1. Where a defendant in an
attachment is brought be-
fore a Magistrate, not by
a levy on his property,
but by summoning a gar-
nishee, no advertisement
or notice in writing is re-
quired. Parker v. Gil-
reath,
400
2. An attachment, served in
the hands of a garnishee
as a debtor, is substantial-
ly an action at law by the
defendant in the attach-
ment, and, therefore, the
plaintiff in the attachment
cannot recover against
the garnishee, in a case
in which the defendant in
the attachment could not
have recovered the same
debt. Patton v. Smith,
438

ATTORNEYS.

Where the condition of a
bond was that A. should
pay to B. and C. attorneys,
one hundred dollars, on
condition that they clear-
ed A. of three suits and
three indictments in the
Superior Court, and A.
was cleared in the Su-
perior Court of all the
cases except one, in which

he was convicted and the
case was taken to the Su-
preme Court, where A.
had to employ another at-
torney, but the judgment
below was reversed, and
A. discharged from the
prosecution; Held, that
B. and C. had substantial-
ly complied with the con-
dition precedent and had
a right to recover from A.
Candler v. Trammell, 125

AUCTION.

1. If A. employ a crier or
auctioneer, to cry proper-
ty at a public auction,
without directing him not
to cry the bid of B., and
B. is the last and highest
bidder and the property
is knocked off to him, then
the contract is complete,
provided B. complies with
the terms of the auction.
Ricks v. Buttle,
269
It is no defence to an ac-
tion by B. against A. for
a breach of this contract,
that A. had previously
told B. his bid should not
be received, unless she so
directed the crier or auc-
tioneer, or unless she ob-
jected at the time of the
bidding and before the
property was knocked off.
Ibid.

2.

3. What is stated by an auc-

tioneer in his advertise-
ment may be explained
by what is said by him at
the time of the sale. Ran-
kin v. Matthews, 286

es.

v. Deming,

BASTARDY.

55

2.

BOND.

262

plied by shewing a deliv
ery to a particular person.
Ibid.

BOUNDARY.

Where a grant called for
certain courses and dis-
tances, and from the last
(the third line.) "thence
No 87 W. 199 poles to a
hickory, thence the courses
of the Swamp to the be-
ginning." Held, that tho'
the distance from the last
corner to the Swamp gave
out nine chains and fifty
links from the Swamp,
and no hickory corner was
to be found, nor was there
any proof of its existence,
yet the line should be ex-
tended to the Swamp and
thence pursue its courses.
McPhaul v. Gilchrist, 169
Held further, that the
declaration of an owner
of the land, that his fourth
line run from the termina-
tion of the distance men-
tioned in the third line,
directly to the beginning,
did not of itself divest him
of his title to the land, ly-
ing between that line and
the Swamp.
Ibid.

When nothing but course
and distance is called for
in a deed, parol evidence
is not admissible, to shew
that a line of marked
trees not called for in the
deed is the true boundary.
Wynne v. Alexander, 237
When one corner is es-
tablished and the course
and distance only given

and the next corner called
for in the deed is also es-
tablished, the line must
run directly from the one
corner to the other, al-2.
though there may be a
line of marked trees be-
tween the corners. but
varying in some places.
from the direct line. Ibid.
5. Nor is it sufficient to
make an exception to this
rule, that the trees were
marked as the line by the
parties, at the time when
the deed was executed
from one to the other.

action of ejectment, in the
name of the State, against
any person in possession.
State v. England, 153
The person, so in posses.
sion, cannot set up as a
defence to this action, that
he had received a deed
from the purchaser, which
had never been registered
but which was alleged to
be lost, or destroyed by an
agent of the purchaser.
Ibid.

Ibid.
6. In a controversy about
boundary, the plaintiff
may give in evidence a
recovery in an ejectment
suit, twenty-five years
ago, by one under whom
the plaintiff claims
gainst the defendant and
the subsequent abandon-
ment by the defendant of
the land now claimed by
the plaintiff. Gilchrist v.1.
McLaughlin,

a-

310

7. Where, in running a line,
another line is called for,
and the distance gives out
before reaching the line
called for, the distance is
to be disregarded. Ibid.

See EJECTMENT.

CHEROKEE LANDS.
1. Under the Acts for the
sale of the Cherokee lands,}
the purchaser has a right,
upon the certificate of his
purchase from the com-2.
missioners, to institute an

CONSTABLES.

Where a constable re-
ceives notes or other evi-
dences of debt, a short
time before his office ex-
pires, and does not collect
them for want of time,
and, after his office ex-
pires, refuses to deliver to
the owner the notes or
other evidences of debt,
so placed in his hands, he
and his sureties on his
official bond are liable to
an action for the amount.
State v. Johnson,
If the constable had con-
tinued in office for another

77

year and the creditor had;
permitted the evidences of
the debt to remain in the
hands of the officer, it
might be evidence of a
new contract of agency,
upon which the sureties
of the second year would
be liable. Ibid.

3. The bonds of constables,

198

who are re-appointed from
year to year, are not
cumulative; and there-
fore sureties of a consta-
ble are only responsible
for breaches committed
during the official year for
which they became his
sureties, tho' at the expira-
tion of the year, he may
have been re-appointed.)
Miller v. Davis,
4. Where the only record of
the appointment and qual
ification of a constable
was in the following 2.
words, to-wit: "James)
R. McMinn appeared in
Court and filed his bond
as constable for the Coun-
ty of Henderson for one
year and was duly sworn."
Held, that, under the Act
of 1844, curing defects in
the official bond of certain
officers therein named, this
was sufficient evidence of
the appointment of the
constable, and of his hav-
ing qualified and given
bond. State v. McMinn,
344

CONTRACT.
1. The plaintiff sold to the
defendant some cattle for
$50. He received from

the defendant a promisso-
ry note for thirty dollars,
payable the first of Jan-
uary, ensuing; and a bank
note for twenty dollars,
which was to be returned,
if not found to be good,
and the defendant was to
have credit until the first
of January. The bank
note was returned as also
the due bill, which was
destroyed by the defen-
dant, who then offered to
pay ten dollars and give
his note with surety for
$40, payable the first of
the next January. The
plaintiff refused to accept
them. Held, that the
plaintiff could not sue the
defendant in a quantum
valebat until after the first
of January. Gudger v.
Fletcher,

372

A due bill, though writ-
ten with a pencil and not
in ink, if legible, is good.

Ibid.