TREATISE ON THE EQUITY JURISDICTION OF THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY. BY GEORGE JEREMY, Esq. PREFACE. occur. As it is impossible for the human mind to predetermine the numerous grounds of contention which may arise among the members of a numerous, a civilized, and an improving society, so it is impracticable for the Legislature to provide an apt remedy for every case that may Our Common-Law Jurisdiction, by the liberal interpretations of the Judges, and the beneficent enactments of the Supreme Power in the State, have from time to time, in a great degree, been modified and adapted to the changing conditions of society; but the remedies afforded at law can only be obtained through the medium of determinate rules of practice, from which the freedom of our constitution will not permit a departure. Hence, although the courts of law administer justice in equity according to the facts which are brought before them, in the cases which fall within their cognizance, yet there are many instances, where, in consequence of the restraint under which they labour from their confined and fixed modes of proceeding, they cannot do complete justice. Again, the exigences of men have sometimes been at variance with the national policy, and evasions of the law have been resorted to, which it would not have been proper openly to sanction, although it perhaps was wise not to oppose; and when the occasions had passed in which they were introduced, it has been discovered that the practice framed upon them had become so deeply rooted, and from experience been found applicable to so many beneficial purposes, that it was desirable, if not absolutely necessary, that the administration of the law should in those respects be qualified. It is obviously possible that the practice of another court, although likewise definite in its rules, might have been so far different from that established in the ordinary courts, as, without infringing upon their jurisdiction, or assuming any control over them, to preserve the uniformity and purity of their proceedings, and in a great degree to supply those defects in the dispensation of justice which the necessities of mankind required. The Court of Chancery has, in its rise and progress, to a certain extent, been a tribunal of this kind. And as it has derived all its authority from the peculiar character of the principles and practice of the Courts of Common Law, it is with relation thereto that its doctrines will be considered in the following Treatise. The Author, being sensible that to obtain a comprehensive knowledge of any science it is requisite to seek a knowledge of its first principles, will, in devoting his attention to the complex system of equity which is administered in that court, endeavour to trace out and arrange the general rules by which its determinations, are governed. He does not presume that he can offer to the public a complete view of that system: for, independently of his own disqualifications for such a task, the foundations of the jurisdiction are so numerous, the reports of decided cases so voluminous, the opinions of the Judges oftentimes so conflicting, and the difficulty of condensing the subject so great, that such an attempt would be incompatible with the duties of a professional life. The Author, nevertheless, ventures to hope that the following Work will be of some advantage to the members of the Profession, and indulges the belief that it will be useful to the student, and that it will be found. intelligible even to the general reader. To those who have professional objects in view he is desirous of explaining, that in selecting the Authorities he will endeavour to introduce those which are the most valuable; and that he will in very frequent instances add others to such as directly support the propositions to which they are affixed, for the purpose of facilitating, if it should be desired, a more full investigation of each subject. He need not apologize therefore to any of his readers on account of the copiousness of the notes; although, by some they may be considered, to a certain extent, an encumbrance to the Work itself. But he feels bound, with regard to defects in style, in justice to himself, to remark, that the nature of the subject, and a wish to avoid deviating from the tenor and meaning of the Authorities, will sometimes induce him to use expressions, and to adopt a course of language, to which his own judgment, if unrestrained, would not permit him to resort. The Author is conscious that his attempt in the following pages may by many persons be considered presumptuous; but he is emboldened to make it public by the conviction that the difficulty attendant upon its execution will obtain indulgence from the more liberal portion of his readers. He disclaims all intention of entering the lists of political discussion, but at the same |