Justice, Institutions, and Luck: The Site, Ground, and Scope of EqualityKok-Chor Tan addresses three key questions in egalitarian distributive justice: Where does distributive equality matter?; Why does it matter?; And among whom does it matter? He argues for an institutional site for egalitarian justice, and suggests that the mitigation of arbitrariness or luck is the basis for distributive commitments. He also argues that distributive obligations are global in scope, applying between individuals across borders. Tan's objectives are tripartite: to clarify the basis of an institutional approach to justice; to establish luck egalitarianism as an account of the ground of equality; and to realize the global nature of egalitarian justice. The outcome is 'institutional luck egalitarianism'—a new cosmopolitan position on distributive justice. |
Other editions - View all
Justice, Institutions, and Luck: The Site, Ground, and Scope of Equality Kok-Chor Tan Limited preview - 2012 |
Justice, Institutions, and Luck: The Site, Ground, and Scope of Equality Kok-Chor Tan No preview available - 2012 |
Justice, Institutions, and Luck: The Site, Ground, and Scope of Equality Kok-Chor Tan No preview available - 2014 |
Common terms and phrases
accept account of equality argue argument background justice bad luck basic needs basic structure brute luck claim concerned criticism demands of justice democratic egalitarians democratic equality difference principle disadvantages distributive egalitarian distributive equality matters doctor duties Dworkin economic egalitari egalitarian commitments egalitarian default egalitarian justice egalitarian principle entitlements G. A. Cohen global egalitarianism global institutional global justice global luck egalitarian humanitarian incentive provision individuals inequalities institutional approach institutional egalitarianism institutional focus institutional luck egalitarian institutions of society justice and personal Left-libertarianism limited luck and choice luck egalitarian ideal luck egalitarian position luck/choice principle meta-ethical metaphysical morally irrelevant Nagel nationality natural facts objection occupational freedom option luck personal choices personal conduct personal pursuits plausible political presumption principles of justice question Rawls Rawlsian regulated relevant require response rules of institutions Scheffler social cooperation social equality social justice substantive distributive principle talented theory of justice Vallentyne value monism value pluralism worst-off