ficient, however large, although it is a strong auxiliary argument where there are other grounds. In a case (k), however, before Lord Rosslyn, this rule, although so frequently acknowledged and acted upon, was not attended to, but biddings were opened after the report was absolutely confirmed, merely on an advance of price. This case is now completely overruled. But very particular cirumstances may perhaps induce the court to open the biddings after confirmation of the report, if the advance be considerable (I). Thus, in a case (1) where the owner of the estate (who joined in a motion for the purpose of opening biddings after the report was absolutely confirmed) was in prison at the time of the confirmation, and it appeared that he would have opened the biddings before confirmation of the report, had he been able, and had even directed persons to bid more that what the estate sold for, who deceived him, and an advance of 4,000l. (being more than one-fourth of the original purchase-money) was offered, the biddings were opened on the deposit of the 4,0007. being made. Strong as the circumstances in this case were, Lord Eldon, in a late case, expressed great disapprobation of the decision, and determined generally, that after a purchaser has confirmed his report, unless some particular principle (k)Chetham v. Grugeon, 5 Ves. Jun.86; and see his Lordship's decision in Prideaux v. Prideaux, ubi sup. when Lord Commissioner. (I) In Ireland a sale under a decree was actually set aside after the purchaser was put in possession, and the conveyance to him executed and registered, because another person offered 2001. more than the purchaser had paid. Conran v. Barry, Vern. and Scriv. 111. See Ex parte Partington, 1 Ball and Beatty, 209. arises out of his character, as connected with the ownership of the estate, or some trust, or confidence, or his own conduct in obtaining his report, the bidding ought not to be opened (m). And Lord Redesdale, also, in a case before him, held that biddings could not be opened after the report was absolutely confirmed, unless, on the ground of fraud on the part of the purchaser. And he considered it to the advantage of suitors, to observe greater strictness in opening biddings, as it would procure better sales (n). In a still later case, Lord Eldon adhered to the same rule, and said that he could not do a thing more mischievous to the suitors than to relax farther the binding nature of contracts in the master's office: half the estates that are sold in the court being thrown away upon the speculation that there will be an opportunity of purchasing them afterwards by opening the biddings (0). Fraud will of course be a sufficient ground for opening the biddings. Therefore, if the parties agree not to bid against each other (p), or a survey be made of an estate with some degree of collusion with the tenants (q), and it misrepresents the value and quality of the estate, and some of the purchasers are aware of this fraud in making the survey, and the owner is ignorant of it; or the pur chaser of the estate be partner with the solicitor of the cause, and is in possession of some particular knowledge to the benefit of which the other parties were entitled (r) ; in all these cases the court would open the biddings, although the report had been absolutely confirmed. (m) Morice v. the bishop of Durham, 11 Ves. Jun. 57. (n) Fergus v. Gore, 1 Scholes and Lefroy, 350. (0) White v. Wilson, 14 Ves. Jun. 151. (p) See 2 Ves. Jun, 52. (q) Ryder v. Gower, 6 Bro, P. C. 148; and see 2 Ves. Jun. 53. (r) Price v. Moxon, July 14, 1754,before Lord Hardwicke ; see 6 Bro.P. C. 155, 2 Ves. Jun. 54, Where Where the biddings are opened, the advance is ordered to be deposited immediately (s), and the costs of the purchaser to be paid by the persons opening the biddings (t); but the court will not direct the master to allow a specific expense (u). If the biddings are opened, the estate may be allotted for sale in a different manner to what it at first was (x). As the biddings are opened for the benefit of the suitor, no other person will be favoured in that respect. Thus, upon a motion to open a bidding of 5,020l. (y) upon the ground of mistake as to the time of sale, and an over-bidding of 150l.; the Lord Chancellor refused it, saying, he would not open it for a less sum than 500l. and that the circumstance that the bidder was too late, was no ground at all. The person who is desirous of opening the biddings having been present at the sale, is no objection to their being opened, although a greater advance may, on that account, be required (z). Nor is it material that the applicant is entitled to a part of the produce of the estates (a). A man opening the biddings on behalf of a person not in existence, will himself be decreed to be the purchaser (b). Where a person is permitted to open the biddings upon the usual terms, paying the costs, and making a deposit, and the estate is bought by another person, the person opening the biddings is entitled to take back his deposit; (8) Anon. 6 Ves. Jun. 513. (1) See Watts v. Martin, 4 Bro. C.C. 113; and see ibid. 178; Upton v.Lord Ferrere, 4 Ves.Jun.700. (u) Anon. 2 Ves, Jun. 286. (x) Watts v. Martin, 4 Bro. C. C. 113. (y) Anon. 1 Ves. Jun. 453. (2) Rigby v.M'Namara, 6 Ves. Jun. 117; see Tait v.Lord Northwick, 5 Ves. Jun. 655 ; sce 15 Ves. Jun. 14. (a) Hooper v. Goodwin, Coop.95. (b) Molesworth v. Opie, 1 Dick. 289. but but he is not entitled to an allowance for his costs, as they are in the nature of a premium paid by him for the opportunity of bidding (c). Under special circumstances, however, they might be allowed. If a person come forward for the benefit of the family, and the estate at the first sale was knocked down by mistake, or sold at a great undervalue, he will be allowed his expenses (d). It seems, that if a person purchase several lots of an estate, and the biddings are opened as to one, he shall have an option to open them all (e). The authority which the court has over these contracts, enables it in a proper case to relieve the purchaser as well as the suitor. Therefore, where the contract is inequitable, the purchaser, on submitting to forfeit his deposit, will be discharged from his purchase (f). Where, however, the contract is not inequitable, a purchaser must proceed in his purchase, and will not be permitted to forfeit his deposit, and abandon the contract, however disadvantageous it may be. Thus, on an application to the court by the persons who opened the biddings for General Birch's estate (g), to forfeit their deposit, which was resisted by the creditors for whose benefit the estate was sold; the court held the purchasers to their bargain, and would not permit them to re (c) Rigby v. M'Namara, 6 Ves. Jun. 466; Earl of Macclesfield v. Blake, 8 Ves. Jun. 214; Trefusis v. Clinton, 1 Ves. and Beam. 361. (d)Earl of Macclesfield v. Blake, ubi sup.; Owen v. Foulks, 9 Ves. Jun. 348; West v. Vincent, 12 Ves. Jun. 6. (e) See 2 Anstr. 657. 745. (g) MS. and see Sewell v.Johnson, Bunb. 76. scind the contract, although they had given a price which was considered much beyond the value of the estate. But where the purchaser has by mistake given an unreasonable price for the estate, the court will in a proper case totally rescind the contract. This equity was enforced in the case of Morshead v. Frederick (h), where it appeared that Smiths' the bankers, were tenants in possession of the house in question, for which they paid two rents, one a ground rent of 561. to the defendant, and the other an improved rent of 2107. to a third person. The house was directed to be sold, under a decree; and the plaintiffs, by a broker, treated for the purchase of it, and employed him to value it. The broker had an interview with the attorney concerned in the sale, who stated, that the rent payable for the house was the 567. and the broker valued the estate accordingly. A written agreement was not entered into, but the contract was approved of by the master, and the money paid into the Bank. The purchasers then moved the court to rescind the contract, on the ground of mistake, and the broker proved that the purchasers had not informed him of the rent of 2107. and that he was ignorant of the existence of it at the time he made his valuation. And the court ordered the purchase-money to be re-paid, and rescinded the contract. This, however, may be considered a strong case. It might be argued that the purchasers' only equity was their own negligence. Although the solicitor in the cause buy-in an estate merely to prevent a sale at an undervalue, yet if he acted without authority he will not be discharged from his purchase. Lord Eldon has said, that it would be a very wholesome rule to lay down, that the solicitor in the cause should have nothing to do with the sale; as the certain effect of a bid (h) Ch. 20 Feb. 1816. MS. App. No. 10, |