through articulating organs capable of producing almost infinite combinations and variations. Place two human beings, thus constituted, in a state like that of Eden, and in a month's time, by using ejaculatory and imitative utterances, and mutually agreeing, as they necessarily would do, to associate certain ideas with certain of these, they would form a primitive language, which both could understand; and a number of their words, too, would probably not be wholly dissimilar in either sound or sense to some that we use to-day.

This fact of agreement, just mentioned, is undoubtedly the most important of the elements causing sounds to become words with definite meanings. But in the present discussion, it is important to notice that, in the beginning, there were the best of reasons for this agreement; the signs used actually represented the things signified; they were like them or allied to them; they compared with them or were associated with them, and that, too, in a natural and not, as is the case with words originated later, in an arbitrary way. Without any agreement at all, an ejaculatory or imitative word would have some meaning, and this a meaning similar to the one ultimately assigned to it by common consent.

Were we dealing with language here for its own sake, it would be in place now to pass on from these earlier sounds, originated in order to represent thought, to the consideration of the same after they have been originated and are used over again in order to represent other and different thoughts. This would introduce us into a sphere where we should find the great majority of words in all vocabularies. But we must defer any reference to these at present. Our object now is to find the connection between representation in natural and in artistic

through articulating organs capable of producing almost infinite combinations and variations. Place two human beings, thus constituted, in a state like that of Eden, and in a month's time, by using ejaculatory and imitative utterances, and mutually agreeing, as they necessarily would do, to associate certain ideas with certain of these, they would form a primitive language, which both could understand; and a number of their words, too, would probably not be wholly dissimilar in either sound or sense to some that we use to-day.

This fact of agreement, just mentioned, is undoubtedly the most important of the elements causing sounds to become words with definite meanings. But in the present discussion, it is important to notice that, in the beginning, there were the best of reasons for this agreement; the signs used actually represented the things signified; they were like them or allied to them; they compared with them or were associated with them, and that, too, in a natural and not, as is the case with words originated later, in an arbitrary way. Without any agreement at all, an ejaculatory or imitative word would have some meaning, and this a meaning similar to the one ultimately assigned to it by common consent.

Were we dealing with language here for its own sake, it would be in place now to pass on from these earlier sounds, originated in order to represent thought, to the consideration of the same after they have been originated and are used over again in order to represent other and different thoughts. This would introduce us into a we should find the great majority of words. ries. But we must defer any reference to t. Our

ct now is to find the connec

in natural and in artistic

language; and, before we go further, it will be best to apply at once what has been noticed with reference to the representation of thought in sound, to its representation in those features of poetic form which depend upon sound.

So far, we have been examining how ideas can be represented in single words. But ideas, when conceived in the mind, are in constant movement. To be represented completely, they must be expressed by words, not standing alone, but following one another in the order of time. Possibly, it is because we usually hear them in this order, that most of us are inclined to give credence to the ejaculatory and imitative theories with reference to their origin. For, whatever may be true of words used separately, it is a fact that, even aside from the conventional meanings ordinarily attached to them, intonations, such as can be given only in the movements of consecutive speech, have a significance. When Bridget, according to a familiar story, was sent to the neighbors to inquire how old Mrs. Jones was, she emphasized the old, and paused after it, and so gave irreparable offence. Her tones represented an idea which the mere words of the message confided to her had not been intended to convey.

These intonations, as will be noticed, are representative of movement on the part of ideas. Movement is a result of the instinctive tendency, which, carried to an extreme, as in great physical passion, ends in explosion. Ideas result from the reflective tendency, which, carried to an extreme, as in the profoundest thought, ends in absolute cessation of movement, or quietness. The intonations result from the blending and balancing of both of these tendencies. But now, whenever the results of reflection are added to those of instinct, or of instinct to those

of reflection; whenever neither one of these elements alone is present but both together are found in an expression, this, in distinction from either instinctive or reflective, is what we may term emotive. A man, for instance, may eat and sleep like an animal, instinctively, or he may think and talk reflectively, without giving any expression to what we mean by emotion. But as soon as he thinks and talks in connection with eating and sleeping, as is the case with a caterer or an upholsterer, an hotel-keeper or a housewife; or as soon as his instincts prompt and accentuate his thinking and talking, as is the case with an actor or a good story-teller, then, as a result of instinct made. thoughtful, or of thought made instinctive, he begins to manifest his emotive nature, and the character of his emotion is represented by the degree in which the one or the other of the two tendencies influencing him is in

excess.

We may arrive at this same conclusion through a different method. That which blends and balances the instinctive or physical and the reflective or mental tendencies, is the soul, holding body and mind together, influencing and influenced by both. But as the intonations result from the blending and balancing of these same tendencies as manifested in language, we may say that the intonations represent not only the emotive nature, as has been shown, but also the soul. Is it, then, the same thing to put emotion into an expression and to put soul into it? Ninety-nine persons out of every hundred will acknowledge that, according to their ordinary conceptions, it is. And our line of thought here will show that, in this case, ordinary conceptions are right. No one can give expression to his emotive nature without representing a blended result of nerve and thought, of instinct and reflection.