Viewing the subject in this light, it will be, I trust, permitted me to plead its supreme importance, as a sufficient excuse for the unusual length, both of the preceding Extract, and of the ensuing Strictures.

I shall begin with noticing a general position of the Reviewer; to the truth of which, every unbiassed mind will, I doubt not, readily subscribe: viz. "That there is not a particle of water, or of air, of which the condition is not defined by rules as certain, as that of the Sun or the Planets." (page 320.) But, having once acknowledged the philosophical justness of this doc trine, are we, by necessary implica tion, in reason bound to yield an equally unqualified assent to the following immediate deduction from it? "So that nothing but information sufficiently extensive, and a calculus sufficiently powerful, is wanting, to reduce all things to certainty, and, from the condition of the world at any one instant, to deduce its coudition at the next." Before we can reasonably allow ourselves to concur in opinion with the Reviewer respecting the legitimacy of such an inference as this, we must needs be thoroughly persuaded, that the very same rules, which of necessity define the present and regulate the future condition of every material substance connected with this earth, define and regulate with equal certainty both the present and the future condition of every spiritual substance so connected. Since, if there really exist, both in Heaven and on Earth, Beings in native dignity, infinitely superior to any portion of the inanimate creation, whose appropriate function and continual employment it is, to exercise over every part of the material world, provident and irresistible dominion; what can possibly be more evident, than that, through the prac tical controul and agency of these shperior Beings, that perfect uniformity

in the order of physical phenomena, which might otherwise have been with certainty anticipated, will now be liable to frequent and almost perpetual interruption.

And should it even be asserted, that neither man, nor any other intelligent creature, is actually invested with the power of varying or influencing, in any degree whatever, the wonted course of natural phenomena; yet will no one, most assuredly, but the avowed Atheist or Fatalist, pretend for a moment seriously to question the physical power and rightful au thority of the Supreme Being, either to alter, to suspend, or to supersede entirely (whenever he shall be pleased to do so), the pre-established order of all sublunary events, and the wonted operation of all secondary causes,

If, however, we feel ourselves thus constrained to own, that it is at all times, and in all circumstances, alike possible and easy for the Divine Being to vary or annul the general laws of material nature (such, for example, as that of gravity); who among us will have the presumption to affirm, that it is not, both in all real and all ima ginable cases, equally possible and easy for that Being to give mankind indisputable evidence of such extra ordinary interposition by means of indirect communication? And if none among us, retaining a sober mind, will dare avow so impious a thought, what is there (we may further reason ably ask) in the nature of human testimany, which renders it in the least improper to be made, by Divine appointment, the ordinary and most effectual medium of such communica tion?

Will it suffice to answer (conforma. bly with the leading principle of Mr. Hume's deistical philosophy) that the most decisive test of truth is men's experience? that a miracle is confessedly an event entirely contrary to such experience; whilst the deceitfulness and fallibility of human testimony are but too indisputably proved by every man's daily observation; and consequently that to believe, in any given instance, an asserted miracle, merely in deference to human testimony, is (truly speaking) to reject the stronger evidence, and admit the weaker,?

What real force there is in this (formerly) much boasted argument,

will be, I conceive, best shewn by a brief enumeration of all the several meanings which can be consistently annexed to the term experience, as used in the preceding passage.

Now these (it is sufficiently obvious to every competent understanding) are no more than the three following. We must needs understand by the term experience, as used above, either universal, individual, or general experience.

To say, however, that in no case can we ever consistently or reasonably admit the truth of any assertion, or the reality of any fact, which is contradicted by the universal experience of mankind, is (in the judgment of every reflecting mind) in no degree to prove, but only gratuitously to assume, the utter incredibility of miracles; it being to every such mind abundantly manifest, that in the firm belief of any asserted miracles, there is necessarily implied a positive denial that miracles are contradicted by the universal experience of mankind.

Passing on, therefore, to the consideration of the second meaning above ascribed to the term experience (that is, understanding that expression as denoting solely, what has been sensibly witnessed and observed by the individual whose judgment is to decide on the truth or falsehood of any asserted or recorded miracles) it is obvious for me to remark, that if men's personal experience (thus defined) be indeed to them in all cases, and on all subjects, the incomparably surest, and almost the only test of truth; then must we of necessity acknowledge, that as on this principle of reasoning we can none of us at present consistently admit, as well authenticated, any of the numerous miracles related in the Old Testament or in the New; so, on the very same ground of argument, must we equally maintain, that with respect to the periodical conversion of water into ice in many regions of the earth, all the untravelled natives of the warmer climates are in reason bound to remain forever equally incredulous with the memorable King of Siam, alluded to by Locke. A mode of reasoning directly leading to, and fully warranting, an inference thus palpably absurd, must, doubtless, be regarded by every sober mind, as neither meriting, nor requiring formal confutation.

And should the advocates of Mr. Hume's philosophy, for the purpose of obviating this glaring inconsistency, be disposed to allege upon the subject, that, by the experience so much insisted on in the Essay on Miracles, as affording men in all cases the infinitely best criterion of truth and falsehood, we are by no means to understand, in any instance, the limited experience of the individual whose judgment is to pronounce on any specific ques tion, but the more enlarged experience and observation of mankind in general: To this our ready answer is, by none of us can it, in the natural course of things, ever possibly be as certained what is, or what is not, in any given instance, the actual result of men's general experience and observation, unless it be permitted us (after due discrimination exercised) to repose full confidence in the fidelity of human testimony. Withhold the aid of this grand medium of general information to mankind, or assert its total insufficiency when considered as the test of truth, and source of rational conviction; and the practical demonstrations of a Newton, it is abundantly manifest, will, in most instances, immediately dwindle into the fanciful hypotheses of a Descartes. Cas

For with regard even to the principle of gravity itself (through the constant and all-pervading influence of which we are now so firmly and so rationally persuaded that the admirable order of all this solar system has been so long preserved): who is there among us, retaining a sound judgment, that will pretend to build solely on the narrow basis of his own partial experience and observation, a well-founded confidence in its universal agency?

Without an entire reliance on the general accuracy of what has been written and related on this head by others, no individual of mankind (it is self-evident) could ever possibly attain to a full and rational conviction of this truth. If, however, the fidelity of human testimony must be thus presumed, before we can pretend to make the least proficiency whatever in the science of natural philosophy, or arrive at any general conclusions with regard even to the most obvious physical phenomena; why is the cor rectness of such testimony to be thus impeached, and its authority thus

denied,

denied, in all discussions and inquiries that concern the doctrines of Revealed Religion? If, without the aid of human testimony, we can none of us be rationally assured, that there is actually prescribed by Divine Power and Widom any one specific law to all material bodies, does it in any degree accord with reason to believe, that, however apparently irresistible its evidence, such evidence is, notwithstanding justly to be esteemed by us altogether incompetent to prove as much even as the very slightest deviation from that law? Or, in other words, is that instrument or medium which we must of necessity acknowledge to be of all others incomparably the most effective and infallible in ascertaining and establishing the general rule, with any semblance of, consistency to be considered as of DO validity whatever in ascertaining and establishing the occasional exception ?

It is for the admirers of Mr. Hume's Deistical Philosophy to reconcile this apparent contradiction. Yours, &c.

OXONIENSIS.

Jan. 4.

HE following Letter was lately sent to a person in an eminent situation. If you should deem it worthy of a place in your Magazine, it may perhaps answer the same purposes for which it was addressed to him, with those whose sensibility and literary endowments are any way on a par with his. I must leave it to his and their taste and judgment to determine, with what reservations the praises I have given to my favourite Author may be assented to. Sure 1 am, that to press his works on the attention of the Publick, is doing service to the cause of genius, good sense, and good morals.

SIR, I have a double motive for intruding this Address upon you. One is, the desire of giving to a man of your worth and eminence, an object of attention which may have still more important effects than the gratification that I think it cannot fail to afford; the other, that of adding to the celebrity of an Author, whose works, I believe, are not so well known and valued in this country as they deserve. With these views, and the presumption that you are yet unac

quainted with the Tragedies of Count Vittorio Alfieri *, I beg very earnestly to recommend them to your perusal; in the firm persuasion that you will find the high encomium bestowed on them in the dedication of a Selection of them published in 3 Vols. at Edinburgh, in 1806, by the Editor Montucci, not more than equal to their merit. Indeed that merit appears to me to comprehend all that is required to make Dramatic writing estimable in the highest degree. You will find, I am persuaded, the excitement of those fine sensations" (painful though they are) which I was lately told that you had (very justly) attributed to Theatrical Representation, at a moment when you was most strongly impressed with its effects, carried to the highest pitch in these Tragedies, which interest, elevate, and I may say fill the mind, more than any I ever read before. Formed as they are on the model of the Greek Tra gedies (which Alfieri seems to have studied to the full extent required by Horace) and carried beyond their simplicity in the embellishments of language, the arrangement of the plots, &c. but, stopping short of the exaberance of many of the moderu plays, they never overstep the modesty of nature," and never was that modesty made more dignified and interesting; nor ever was any language more happily made the vehicle of thought and expression, than the beautiful and truly classical one in which they are written, and to which they have given a lustre beyond perhaps what it ever had before. That language indeed in common use is now superseded by the easy and lively garrulity of one which may, after all, realize the motto of an eloquent little pamphlet, written 20 or more years ago, by M. de Rivarol," sur l'universalité de la langue Françoise." "Tu regere Eloquio populos, O Galle, memento.". Possibly, however, its influence may only tend in future to counteract the more powerful causes of discord among the Nations of Europe, especially if it is favourable to discussion, by opposing one kind of preponderance to another, and by varying the modes and instruments of human contention. But who shall