REVIEW OF HIS POLICY.

Ch. 2.

1761 Review of

83

The public life of Pitt extended to nearly half a century; but the eventful part of it was crowded into these four years. All the rest, though containing some noble and splendid passages, was dis- Pitt's policy. figured by faction, by pride, and during some part clouded, I fear, by mental aberration. But if Chatham's conduct, previous to 1756, was deeply marked with the traits of overbearing ambition, it is assuredly not chargeable with any of the difficulties in which the country was involved at that period. While the Duke of Newcastle was intent only on the maintenance of mere political ascendancy; while the other members of the Government, with limited power and responsibility, were chiefly bent on personal aggrandisement, the interests of the nation, little regarded or understood, were treated as subservient to these selfish objects. The consequence was, that the Government lost all vigour and respect both at home and abroad. Indignant at seeing his country thus sacrificed, Pitt declared that he, and he alone, was able to save her.

His remedy was war. And it is plain there was no other remedy. Loyalty, then the ruling principle, had for upwards of seventy years remained in a state of suspended animation. This alone would have sufficed to deprive public spirit of all energy; but, in addition, the upper classes had become so enervated by a long course of corrupt and feeble government, that the distant menace of a French invasion, instead of, as in better days, inspiring a

84

Ch. 2.

1761

War policy

of Pitt.

VENALITY OF PARLIAMENT.

genuine spirit of resistance, became a subject of
exaggerated terror and alarm. Pitt had endea-
voured to rouse Parliament to a sense of duty; but
eloquence, the like of which had not been heard
since the days of Greece, was in vain lavished on
a packed and venal assembly. Some faint echoes.
of this patriotic oratory reached many who were
not unworthy of the name of Englishmen, and, pro-
pagated by report, caused thousands to fix their
affections on that Great Commoner, who they
fondly hoped was destined to become the saviour of
his country.
Peace is a great, but not an inesti-
mable, blessing; and when war is the only alterna-
tive to a state of national prostration, it is readily
to be preferred. Nay, even an appeal to the old
animosity between England and her great neigh-
bour was better than the demoralising rule of
Newcastle and his Parliaments. But, apart from
these higher considerations, this country could not
then, at least, safely permit her great rival to attain
a military preponderance. Moreover, it was evi-
dent that England must submit to the dictation of
France, and surrender a portion of her foreign do-
minions, unless she was prepared to vindicate her
rights and her honour by the sword.

The principal scene of war had been determined
by the enemy.
It was in the new world that
with France strove for mastery her old rival. We
have seen how Pitt provided for the conflict in
America, and the great results of his wise and ener-
getic measures. He formed, at the same time,

PITT'S CONSISTENCY.

Ch. 2.

extensive schemes for harassing the enemy at sea, on his own soil, and on the continent of Europe. The expeditions to Rochefort and St. Malo have been censured, as if their object had been incommensurate with their vast expense; but, in fact, these adventures formed part of an extensive scheme of operations, the principle of which was to distract the attention and divide the resources of the enemy. Nor was Pitt to be deterred by any idle charges of inconsistency from availing himself of every means for the successful prosecution of the war. His early Parliamentary fame had been chiefly acquired by denunciations against the mode of carrying on war by subsidising petty military states; but the practice so reprobated was a gross abuse of a system which, under appropriate circumstances, might be highly recommended to a war minister. For England to take into her pay a petty chieftain, who might or might not bring into the field his contingent of all-appointed troops1-was one thing: to aid a great military monarch, of consummate ability, and already in the field at the head of a splendid army-was another. There could be no just comparison between the waste of a hundred thousand pounds upon the Elector of Hesse, and the grant of half a million to the King of Prussia. The Great Commoner had well and wisely denounced Hanoverian wars for the sake of Hanover;

1761

85

1 Pelham to Duke of Newcastle, Oct. 25th, 1748-Coxe's Pelham,

1

86

Ch. 2.

1761

Character of
Pitt's agents.

Provision for the war.

HIS SUBORDINATES.

but when England was to be attacked through the side of Hanover, he as well and as wisely declared that the protection of Hanover should be as dear to this country as that of Hampshire.

Still, it was to little purpose that skilful plans were devised, unless fitting agents could be found to carry them into execution. The genius of a great minister is never more signalised than in discovering such agents. Pitt may almost be said to have created his captains. In defiance of all military usage and etiquette, he selected a young regimental officer for the conduct of the great enterprise, which was the leading feature of his plans; and the fame of Pitt must for ever be associated with that of Wolfe. Such cautious veterans as Loudon and Holbourne, who never committed themselves, were not the men for him. Even Hawke and Amherst were different officers under Pitt and under Newcastle. The whole public service was animated by his zeal and energy.

If, then, it is admitted-and it can hardly be questioned that England at this time had no alternative but war or submission, it surely follows that such a war must be undertaken on a scale of magnitude proportioned to the great contending powers, and the cause for which they fought. On the one side it was a war of aggression, which, if suffered to proceed unchecked might have reduced the empire to a province; on the other, not only our colonial possessions, but the civil and religious liberties of the nation were placed in jeopardy. To

COMMERCIAL PROSPERITY.

carry on a war according to such exigencies, must necessarily involve a vast expenditure. But, though he spent enormous sums, it was the singular fortune of this minister to have it recorded of him that the very treasure applied to the purposes of war at the same time promoted those pursuits which are supposed to be fostered only by peace.

The merchants of London have commemorated the rule of their revered statesman as one which united commerce with, and made it flourish by war.' And in days when the principles of free exchange had never been broached save in the writings of some French theorists, and when the navigation laws were in full force, foreign conquests were valuable as affording markets for home manufactures, and consequently employment for shipping.

Ch. 2.

1761

the war.

87

It must, I think, be agreed, therefore, that this Results of great administration was beneficial as it was glorious. Not only was the national honour vindicated, and the best security for peace taken, in the assurance that England was still, as ever, willing and able to resent an insult, but the physical power of the enemy was, for a time at least, crippled. His fleets were driven from the British waters-dispersed or destroyed. We had conquered all his important possessions in the Atlantic and the Caribbean sea, besides his great dependencies on the St. Lawrence. India was also wholly lost to him, though this was a happy coincidence in which Pitt had no concern. It only remained that the united House of Bourbon