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ATTEMPT ON ROCHEFORT.

Such was the state of the Empire when consigned to the care of Pitt. Dispossessed of her principal military position in America; of her only harbour in the Mediterranean; driven from the Continent; the seat of empire menaced; her military fame disparaged; the policy no less than the arms of her ancient enemy triumphant in every quarter of the globe. But though politicians were dismayed, the public spirit bore up undaunted under this accumulation of misfortune: and the cry was not for concession or compromise, but for redress of grievances, and the vindication of the national honour.

Ch.

1757

33

against Roche

failure.

The season for active military operations was Expedition far advanced when Pitt came into power. Never- fort. Its theless, immediate measures were taken for relieving the pressure upon the arms of England and of her heroic ally, by an important diversion. Early in September, an expedition sailed for the coast of France, with orders to make a descent upon Rochefort, which contained one of her principal naval magazines. But the enterprize wholly failed, in consequence of the jealousies and misconduct of the officers in command. They had every reason to believe that a prompt attack would find the place comparatively defenceless. Yet the general's chief concern was, in possibility of failure, to secure a safe retreat to the ships; and because the admiral could not undertake to provide for an event, which must always depend upon the winds and waves, instead of an attack, the precious time

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Ch. 1.

1757

Return of the
Fleet.

PUBLIC DISSATISFACTION.

was occupied by councils of war. While these councils were deliberating, preparations for defence were being made; the opportunity was lost, and the fleet sailed homeward, followed by the derision of the foe.

Some critics, whose judgment is formed by the event, have censured this expedition as rash and ill-planned. But according to the better opinion, the scheme was perfectly feasible, and, in fact, must have succeeded, had the general in command acted with promptitude and decision, or even in accordance with his orders. The French monarch, knowing the defenceless condition of the place, took it for granted that it had fallen, as soon as he heard of the projected attack;" and one of the ablest officers of the expedition, one who afterwards achieved the highest professional distinction, expressed his amazement at the infatuation of its leader."

The return of the fleet without having effected their object, or hardly made an attempt towards it, was greeted, as well it might be, with a burst of public indignation. It was affirmed, and extensively believed, even by persons of ordinary intelligence and information, that Mordaunt and Hawke, the general and admiral in command, had acted in pursuance of secret orders, without the knowledge of the responsible minister; and that

Jenkinson to Grenville, Oct. 18, 1751-Grenville Correspondence Rodney to Grenville.

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DUKE OF CUMBERLAND.

the honour and interests of England had been sacrificed on this occasion, as they were by the treaty of Closterseven, to the sole object of purchasing the immunity of Hanover.” But both disasters can be accounted for, without impugning the honour of the officers in command on these occasions. The military incapacity of the Duke of Cumberland was sufficient to mar the prospects of a campaign far more hopeful than that which he directed; but the treacherous and pusillanimous policy, thus attributed to him and to his father, was utterly foreign to the character of the princes of the House of Brunswick. So far from being a party to the evacuation of Germany, the King refused to ratify the treaty under which it had been made; and the duke himself, though the King's favourite son, and admitted to all his counsels, was so much aggrieved by the stern displeasure which he experienced on his return, that he resigned all his appointments and retired from public life.

Ch. 1.

1757

failure at

The failure of the Rochefort expedition may well Cause of be ascribed to the evils of a divided command. Rochefort. But there were other causes, which had long depressed the tone of military intelligence and energy. The system of promotion by seniority, which then obtained in the British service, was not calculated to bring forward merit; and the evasion of responsibility, which characterised the feeble

P Potter to Pitt, Oct. 11th, 1757.-Chatham Correspondence. Horace Walpole to General Conway. Walpole Correspondence.

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Ch. 1,

1757

Plan for recovering Minorca.

PROPOSED CESSION OF GIBRALTAR.

plans and hesitating orders of the government, had taught the routine leaders of our fleets and armies to consult their own safety, by a cautious adherence to the strict line of duty, rather than the pride of their profession and the glory of their country by a more daring course. But the fortunes of the empire were now guided by a statesman who sought for merit wherever it was to be found,' and to whose favour or indulgence the only recommendations were zeal and enterprise in the public service.

Before the failure of the Rochefort expedition, the prompt energy of Pitt had devised a plan for the recovery of that important post which had been wrested from England under circumstances so disgraceful to her arms. He instructed the British minister at Madrid to propose the cession of Gibraltar to Spain, in consideration of her assistance in the recovery of Minorca. The great natural fortress which commands the entrance to the Mediterranean, is, perhaps, the last military possession which a government of the present day would think of relinquishing; but it might have been argued, that it was of little use to command the entrance to the Mediterranean when we did not possess a single harbour or haven in that wide sea; and the necessity of regaining Minorca was a primary and urgent consideration. The able and experienced diplomatist, to whom the treaty was entrusted, was, however, astounded at such a rash

Sir B. Keene.-Chatham Correspondence.

POLICY OF SUCH A MEASURE.

scheme; and, certainly, a more improvident device

never conceived by
Had it been carried
indeed, have been
distant day must

to procure present relief was
the most reckless speculator.
into effect, the object might,
immediately gained, but at no
have been entirely frustrated. To maintain any
possession in waters, our only access to which was
to be at the pleasure of a Power no longer capable
of exercising an independent policy, even if there
had been reason to suppose that such policy would
be in accordance with British interests, was mani-
festly impracticable; the consequence must have
been the conversion of the Mediterranean into a
French lake, the annihilation of our commerce with
the greater part of the European continent, and
the prevention of that direct communication with
our Eastern empire which has so greatly enhanced
its value.

The proposition, however, was, happily, not entertained; and it so chanced that its disappointment was owing to the ill humour of that Court upon the continuance of whose friendly relations the policy of such a measure must have been originally calculated.

Ch. 1,

1757

37

This was the only war measure open to any con- Pitt's vigorous prosecution of siderable censure. One of the most efficient means of the war. prosecuting the war was to assist the able and indomitable chief, who, beaten and apparently ruined one day, shewed again victorious the next. Pitt had no soldiers to send, the King of Prussia; but he was prompt in procuring him a subsidy. At the

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