinguish into species, and as so distinguished we name, ought to be known; i. e., we ought to have ideas of them. But since we are ignorant in these four |