stand limited and settled, and subject to or for the same uses, trusts, intents and purposes, or by reason that a greater quantity of an estate has been sold than may have been necessary to be sold for the authorised purposes, or by reason of some other mistake or inadvertence; Now be it further enacted, That all sales so made, as aforesaid, and all convey. ances executed of the lands or other hereditaments so sold, provided the same have been respectively made and executed bona fide and for valuable consideration, and shall appear to have been made and executed under the authority and with the consent and approbation of the commissioners as required by the said Acts or any of them, in cases of sales under the powers of the said Acts, shall be and the same are hereby ratified and confirmed from the respective periods at which such sales and conveyances were respectively made and executed, and shall be from such respective periods as valid and effectual in the law as if such sales and conveyances had been made and executed in strict conformity to the powers and provisions under which the same were intended to have effect, any thing in the said Act of the 42d year of his present Majesty, or of any such subsequent Act, as aforesaid, to the contrary notwithstanding. But this provision is qualified by a proviso, That every person injured or prejudiced by any sales hereby confirmed shall be entitled to relief either by the decree of a court of equity on a bill filed, or by a summary application to a court of equity by petition, and by the usual proceedings before tlie master or other proper officer of the court on such petition, and an order thereupon; and shall, under such decree or order, have an annual rent-charge to such an amount, and for and during such term or estate, and charged upon such lands or other hereditaments as such court shall order or direct; and the said court shall have full power to adjust the proportion and terms of such annual rent-charge between different claimants, and to direct the settlement of such annual rent-charge in such such manner as the said court shall, under the circumstances of the case in its discretion, think proper; and shall also have power to make such order respecting the costs of the parties as the said court shall think fit. With respect to the general operation of statutes passed in favour of purchasers, it may be laid down as a rule, that equity will not permit them to be taken advantage of where the purchasers have notice of the incumbrance or deceit which the statutes were intended to guard them against, because qui scit se decipi non decipitur, and the resolutions respecting voluntary settlements must be considered anomalous. SECTION IX. Of equitable Relief and Protection. 1. THUS have we taken a cursory view of the several statutes passed for the relief or protection of purchasers. The relief and protection afforded to purchasers by the rules of equity, form the next branch of our inquiry. A court of equity acts upon the conscience, and as it is impossible to attach any demand upon the conscience of a man who has purchased for a valuable consideration, bona fide, and without notice of any claim on the estate, such a man man is entitled to the peculiar favour and protection of a court of equity. And it has been laid down as a general rule, that a pur chaser bona fide, and for a valuable consideration, without notice of any defect in his title at the time he made his purchase, may buy, or get in a statute, mortgage, or any other incumbrance, (and that, although it is satisfied); and if he can defend himself at law by any such incumbrance, his adversary shall never be aided in a court of equity for setting aside such incumbrance: for equity will not disarm a purchaser, but assist him; and precedents of this nature are very ancient and numerous, viz. where the court hath refused to give any assistance against a purchaser, either to an heir, or to a vendor, or to the fatherless, or to creditors, or even to one purchaser against another (a). And the favour and protection of a court of equity is extended to a purchaser, not only where he has a prior legal estate, but also where he has a better right to call for the legal estate than any other person (b). A purchaser cannot, however, protect himself by taking a conveyance or assignment of a legal estate from a trustee, in whom it was vested upon express trusts (c). The court of Chancery will not supersede a commission of bankruptcy even for fraud, where there have been purchasers under it (d); for a commission being superseded, all falls with it (e). So equity will not relieve against a bona fide (a) Basset v. Nosworthy, Finch, 102; Jerrard v. Saunders, 2 Ves. Jun. 454; see Anon. 2 Cha. Ca. 208; Hithcox v. Sedgwick, 2 Vern. 156. (b) See 2 Vern, 600; Willoughby v. Willoughby, 1 Term Rep. 763; Blake v. Sir Edward Hungerford, Prec. Cha. 158; Charlton v. Low, 3 P. Wms. 328. Ex parte Knott, 11 Ves. Jun. 609; Shine v. (c) Saunders v. Dehew, 2 Vern. 271; 2 Freem. 123. (d) Ex parte Edwards, 10 Ves. Jun. 101; ex parte Leman, 13 Ves. Jun. 271; ex parte Rawson, 1 Ves. and Bea. 160. (c) See 1 Ves. and Bea, 66, purchaser purchaser without notice, although the remedy be gone by accident (ƒ), nor will it compel him to discover any writings which may weaken his title (g); or take any advantage from him by which he may protect himself at law, or obtain terms of his antagonist (h); neither will equity give any person an advantage over (i) a purchaser, or any assistance against him (k); and his having taken a collateral security for the title will not make his case worse (1), unless the purchase by the vendor was fraudulent: in which case it would have considerable weight with a court of equity (m). The rules on this subject have. gone so far, that a purchaser bona fide, for valuable consideration, and without notice, has been allowed to take advantage of a deed which he stole out of a window by means of a ladder (n), and of a deed obtained by a third person without consideration, and by fraud (0). If a man purchase for valuable consideration, without notice from a disseisor, and the disseisee is a trustee for another, although the general rule is, that a trustee is bound to convey, upon request, to his cestui que trust; yet if in (f) Harvy v. Woodhouse, Sel. Cha. Ca. 80; Bell v. Cundall, Ambl. 101. (g) Bishop of Worcester v. Parker, 2 Vern. 255; Ifall v. Adkin. son, 2 Vern. 463; 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 333, pl. 54; Millard's case, 2 Freem. 43; Sir John Burlace v. Cook, 2 Freem. 24; Jerrard v. Saunders, 2 Ves. Jun. 454. (h) Walwynn v. Lee, 9 Ves. Jun. 24. (i) Bechinall v. Arnold, 1 Vern. 354. (k) See Graham v. Graham, 1 Ves. 262. (1) Lowther v. Carleton, For. 187, S. C. MS.; see, however, White v. Stringer, 2 Lev. 105; Jennings v. Selleck, 1 Vern. 467. (m) How v. Weldon, 2 Ves. 516. (7) See a case cited in Sanders v. Deligne, 2 Freem. 123; and Siddon v. Charnells, Bunb. 298; and see Fagg's case, cited 1 Vern. 52, and reported in 1 Cha. Ca. 68; nomine Sherly v. Fagg, where the circumstance of theft does not appear. (0) Harcourt v. Knowel, 2 Vern. 159, cited. this case the trustee refuse to convey the legal estate to the cestui que trust, or to suffer the latter to bring an ejectment in his (the trustee's) name, a court of equity will not compel the trustee to do so, because it would in effect be granting relief against a purchaser (p). This case strongly marks the favour shown to a bona fide purchaser. Equity will relieve a bona fide purchaser without notice from ancient statutes, if there be no direct proof on either side, and will decree them to be cancelled (q). And this rule extends to mortgages, and all incumbrances which have lain dormant for a long time, and no demand made in respect thereof (r). So, equity will relieve a purchaser for valuable consideration against a defective execution of a power, in the same manner as he will be relieved against a defective surrender of copyholds (s). But if a devisec, having an estate for life, with a power to dispose of the inheritance by will, sell the estate in his lifetime, equity cannot relieve the purchaser, although by the effect of accident he has got the legal estate in fee-simple; for, in a case like this, the testator cannot be understood to mean that the devisee should so execute the power. The intention is, that he should give by will, or not at all; and it is impossible to hold, that the execution of an instrument, or deed, which, if it availed to any purpose, must avail to the destruction of that power the testator meant to remain capable of execution to the moment of the devisee's death, (p) Turner v. Back, 22 Vin. p. 21, pl. 5, where the cestui que trust claimed under a voluntary settlement. (q) Burgh v. Wolf, Toth. 226; Smith v Rosewell, ibid. 247; and see ibid. 224. (r) See Abdy v. Loveday, Finch, 250; Sibson v. Fletcher, 1 Cha. Rep. 32. (s) Vide infra; and see Chap. man v. Gibson, 3 Bro. C.C. 219; Treat. of Powers, ch. 6. can |