Personal Identity: Volume 22, Part 2Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred Dycus Miller, Jeffrey Paul What is a person? What makes me the same person today that I was yesterday or will be tomorrow? Philosophers have long pondered these questions. In Plato's Symposium, Socrates observed that all of us are constantly undergoing change: we experience physical changes to our bodies, as well as changes in our 'manners, customs, opinions, desires, pleasures, pains, [and] fears'. Aristotle theorized that there must be some underlying 'substratum' that remains the same even as we undergo these changes. John Locke rejected Aristotle's view and reformulated the problem of personal identity in his own way: is a person a physical organism that persists through time, or is a person identified by the persistence of psychological states, by memory? These essays - written by prominent philosophers and legal and economic theorists - offer valuable insights into the nature of personal identity and its implications for morality and public policy. |
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... Self - Ownership 28 100 70 MARVIN BELZER Self - Conception and Personal Identity : Revisiting Parfit and Lewis with an Eye on the Grip of the Unity Reaction 126 DAVID COPP The Normativity of Self - Grounded Reason 165 JENNIFER ROBACK ...
... Self - Ownership 28 100 70 MARVIN BELZER Self - Conception and Personal Identity : Revisiting Parfit and Lewis with an Eye on the Grip of the Unity Reaction 126 DAVID COPP The Normativity of Self - Grounded Reason 165 JENNIFER ROBACK ...
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action agency animal Aquinas argue argument autonomy behavior believe biological body brain Cambridge capacity Cartesian Cartesian dualism choice Christine Korsgaard claim cloning concept connectedness consciousness constitution view David Derek Parfit discussion disorder distinct dualism embryo enhancement entities essay example existence fact fetus first-person perspective fission future genetic Homo economicus human organism human person hylemorphic Ibid idea immaterial important individual intentions John Finnis Korsgaard least Lewis matters in survival means mental metaphysical Michael Bratman moral nature Normativity object one's oneself ontological Oxford Parfit personal identity Philosophy philosophy of mind physical policies postmortem survival preferences problem properties question R₁ rational agents Reasons and Persons reductionist relation relevant require rudimentary first-person perspective seems self-governing self-ownership self-unity sense simply someone soul stages substance substance dualism substantial form suppose technological theory thesis things Thomistic tion trait change unity reaction University Press values standard virtue