again preferred the places in Normandy or Britany whence they had arrived; thus, if a man came from a village called Vernon, Montague, Howard, or Spencer, he transmitted to his posterity the surname of Vernon, Montague, Howard, or Spencer, to be put after their Christian names, so long as any of them should remain. from a want of knowledge of the English language, to give your own judgment on my Essay. You add, that you do not controvert my tenets, but the evil consequences deducible from them, and the maxims which some persons of notable sagacity have imagined that they have discovered in my Poem. This declaration is a shining proof of your candour, your discre On the Religious Sentiments of Mr. tion, and your charity. I must take Pope. MR. EDITOR, SIR, After Mr. Pope had published his Essay on Man, he was considered, by many of his readers, as an advocate for Deism. The younger Racine, a celebrated French writer, had frequently heard persons deduce consequences, from some of the principles inculcated in this Essay, unfavourable to revealed religion. This induced him to notice that work, in his Poem on Religion, in a way not very congenial to the feelings of the poet. His allusions gave birth to the following letter; in which, Mr. Pope distinctly disavows the opinions imputed to him, and declares his faith to be in perfect accordance with that of Mr. Pascal, and the Archbishop of Cambray; two learned and pious Roman Catholics. As the readers of his Essay, are by far more numerous than the readers of his Letters; so, I believe, the number of persons who rank him with deists, greatly exceeds those who class him with the believers in Christianity. If you are of opinion, that this letter, with the remarks annexed, are calculated to exhibit a correct view of the Bard's real religious sentiments, their insertion will oblige, Sir, 66 Your's, respectfully, OBSERVER. leave to assure you, Sir, that your unacquaintance with the original, has not proved more fatal to me, than the imperfect conceptions of my translators, who have not sufficiently informed themselves of my real sentiments. The many additional embellishments which my piece has received from the version of M. D. R-, have not done an honour to the Essay on Man, equal to the prejudice it has suffered from his frequent misapprehension of the principles it inculcates. These mistakes, you will perceive, are totally refuted in the English piece which I have transmitted to you. It is a critical and philosophic commentary, written by the learned author of the Divine Legation of Moses. I flatter myself that the Chevalier Ramsay will, from his zeal for truth, take the trouble to explain the contents of it. I shall then persuade myself, that your suspicions will be effaced, and I shall have no appeal from your candour and justice. In the mean time, I shall not hesitate to declare myself very cordially in regard to some particulars about which you have desired an answer. I must avow, then, openly and sincerely, that my principles are diametrically opposite to the sentiments of Spinoza and Leibnitz; they are perfectly coincident with Mr. Pascal and the Archbishop of Cambray; and I shall always esteem it an honour to me, to imitate the moderation with which the latter submitted his private opinions to the decision of the Church of which he professed himself a member. SIR, The expectation in which I have been for some time past, of receiving the present you have honoured me with, was the occasion of my delay- "I have the honour to be, &c. ing so long to answer your letter. I am "A. POPE." at length favoured with your Poem on As Mr. R. was but imperfectly acReligion; and should have received quainted with the English language, from the perusal of it, a pleasure un- this letter was quite satisfactory, and mixed with pain, had I not the mortifi-produced a polite apology for his supcation to find, that you impute several posed mistake. His answer concludes principles to me, which I abhor and thus: "* The respect you avow for the detest. My uneasiness met some alleviation from a passage in your preface, where you declare your inability, Pope's Works, vol. 3, p. 89, 90, 91.-London edition, printed by Cavil, Martin, &c. 1795. 833 On the Religious Sentiments of Mr. Pope. says, 834 "All are but parts of one stupendous whole, Whose body nature is, and God the soul." And, religion you profess, is a sufficient vin- | And pursuing the same subject he dication of your doctrine. I will add, that, for the future, those among us who shall feel the laudable ambition of making their poetry subservient to religion, ought to take you for their model; and it should ever be remembered, that the greatest poet in England is one of the humblest sons of the Church!!!" From Mr. Pope's letter, it is evident that he was suspected, by his foreign correspondent, to have given some countenance to the peculiar tenets of Spinoza or Leibnitz; and as some parts of the Essay on Man obviously favour these tenets, it probably appears very remarkable to some of your readers, that this writer directly opposed those principles which he professes to believe, and maintained those which he pretends to abhor and detest. That he has advocated the opinions of Spinoza and Leibnitz, will plainly appear, by comparing a brief statement of their schemes, with a few passages from the Essay. The chief articles in Spinoza's system are reducible to these: That there is but one substance in nature, and that this only substance is endued with an infinite number of attributes, among which are extension and cogitation: That all the bodies in the universe are modifications of this substance considered as extended; and that all the souls of men are modifications of the same substance considered as cogitative: That God is a necessary and an infinitely perfect being, and is the cause of all things that exist, but is not a different being from them: That there is but one being and one nature, and that this nature produces within itself, by an immanent act, all those which we call creatures: And that this being is, at the same time, both agent and patient, efficient cause and subject; but that he produces nothing but modifications of himself. Howard's Encyclopedia, article Spinoza.-What says Mr. Pope? "See through this air, this ocean, and this All matter quick, and bursting into birth; "To him, no high, no low, no great, no small; He fills, he bounds, connects, and equals all." Ibid. Far different from these are the representations given of the Supreme Being and his works, in the volume of inspiration. In this we are taught that he existed eternally before they were made; and now that they are created, heaven is his throne, and the earth is his foodstool. To huddle God and his creatures into one system, is little short of blasphemy. But the leading feature in Leibnitz's system is more obvious in the Essay on Man, than Spinoza's. According to that philosopher, an infinitely wise being, when creating a system, must necessarily choose the best, and consequently that the present system is the best. Every thing is therefore put as it should be, and nothing could be otherwise than it is.-What is the language of the Poet on this subject? It is as follows, "Of systems possible, if tis confest "All nature is but art unknown to thee; All discord, harmony not understood; And spite of pride, in erring reason's spite, "Know thy own point; this kind, this due degree Of blindness, weakness, heav'n bestows on thee. Submit-in this, or any other sphere, Secure to be as blest as thou canst bear; Safe in the hand of one disposing pow'r, Or in the natal or the mortal hour." This language does not appear to be perfectly coincident" with the declarations of holy writ; according to which, indignation and wrath, tribu 66 lation and anguish, will be upon every soul of man that doeth evil. Perhaps it would be next to impossible to reconcile this amazing inconsistency in the conduct of Mr. P. were it not for the following fact, recorded in Boswell's Life of Johnson. "In the year 1763, Lord Bathurst told us, that the" Essay on Man" was originally composed by Lord Bolingbroke in prose, and that Mr. Pope did no more than put it into verse ;-that he had read Lord B.'s manuscript in his own hand-writing; and was at a loss whether most to admire the elegance of Lord B.'s prose, or the beauty of Pope's version." This, I think, explains the whole mystery, and I shall leave your readers to make their own reflections on the faith and practice of the Poet; and conclude by subjoining the following remarks, from an elegant pen, on the sentiments maintained by Leibnitz, Bolingbroke, and Pope. "That which necessity ordains, necessity justifies. If God be the author of all things, and if there be a sufficient reason why every thing happens as it does; there can be no moral obligation, and there need be no religious motive. It is in vain to worship the Deity as the intelligent governor of the universe; while we believe, that pain, punishment, and torture, all the evils that afflict humanity, and all the crimes that disgrace our nature, were pre-ordained by Omnipotence. Shall we insist then upon such a doctrine? If it be true, miserable indeed is the state of the world; fruitless are the virtues, and indifferent are the vices, of men; vain their hopes for the future, and useless their repentance for the past. When we assert with Leibnitz, Bolingbroke, and Pope, that whatever is, is right, (a doctrine which the first of these writers borrowed from the Stoics,) to what conclusion can we come, unless it be--that there is no evil in the sight of God." On the Prescience of God. MR. EDITOR, SIR, I beg to offer a few observations, through the medium of your valuable Miscellany, on the subject of Divine PRESCIENCE, which I perceive, from the pages of your 13th Number, has been re-agitated by a writer of no common talent. Not to admit that the Divine Being can penetrate contingencies, goes to destroy the harmony of our ideas of infinite power. Of what is called the PHYSICAL nature of the Divine Being, our perceptions of infinite power are the most perfect; nor must we lose sight of that most important maxim of sound philosophy, of reasoning TO what we know imperfectly, FROM what we know upon perfect and satisfactory data. For a Being of infinite power, who pervades duration in a manner incomprehensible to us, to foreknow all events, contingent or otherwise, without influencing by such foreknowledge, these events, through necessity, is so consistent with a JUST idea of such a Being, as to be spontaneously admitted: indeed the contrary supposition argues very considerably in favour of necessity. As what cannot be foreseen, cannot be controlled, we are left, by such an hypothesis, to contemplate what appears to be too inconsistent with the wisdom of God in the moral government of the world, to be admitted, viz. the necessary CONSEQUENCES under ALL circumstances of disastrous and fatal contingencies. In asserting that the Divine Being must, in the regular courses and unerring regulations of Divine Providence, defeat the result of events that have a contingent causation, can elicit but one objection, which, having only an abstract bearing upon the point in question, may be met by an abstract reply. It may be objected, that to control a contingency, amounts simply to a determination that neither result shall take place, one of which would be inevitable. To this I answer,there must be circumstances under which such controlment supposes a knowledge of an inevitable result. For instance; parallel cases in point of circumstances may exist, where the result of EACH may involve such different consequences, as to render one case the subject of Divine controlment, while the OTHER CASE in its consecutive relations, may not only be indifferent to such controlment, but may influence certain results, which it is consistent with the Divine goodness and wisdom to promote. In a future state it will probably constitute a part of the employment of the redeemed, to contemplate the co-operations of Di 837 On the Prescience of God. On the Prescience of God. MR. EDITOR, SIR, Should the following remarks upon the Foreknowledge of God, meet your approbation, their insertion in your Miscellany will oblige, B. 838 not separating in our ideas the extent of possible fatal contingencies, and that aggregate number, who, out of the mass of free agents, are found associated with, or rather absorbing, a portion of such possibilities. As to the question of the freedom of the will, after the Divine Being has given intuitive conviction; the conviction of experience, that the human will is free; it is, to say the least of it, ingratitude in His creatures to deny it such a power-the admission of which solves so many difficulties, and furnishes so ample a commentary upon that sublime truth" God is love." Respecting the primary catastrophe of the fall of man, the circumstances under which that event took place, in reference to the general moral government of God, it is wise to consider as altogether without the limits of speculation. The doctrine, however, of Divine London, April 1, 1820. There must certainly be some mode the moral world, contingent or otherpermission in regard to the events of of the Divine intelligence, by which the wise, a doctrine so implicitly and exextent and variety of all actions are plicitly inculcated in sacred writ, does known, even those that are the result away, if not entirely, at least most raof contingent causes. We call it tionally, with the doctrine of Necessity; FOREKNOWLEDGE, and sometimes as- the Divine Being being perfectly free in sociate such terrible ideas with the His actions. If the procedures of inexpression, as are in fact expressive finite wisdom be referible to an inof little more than our ignorance. The flexibly modified and universal rule, subject is evident too much connected then the circumstance of Divine perwith the mystery of the Divine nature; mission, does not destroy the idea of the and from this fact, we have not the necessary existence of evil in the aggreleast authority to draw any of the ap-gate; such necessary evil will be found parently natural conclusions from the to operate only to a less extent in this Divine foreknowledge, viewed without case, where we suppose the fatal relimitation. It must be the highest pre-sult of numerous contingent events to sumption of a rigid predestinarian to assert, that simple foreknowledge is inconsistent with the absolute freedom of moral actions. be defeated, than upon the presumption of Divine ignorance respecting all such events. This ultimate RULE, however, of infinite wisdom being so It cannot be denied that the existence vastly comprehensive,-having a geof evil is necessary* in the present state neral regard to the Divine government of things. If the Divine Being, however, knows all the modifications of the indirect connections of contingent -surveying remote connections, even good and evil that may result from results, in the vast and reciprocally adPOSSIBLE contingencies, this know-justed machinery of Divine providence, ledge of the individuals who should be associated with some of these POSSIBILITIES, could no more make such a junction individually necessary, than any number of possibilities should be necessary; which would be absurd. Our error in this respect, arises from are considerations which weaken as much as possible the presumptive doctrine of universal Necessity; while, BY A PARITY OF REASONING, the notion of Divine ignorance of contingent events, goes very far to strengthen such necessity. When you consider the action other, of numerous contingent events, and reaction upon the influence of each transpiring remotely within the extended limits of the general connection of things and events; in consequence of 66 of these no Necessarian will deny; and few, I presume, will dare to controvert the second, That the purposes of God are to be considered as eternal, is evident," says Mr. Buck, "for if God be eternal, consequently his purposes must be of equal duration with himself: to suppose otherwise, would be to suppose that there was a time when he was undetermined and mutable; whereas no new determinations or after-thoughts can arise in his mind, Job xxiii. 13, 44." The sentiments conveyed in this quotation, I which the result of numerous disastrous contingencies may be defeated;the connection which many such have, in a scheme of infinite arrangement, wisdom, and order, with similar others, either immediate or remote; I say, the procedure of Divine providence where contingent results may act and react upon each other, either in closely connected, remotely connected, or general consequences, associated with the circumstances of some being permitted and others repressed-will, I think, destroy, more than any other hypothetical considerations, the no-conceive to be in perfect consonance tions of Necessity. ON THE PRESCIENCE OF GOD. Further Remarks on the Prescience of God,―in connection with Z. of Aberdeen, and Bromley. By a Correspondent. Z.'s remarks upon Bromley, on the Prescience of the Deity, col. 273, are brief and subtle, and, I have no reason to doubt, written with a pious intention but his reasoning and deductions are, I conceive, far from being either accurate or profound. He seems to have taken only a partial view of the subject. Hence, he argues from Eph. i. 4.-iii. 11. that it was the fixed and eternal purpose of God, to unite Jews and Gentiles in one church; and infers, that the fall of Adam, which gave occasion for Christ's mission into the world, must have been foreseen as certain: for, if it had not, he remarks, then the fixed purpose of sending Christ into the world might have been thwarted, if man had not fallen, &c.; which is absurd. Now it appears to me clear and evident, both from scripture and reason, that it was the will and purpose of the Deity, that Adam should retain his primitive state of holiness and rectitude: consequently, reasoning upon the above principle, to wit, that whatever is an eternal purpose of the Deity must be foreseen as certain, I may rationally and legitimately conclude, that the continuance of Adam in bis primitive state was also foreseen as certain; which is absurd. The above may be exemplified in the following manner :-by allowing, 1. That all the purposes of the Deity are eternal: 2. That he never acts without design or purpose. The first with the doctrine contained in Z.'s remarks. 1. That all the purposes of the Deity are eternal. 1st. If it was an eternal purpose to provide for man a Saviour, it must have been an eternal purpose to create man; for that which has no existence can have no properties, modes, or relations, necessary or casual. 2dly, If it was an eternal purpose to restore man, it must have been an eternal purpose to make man upright; for such a purpose was essential to man's existence in his primitive state, before he could fall or degenerate. 2. Allowing that the Deity never acts without design or purpose; it follows, that it was his eternal purpose, that man should retain his primitive state, in as much as he gave him a command so to do: "Of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it; for in the day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die." Gen. ii. 17. And that his original state of innocence and purity was the best in which he could be in this world, we have the judgment of the all-wise Creator; for he pronounced him to be not only good, but very good. I am not aware that this was ever predicated of man after the fall; but awfully on the contrary:-" God saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually. And it repented the Lord that he had made man on the earth, and it grieved him at his heart. And the Lord said, I will destroy man whom I have created, from the face of the earth." Gen. vi. 5, 6, 7. From all of which, I think, it may be at least indirectly inferred, that in this particular the design or purpose of the Deity was thwarted. Again, if giving a com |