a weak and jealous confederacy to oppose. The inhabitants of Platea alone furnished them with a thousand soldiers, and they were left to find all other assistance in their courage and their despair.

In this extremity, they were obliged to arm their slaves for the safety of all; and their forces, thus united, amounted to but ten thousand men. Hoping therefore, to derive from their discipline what they wanted in power, they placed their whole army under the conduct of ten generals, of whom Miltiades was chief; and of these, each was to have the command of the troops, day about, in regular succession. An arrangement in itself so unpromising, was still more embarrassed by the generals themselves disputing whether they should hazard a battle, or wait the approach of the enemy within the walls. The latter opinion seemed for a while to prevail : it was urged that it would be rashness itself to face so powerful and well-appointed an army with an handful of men. It was alleged, that the soldiers would gather courage from their security behind their walls, and that the forces of Sparta without, might make a diversion in case of a sally from within. Miltiades, however, declared for the contrary opinion, and shewed that the only means to exalt the courage of their own troops, and to strike a terror into those of the enemy, was to advance boldly towards them, with an air of confidence and desperate intrepidity. Aristides also strenuously embraced this opinion, and exerted all his masculine eloquence to bring over the rest. The question being put,

when the suffrages came to be taken, the opinions were equal on either side of the argument. It now, therefore, remained for Callimachus, the Polemarch, who had a right of voting as well as the ten commanders, to give his opinion, and decide this important debate. It was to him Miltiades addressed himself with the utmost earnestness, alleging that the fate of his country was now in his power; that his single vote was to determine whether his country should be enslaved or free; that his fame might now, by a single word, be made equal to that of Harmodius and Aristogiton, who were the authors of Athenian liberty. If, said he, we decline a battle, I foresee some great dissension will shake the fidelity of the army, and induce them to a compliance with the Medes; but if we fight before corruption insinuates itself into the hearts of the Athenians, we may hope, from the equity of the gods, to obtain the victory. Thus exhorted, Callimachus did not long debate, but gave his voice in favour of an open engagement; and Miltiades, thus seconded, prepared to marshal up his little army for the great encounter.

In the mean time it appeared, that so many leaders commanding in succession, only served to perplex and counteract each other. Aristides perceived that a command which changes every day must be incapable of projecting any uniform design; he therefore gave it as his opinion, that it was necessary to invest the whole power in one single person, and, to induce his colleagues to conform, he himself set the first example of resignation. When

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the day came on which it was his turn to command, he resigned it to Miltiades, as the more able and experienced general, while the other commanders, warned by so generous a preference, followed his example.

Miltiades, thus vested in the supreme command, which was now the post of highest danger, like an experienced general, endeavoured, by the advantage of his ground, to make up for his deficiency in strength and numbers. He was sensible, that by extending his front to oppose the enemy he must weaken it too much, and give their dense body the advantage. He therefore drew up his army at the foot of a mountain, so that the enemy should not surround him, or charge him in the rear. On the flanks on either side he caused large trees to be thrown, which were cut down for that purpose, and these served to guard him from the Persian cavalry, that generally wheeled on the flank in the heat of an engagement.

Datis, on his side, was sensible of this advantageous disposition; but relying on his superiority of number, and unwilling to wait till the Spartan reinforcements should arrive, he determined to engage. And now was to be fought the first great battle which the Greeks had ever engaged in. It was not like any of their former civil contests, arising from jealousy, and terminating in an easy accommodation: it was a battle that was to be decided with the greatest monarch of the earth, with the most numerous army that had been hitherto seen

in Europe. This was an engagement that was to decide the liberty of Greece, and, what was of infinitely greater moment, the future progress of refinement among mankind. Upon the event of this battle depended the complexion which the manners of the West were hereafter to assume; whether they were to adopt Asiatic customs with their conquerors, or to go on in modelling themselves upon Grecian refinements, as was afterwards the case. This, therefore, may be considered as one of the most important battles that ever was fought, and the event was as little to be expected as the success was glorious.

The signal was no sooner given, than the Athenians, without waiting the Persian onset, rushed in upon their ranks with desperate rapidity, as if wholly regardless of safety. The Persians regarded this first step of the Athenians as the result of madness, and were more inclined to despise them as maniacs, than oppose them as soldiers. However, they were quickly undeceived. It had never before been the custom of the Greeks to run on with this headlong valour; but, comparing the number of their own forces with that of the enemy, and expecting safety only from rashness, they determined to break through the enemy's ranks, or fall in the attempt. The greatness of their danger added to their courage, and despair did the rest. The Persians, however, stood their ground with great intrepidity, and the battle was long, fierce, and obstinate. Miltiades had made

the wings of his army exceeding strong, but had left the main body more weak and not so deep; for having but ten thousand men to oppose to such a numerous army, he supposed the victory could be obtained by no other means than strengthening his flanks; not doubting but when his wings were once victorious, they would be able to wheel upon the enemy's main body on either side, and thus put them easily to the rout. The Persians, therefore, finding the main body weakest, attacked it with their utmost vigour. It was in vain that Aristides and Themistocles, who were stationed in this post of danger, endeavoured to keep their troops to the charge. Courage and intrepidity were unable to resist the torrent of increasing numbers, so that they were at last obliged to give ground. But in the mean time the wings were victorious; and now, just as the main body was fainting under the unequal encounter, these came up, and gave them time to recover their strength and order. Thus the scale of victory quickly began to turn in their favour, and the Persians, from being the aggressors, now began to give ground in turn; and, being unsupported by fresh forces, they fled to their ships with the utmost precipitation. The confusion and disorder was now universal, the Athenians followed them to the beach, and set many of their ships on fire. On this occasion it was that Cynægirus, the brother of the poet Eschylus, seized with his hand one of the ships that the enemy was pushing off from the shore.