at four years old) and worked till fix or feven; they are lefs liable to fickness than horfes; and if accidents befal them, they are of fome value. Two oxen will do more work than one horse of equal value with them, nearly in proportion as fix to four, and they coft lefs in keep.

"To the twelfth. In places subject to rot fheep, fold them before the dew falls, and keep them in fold till it exhales in fpring and fummer; in winter attend to this as much as the weather will admit; and feed them in the fold, or on turning out, with hay on which falt has been sprinkled at ftacking up at harvest.

It is a known truth, that the pastures (though marshes) which are overflowed by the falt water at the vernal and autumnal high tides, never rot sheep, but are an antidote to the disease, if the infected are depastured thereon while the disease is recent.

To the thirteenth, Chiefly in the cross-tree, pot-hook-drail, fwing-plough, which, with two horfes, will plough most kinds, and with three horfes any fort of land; having a point to the fhare for ftoney lands, and no point in land that are not stonev."

We fhould be induced to make many more extracts from this collection, for the benefit of our country readers, were we not afraid they might appear tedious to thofe, whose thoughts are not fo immediately turned towards agriculture, We fhall, however, take a future opportunity to felect fuch letters as may appear calculated to promote agriculture. We cannot close this article without wifhing the Society every fuccefs their endeavours merit.

1

On Government; addressed to the Public. By Thomas Wycliffe, of Liverpool. 8vo. 4s. Eyres, Warrington.

"Every day," fays our author, "brings fresh accounts of the prefent alarming fituation of public affairs.

"That the lofs of America would be a most violent blow on the trade and ftrength of this kingdom, cannot be denied; but as I believe that prefent evils are fometimes productive of future good, let us hope that it is poffible for fome good confequences to arife from the prefent lofs, even of America.

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For many years paft, America has certainly been a valuable part of this empire, by contributing materially to the strength of this kingdom in time of war, and by being at all times a confiderable fource of wealth and commerce. But now let us view this ifland, ftripped of her most valuable colonies, her trade and revenues leffened, and every fource of national power weakened and impaired; and is it not reasonable to expect, that this relaxed ftate, will at least produce this good confequence? viz. "That

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"That when government find themselves weakened by the lofs of the external ftrength of colonies, they will certainly be more inclined to purfue fuch measures, as will beft improve the internal ftrength of this ifland; and many are the measures that would most effectually obtain that end, if ever neceffity fhould enforce the meafures. For instance,

"Suppofe a tax of twenty pounds per annum to be laid on every horfe in this kingdom, and that this tax would deftroy fo many of them, as to leave only half a million of horses, which at twenty pounds per horfe would be ten millions a year to govern ment; then, as the deftroying of fo many horfes would certainly lower the price of provifions, and, by enabling the poor to live at home, would prevent their going to feek their bread in foreign countries: fo, from this one measure alone, what an increafe would there be to the ftrength of government, both in men and money? As to the money, it would probably be more than would be wanted, even at the height of a French and Spanish war; and if the furplus were applied to the paying off fuch loans, as would enable the government to take off the taxes from windows, leather, foap, and all the neceffaries of life, it would be fuch an additional relief to the fubject, that the argument for preventing emigrations, and thereby ftrengthening the government with more men, would then fall with double force. And as this tax, by prevent ing emigrations, would certainly increase the number of British fubjects, it would thereby operate in favour of government, not only by its own weight, but by the accumulated weight of increafing all other duties and taxes.

Now, from thefe and fuch like meafures, to improve the internal ftrength of this kingdom, it does not appear to me to be a thing at all impoffible, to make this island (though stripped of all her colonies) to ftand fairly on her own legs, and, by her own in ternal and natural ftrength, to defend herself against the united force of all her enemies. And until this kingdom is thus far rendered independent of her colonies, to look for an extended and permanent empire, feems to me to be a vain purfuit; as every part of the empire will always fee the defect, and never fuffer this, or any kingdom upon earth, to ftand long on fo fandy a foundation. First, let Great Britain take fuch steps as will beft improve her internal ftrength, and fecure her independency; and then, but not till then, fhall I think this kingdom has a reasonable and good foundation, on which the can fafely build an extended empire, in grandeur and dignity fuitable to the unbounded genius and spirit of Britons.

Speaking of the power of government, Mr. Wycliffe obferves, that'

"It is a principle inherent in the very nature of government, that in every government there are three distinct forts of power, viz. the power of making laws, the power of executing laws, and the power of afterwards judging, in particular cafes, whether those

laws

:

laws have, or have not, been properly made, and properly executed now, by this laft power of judging, in particular cafes, I mean a power to relieve an individual, when, in a particular cafe, he is unjustly oppreffed by a general law; which is a power indifpenfably neceffary in all human governments, to guard the fubjects against the errors and imperfections of all human gover nors: thefe are the three powers of government, and it is in a proper or improper diftribution of these three powers, that all good or bad government confifts. For, when thofe feparate powers are given to feparate perfons, then thofe feparate perfons may mutually guard against each other's errors, both in the making, and in the executing of all laws; but, when thofe feparate powers are given to the fame perfon or perfons, then this mutual guard is wanting, and the fubjects are expofed to all the errors and imperfections of their governors, without any guard at all: and therefore, whenever thefe diftinct powers are united in the same perfon or perfons, it is a defect in the form of government, for then they cannot be a guard on each other's conduct, either in the making, or in the executing of laws; but, whenever they are perfonally feparated, it is the most perfect form of government, that human wisdom has ever yet been able to contrive.

The conftitution that has formed the British government (which, in this part, feems almoft more than human wisdom) has plainly feparated these three powers, by giving them to separate perfons: for it has given, to the house of commons, the power of making laws; to the king, the power of executing laws; and to the houfe of lords, the power of afterwards judging in particular cafes, whether thofe laws have, or have not, been pro perly made, and properly executed. Indeed, the conftitution

has alfo given, to the king, and to the houfe of lords, a negative in the making of all ftatute laws, and for these plain reafons: if the executive power did not affent to the making of a law, and thereby declare that he will execute it, the law might be made in vain, as it might never be executed; nor without that aflent, could the fubject poffibly know, whether he did, or did not. intend to execute it; and therefore, the executive power must and ought to join in every act of legiflation. And, in like manner, if the power that has a right of judging, in particular cafes, whether laws have, or have not, been properly made, and properly executed, did not affent to the making of a law, and thereby declared that the law ought to be both made and executed, the law might then be made in vain; as it then might happen, that the fubject who offends against that law, might be tried for that offence, by a court that would condemn the law, and not the man for breaking it: this power must therefore affent to every law, before the fubject can tell, that that is the law by which he is to be judged; and therefore, this power alfo muft and ought to join in every act of legiflation: for, after affenting to a law, they must judge by that law, nor can they release an offender from the force

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of it, but by the exercife of that difcretionary power, which is the natural and inherent right of that power.

"Thus, though it be unavoidably neceffary, that the three powers of government fhould unite in the making of all statute laws, yet it is impoffible that they should be perfonally united, without taking from each power the opportunity of judging of the conduct of the other powers, as diftinct and feparate agents: for, if the feparate powers of government, are not given to feparate perfons, then, there are no feparate perfons to judge, whether laws are, or are not, properly made; nor afterwards, whether thofe laws have, or have not, been properly executed; as feparate powers of judging, when lodged in the fame man, become the fame power, unless you can feparate a man from him-felf: and when feparate powers of judging are thus perfonally united, as it is then impoffible for those powers to be the mutual judges of each other's conduct, confequently each power becomes its own judge; a privilege, utterly fubverfive of all law and all government.

"Man, in his original state of nature, and unconnected by fociety, has certainly a right to be his own judge; but it is impoffi ble for him to carry this privilege with him into fociety; for, other men having the fame natural right, they alfo might chufe to do the fame; and when men are united in the fame, fociety, fhould every man be determined to continue the exercise of this original right, then, instead of finding themselves in a well-go, verned fociety, they would certainly find themfelves ftill in their former ungoverned state of nature. Men therefore ought, when they engage in fociety, to give up the exercife of their original privilege of felf-judgment, and to fubmit themfelves to the judgment of other men, in every thing, as far as it relates to the fociety in general, or to any particular member of that fociety: and it is this fingle circumftance, of a man giving up the right of being his own judge, and fubmitting himself to the judgment of other men, which conftitutes the difference between men in a ftate of nature, without any government at all, and men in a wellgoverned ftate of fociety. It is, I fay, this fingle circumstance, of giving up the privilege of felf-judgment, and fubmitting to the judgment of other men, that lays the foundation of all human government, and is the first and great bond of all human fo cieties.

"Now, allowing it to be impoffible, in a well-governed society, for a man to be his own judge; this maxim will certainly hold good, in refpect to those who govern, as well as in refpect to those who are governed (unless thofe who govern can justly plead an exemption from felf-partiality, and the common frailties of human nature). And agreeably to this very maxim (that our governors fhould not be their own judges) the conftitution has feparated the powers of government, in the form of the British government, and has given these three diftinct powers, to diftinct perfons; for, it has given, to the house

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of commons, the legiflative; to the king, the executive; and to the house of lords, the judiciary power of government; and certainly with this very intention; that thefe three distinct powers, being lodged in diftinct perfons, they might thereby become dif tinct and feparate agents, not only in the making and executing of all ftatute laws, but alfo in the making and executing of all parliamentary orders and regulations whatsoever, refpecting the public national bufinefs; and that, by being diftinct and feparate agents, they might then, in all cafes, be the mutual judges of each other's conduct: and thus the conftitution has fubjected, even the governors themfelves, to that first and great law of all focieties, viz. That no man shall be his own judge.

"This appears to me to be the language of the conftitution; but, does the practice of government fpeak the fame language? I wish I could fay, that it did. But to compare what they fay:The conftitution has given the powers of government to separate perfons: the practice of government has given them to the fame perfons. The conftitution, by a perfonal feparation of the powers of government, has made the governors fubject to the will of other men the practice of government, by a perfonal union of those powers, has made the governors fubject to their own will. That is, the constitution has made the governors fubject to the great law of all focieties, viz. The judgment of other men: but the practice of government has broken down that great law, and made the governors their own judges; in direct contradiction to the great law of all focieties, viz. That no man fhall be his own judge. This is, I think, the real language of them both. And this is the certain confequence of a perfonal union with the powers of government: for, in the cafe of an officer of ftate having a feat in parliament; as a member of parliament, he has a right to judge, not only of all laws that are made by the joint affent of the three powers of government, but also of all orders and regulations, respecting the public national bufinefs, that are made by that houfe where he has a feat; which, to an officer of state, inay be called a law, and which he ought to execute: now in this latter cafe, the fubject has no fecurity, but that this officer of state will never confent to make any orders or regulations, but just such as will beft fuit his own inclinations in the execution, which is certainly being his own lawgiver, and his own judge; or, fhould the will of parliament prevail against his confent, yet even then, if he chufes to neglect the execution, as a member in parliament, he ftill has a right of judging, whether that will has, or has not, been properly executed and therefore, an officer of state that has a feat in parliament, is thereby made, not only his own lawgiver, but afterwards, in the execution of those very laws, he is alfo made his own judge, of his own conduct, as an officer of state.-At an affize, held for a county, where a man is brought to be tried for an offence, we should think it very odd, if the culprit were impannelled on either jury, to try his own caufe: were he on the

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