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for thinking that the fcripture did really attribute human affections to God; for how could he think otherwife, when "the most fundamental point is not clearer in fcripture, "than that God hath hands, feet, &c.?" How could Origen in reafon expect from Celfus, (though never fo great a philofopher), that he should be able, without the help of oral tradition, to distinguish between what is fpoken literally, and what by a certain fcheme of fpeech? Theodoret (Hæret. fabul 1. 4.) tells us of one Audæus, who held that God had a human fhape and bodily members; but he does not fay, that the reafon of this error was becaufe he made fcripture the rule of his faith, but exprefsly because he was a fool, and did foolishly understand thofe things which the divine fcriptures fpeak by way "of condefcenfion." So that although Mr. S. is pleafed to make this wife objection, yet it feems, according to Theodoret, that men do not mistake fuch texts, either for want of oral tradition, or of fufficient clearness in the fcriptures, but for want of common reafon and fenfe. And if Mr. S. know of any rule of faith that is fecure from all poffibility of being mistaken by foolish and perverfe men, I would be glad to be acquainted with it, and with him for its fake.

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SECT. IV. That fcripture is a fufficient rule to the unlearned, and to the most rational doubters.

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IN N his next difcourfe, he endeavours to fhew, that unlearned perfons cannot be juftified as acting rationally in receiving the fcripture for the word of God, and relying upon it as a certain rule; because they are not capable of fatisfaction concerning thefe matters. But I have already fhewn that they are, and fhall not repeat the fame over again. And whereas he fays, p. 24. That "feveral profeffions all pretend to fcripture, and yet differ, and damn, and perfecute one another a*bout thefe differences; the answer is cafy: That they all pretend to fcripture, is an argument that they all acknowledge it to be the word of God, and the rule of faith; and that they are generally agreed about the fense of those plain texts which contain the fundamental points of faith, is evident, in that thofe feveral profef

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fions acknowledge the articles contained in the Apostles creed to be fufficiently delivered in fcripture: and if any profeffions differ about the meaning of plain texts, that is not an argument that plain texts are obfcure, but that fome men are perverfe. And if those profeffions damn and perfecute one another about the meaning of obscure texts, the fcripture is not in fault, but thofe that do fo.

§ 2. And whereas he pretends, p. 25. 26. 27. that "the fcripture is not able to fatisfy fceptical diffenters "and rational doubters, becaufe nothing under a de"monftration can fatisfy fuch perfons fo well concern"ing the incorruptednefs of originals, the faithfulness of "tranflations, &c. but that fearching and fincere wits 66 may still maintain their ground of fufpence with a 66 Might it not be otherwife?" This hath been answered already, partly by fhewing, that the fcripture was not intended to fatisfy fcepticks, and that a demonftration is not fufficient to give fatisfaction to them; and partly, by fhewing, that rational doubters may have as much fatisfaction concerning those matters, as the nature of the thing will bear: and he is not a rational doubter that defires more.

But, that he may fee the unreasonablenefs of this difcourfe, I fhall briefly fhew him, that all mankind do, in matters of this nature, accept of fuch evidence as falis fhort of demonftration; and that his great friends and mafters, from whom he hath taken the main grounds of his book, though he manageth them to lefs advantage, do frequently acknowledge, that it is reasonable for men to acquiefce in fuch affurance as falls fhort of infallibility, and fuch evidence as is lefs than demonftration. Do not mankind think themfelves fufficiently af fured of the antiquity and authors of feveral books for which they have not demonstrative evidence? Doth not Ariftotle fay, that things of a moral and civil nature, and matters of fact done long ago, are incapable of demonstration; and that it is madnefs to expect it for things of this nature? Are there no paffages in books fo plain, that a man may be fufficiently fatisficd, that this and no other is the certain fenfe of them? If there be none, can any thing be spoken in plainer words than may be written? If it cannot, how can we be fatisfied

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of the certain fenfe of any doctrine orally delivered? And, if we cannot be fo fatisfied, where is the certainty of oral tradition? But if books may be written fo plainly as that we may be abundantly fatisfied, that this is the certain fenfe of fuch and fuch paffages, then we may reasonably rest satisfied in evidence for thefe matters fhort of demonftration. For was ever the fenfe of any words fo plain as that there did not remain this ground of fufpence, that those words might be capable of another fenfe? Mr. Rufhworth (Dialog. 2. $7.) fays, that "difputative scholars do find means daily to explicate "the plaineft words of an author to a quite different "fenfe." And that the world might be furnished with an advantageous inftance of the poffibility of this, Raynaudus, (De bonis & malis libris), a writer of their own, hath made a wanton experiment upon the Apostles creed; and, by a finifter, but poffible interpretation, hath made every article of it herefy and blafphemy, on purpose to fhew, that the plaineft words are not free from ambiguity. But may be Mr. S. can outdo the Apostles, and can deliver the Chriftian doctrine fo clearly, that he can demonftrate it impoffible for any man to put any other fenfe upon any of his words than that which he intended. I do not what know may be done: but, if Mr. S. doth this, he must both amend his style, and his way of demonstration.

Is Mr. S. fufficiently affured, that there is fuch a part of the world as America? and can he demonftrate this to any man without carrying him thither? Can he fhew, by any neceffary argument, that it is naturally impoffible that all the relations concerning that place fhould be falfe? When his demonstrations have done their utmost, cannot "a fearching and fincere wit at leaft maintain "his ground of fufpence with a Might it not be other"wife?" p. 27.; and with an Is it not poffible, that all men may be liars, or that a company of travellers may have made ufe of their privilege, to abufe the world by falfe reports, and to put a trick upon mankind? or that all those who pretend to go thither, and bring their commodities from thence, may go to fome other parts of the world, and, taking pleasure in abufing others, in the fame manner as they have been impofed upon themselves,

309 themselves, may say they have been at America? Who' can tell but all this may be fo? And yet I fuppofe, notwithstanding the poffibility of this, no man in his wits is now poffeffed with fo incredible a folly as to doubt whether there be fuch a place. The cafe is the very fame as to the certainty of an ancient book, and of the fenfe of plain expreffions. We have no demonftration for these things; and we expect none, because we know the things are not capable of it. We are not infallibly certain, that any book is fo ancient as it pretends to be, or that it was written by him whofe name it bears, or that this is the fenfe of fuch and fuch paffages in it. It is poffible all this may be otherwife; that is, it implies no contradiction: but we are very well affured that it is not; nor hath any prudent man any just caufe to make the leaft doubt of it. For a bare poffibility, that a thing may be, or not be, is no juft caufe of doubting whether a thing be or not. It is poffible all the people of France may die this night; but I hope the poffibility of this doth not incline any man in the leaft to think it will be fo. It is poffible the fun may not rife to-morrow morning; and yet, for all this, I fuppofe that no man hath the leaft doubt but that it will.

§3. But becaufe this principle, viz. That in matters of religion a man cannot be reafonably fatisfied "with any thing lefs than that infallible affurance which "is wrought by demonftration," is the main pillar of Mr. S.'s book; therefore, befide what hath been already faid, to fhew the unreafonablenefs of this principle, I fhall take a little pains to manifeft to him, how much he is contradicted in this by the chief of his brethren of the tradition, viz. Mr. Rushworth, Dr. Holden, Mr. Creffy, and Mr. White; who, befides Mr. S. and one I. B. are, fo far as I can learn, all the publick patrons that ever this hypothefis of oral tradition hath had in the world and if Mr. White, as I have reason to believe, was the author of thofe dialogues which pafs under Rufhworth's name, the number of them is yet lefs. Now, if I can fhew, that this principle, efteemed by Mr. S. fo fundamental to this hypothefis, is plainly contradicted by the principal afferters of oral tradition, I fhall hereby gain one of thefe two things; either that these great patrons

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patrons of oral tradition were ignorant of the true foundation of their own hypothefis, or that this principle is not neceffary for the fupport of it. Not that I would be fo understood as if I did deny, that these very perfons do fometimes fpeak very big words of the neceffity of infallibility. But if it be their pleasure to contradict themselves, as I have no reafon to be difpleased, fo neither to be concerned for it; but fhall leave it to Mr. S. to reconcile them first to themselves; and then, if he pleases, afterwards to himself.

$4. I begin with Mr. Rufhworth, of immortal memory, for that noble attempt of his, to perfuade the world, that, notwithstanding he was the firft inventor of this hypothefis of oral tradition, yet he could prove, that the church had in all ages owned it, and proceeded upon it as her only rule of faith. He, in his third dialogue, §3.

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4. when his nephew objects to him, "That perhaps 66 a Proteftant would fay, that all his foregoing discourse "6 was but probability and likelihood; and therefore, to "hazard a man's eftate upon peradventures, were "fomething hard, and not very rationally done," replies thus to him: "What fecurity do your merchants, your statesmen, your foldiers, thofe that go to law, nay, even those that till your grounds, and work for "their livings; what fecurity, I fay, do all thefe go upon? Is it greater than the fecurity which these 66 grounds afford? Surely no; and yet no man eftecms "them foolish. All human affairs are hazardous, and "have fome adventure in them: and therefore he who 66 requires evident certainty only in matters of religion, "difcovers in himself a lefs mind to the goods promi"fed in the next life, than to these which he fecks here "in this world upon weaker affurance. Howfoever, "the greatest evidence that can be to him that is not capable of convincing demonftrations, which the "( greatest part of mankind fall short of, is but con66 jectural." So that, according to Mr. Rushworth, it is not reafon and difcretion, but want of love to God and religion, which makes men require greater evidence for matters of religion than for human affairs; which yet, he tells us, are hazardous, and have fome adven66 ture in them," and confequently are not capable of demonftration.

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