CHAPTER III.

THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED: FROM THE FIFTH CENTURY TO THE TIMES OF MR. HOBBES.

Up to the commencement of the sixth century, the philosophical opinions of Plato, and the system of the Gnostics, had exercised an almost undivided sway over the minds of the Christian fathers and doctors of the church. The doctrines of Aristotle had hitherto never been able to gain any thing like popularity; for the expounding of them was confined within very limited bounds indeed. A change, however, took place at this period, which produced very considerable effects upon the general nature of doctrinal religion and theoretical morality. The Emperor Justinian published, at Athens, an edict against all philosophy, which was supposed to be exclusively levelled against the modern system of Platonism, then very popular, but to which he

seemed to have a great dislike.

In consequence of

this edict, the learned all fled into Persia, which was, at that time, at war with the Roman empire; and though the majority of them returned when peace between the two states was effected, in A. D. 533, yet the temporary absence of these teachers of the people had produced a coldness and unconcern towards their philosophical tenets, which all their subsequent efforts to regain their former popularity were unable to remove.

It may be necessary to apprise the general readers here, that by the system of Aristotle is meant only one part of his very numerous writings, namely that on logic, or the art of reasoning. This was considered as an important instrument for the discovery and propagation of truth. It would be altogether out of place here to give even any thing like an outline of this system of logic; but it may be briefly mentioned, in passing, that the leading principle of it was founded upon the presumed importance of the various forms in which the syllogism may be used in all our reasonings, especially on abstract and subtile questions. There has a great deal been written, even in modern times, on the merits of this part of the philosophy of Aristotle. By some it has been totally and unceremoniously

D

condemned; and by others it has been praised and considered useful. However, it is not for us to decide this important and keenly contested question; it will be sufficient to point out some of the prominent effects its exclusive cultivation had upon the minds of the learned for some centuries while it was held in estimation.

The Platonic and eastern systems of philosophy having been thus nearly driven off the field, and the learned having yielded an implicit obedience to the dictation of the Stagirite, they gave themselves up to nothing but contentious wrangling, which the perplexing subtilties necessarily connected with his logic, and the nature of the subjects of inquiry to which it was applied, were so well fitted to foster and perpetuate. It began to be taught almost universally in all the public schools and seminaries of learning; and it soon began to yield a plentiful harvest of its natural fruits-verbal quibbles, and endless sophistries. The general principles of natural and revealed religion, and moral science, became ingulfed in an accumulation of words without meaning, and in subtile and trifling distinctions on points of no earthly consequence whatever. The faculty of reason in men became darkened, and their moral sense blunted, by those incessant

wranglings and disputes; and every thing like correct notions on the nature and obligations of virtue, was, century after century, fast wearing away from the minds of both the learned and the unlearned.

Among the many ridiculous and unprofitable disputes which engaged the learned in these ages, it will be necessary we should here allude to the famous controversy which arose about the middle of the eleventh century, out of the abstruse subtilties of the Aristotelian philosophy. This controversy raged with great fierceness between the two contending parties, the Realists, and the Nominalists; and the reason for its being more particularly mentioned here is, that it generally finds a place every academical course of lectures on moral subjects; and though not possessing such intrinsic me

in

rits as to entitle it to much attention, yet it has some claims to the notice of the moral student. Besides, the controversy has not been without its influence, even in modern times, over the speculations of several moral writers, who have embraced, in some cases, quite opposite theories; but the nature and degree of this influence cannot be pointed out at any length in this place.

It was laid down as a maxim in the school logic, that all our reasonings related to universal ideas;

that these were the objects or materials on which we exercised our reason; that particular things were liable to change, and could not therefore be permanent objects for immutable conclusions; but that the relations which subsisted between universals afforded

the proper objects for logic. But the difficulty which was started was, whether these universal ideas, which were the elements of ratiocination, were real objects, or only verbal denominations given to certain things or notions. One party maintained that they were real objects; for if they were not real, then it would obviously follow that we would always be reasoning about matters which had no solid foundation. The other party as stoutly denied the reality of these universal ideas, and affirmed they were only words or denominations arbitrarily given to certain classes of thoughts or objects. The one party were denominated Realists, and the other Nominalists. The most celebrated writers of the former party at different periods of this dispute were, Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, and Duns Scotus; and of the latter the famous but unfortunate Abelard, Occam, &c. This controversy excited such attention, that even popes and monarchs engaged themselves in it. The university of Paris published an edict, in which