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short time, to relinquish the chair in which he did such devoted service-service, now fully appreciated, but too late. With disappointed hopes, and in broken health, he shrank from essaying anew work which he considered a failure, and in particular from preparing for publication the materials of his past lectures. Hence, in spite of the rare ability of his widow and editor, the works of Austin necessarily come to us in a brief incomplete form, and present an appearance of dogmatism very alien to the humility of the real genius that produced them. This form appears to have blinded many students of Austin, to the spirit. I find him 'got up' like an analysis, and with as little good to the getter up as ever accrues from any analysis: his somewhat abrupt dicta are alleged-almost (like Coke's reports) without citation of the name of their author—as final truth beyond the region of discussion: his terminology confronts us in capitals, like the laws of the Twelve Tables. Such a servile following would not have been by any means to the taste of this eminently fair-minded man, who above all things courted close examination. Least of all would he have tolerated an acquaintance with the once popular jurist, whom he subjected to such unsparing criticism, formed, as it now too often is, merely through the medium of that criticism itself. To counteract this one-sided study of English jurisprudence, I have made it part of my business to take every year some considerable portion of Austin's work, directing careful attention to the previous views which have occasioned his dicta, and investi
gating the practical bearing of the latter upon the life and law of the present day. One of the most important parts of that work is what its author styled an Analysis of Pervading Notions, and, in this analysis, the greatest practical value, according to my view, belongs to the part which deals with the operation of sanctions—notably of criminal sanctions. As this part of Austin's subject is, moreover, easily separated from the rest, I have for some time given it a separate, and rather special, consideration. Such a consideration is also
. suggested and facilitated by the recent and most valuable contributions of Sir James Stephen to the scientific knowledge and the reform of our own criminal law. To the 'General View' the Digest' and the proposed Code,' of this author, I am, as will be seen, deeply and continually indebted. Towards the practical work of reform in which he and others are at present engaged, it would almost be impertinent in a student to offer his suggestions. For he can scarcely fail to intrude, into a consideration of the actual and possible, some a priori view or ideal which cannot be entertained by the working legal reformer. It has however been my continual endeavour to render my work as little speculative as possible, by confining myself within such opinions, aims, and sentiments as I take to be generally admitted: to make the jurist, in fact, what he should be, in such an eminently practical matter as criminal law, merely an exponent of the feelings of ordinary men. I have, therefore, tried to reduce enquiries, which might otherwise stray any lengths through the domain
of psychology and metaphysics, to such plain points and questions as would seem natural and fitting, to be put by a judge before a jury.
The principles and illustrations employed are mainly drawn from English Law; but I have not, of course, omitted anything which was to be found in the Corpus Juris, bearing upon my subject: and I am not without hope that I may subsequently enlarge this work by comparing some of the rules, of principle or practice, in bodies of modern continental law. Reserving, however, such a treatment of my subject for the future, I have at present purposely avoided the quotation of many parallels, which will probably occur to my readers, from the Code Napoléon or similar sources.
In point of style, I have to apologize for a use of the first person, which certainly does not indicate any egotistical value placed on the matter published, but is an almost unavoidable result of that matter having been originally cast in the form of lectures. For convenience of reference, I append a list of such of the works quoted as may vary in edition or mode of citation.
Austin's Jurisprudence. Third edition. 1869.
tion. (Clarendon Press.) 1879. Bentham's Theory of Legislation, translated from the French of
Dumont by R. Hildreth. 1864. Bentham's Works. (Bowring.) 1843. Blackstone's Commentaries (Int. Introduction), with the original
paging (printed in the margin of Chitty's edition).
Bracton. Paging of Tottell's edition. 1569.
mittee. 1879. Coke's Institutes. (1. Commentary on Littleton: 2. Exposition
of Statutes: 3. Pleas of the crown: 4. Jurisdiction of Courts),
with the chapters and the old paging. Foster.
Report and Discourses. 1762. Hale. Pleas of the Crown. Chapters and old paging. Hobbes. Leviathan. 1651. Markby. Elements of Law, &c. Second edition. 1874. Maudsley. Responsibility in Mental Disease. (International
Scientific Series.) 1874. Russell. On Crimes and Misdemeanours. Fifth Edition. Skeat. Etymological Dictionary of the English language. (In
course of publication.) Stephen. (G. V.) A general view of the Criminal law of England,
by James FitzJames Stephen. 1863. Stephen. (Digest.) A Digest of the Criminal Law, by Sir
James FitzJames Stephen. 1877. Also see Code. Taylor. Manual of Medical Jurisprudence. Tenth edition. 1879. Taylor (P. P.). Principles and Practice of Medical Jurisprudence.
Second edition. 1873.