look out for a Supply to this Deficiency. The moft obvious feems to be private Fellowships; which by an Union of Hearts, and amicable Intercourses, might procure Enjoyments, which do not result from general Affociations. This I take to be the true Source of Friendship: Nor does it appear to me any Derogation to the Lovelinefs of the Affection. For, what but the Imbecillity of our Frame gives Rife to that Paffion, which is looked upon as the most amiable belonging to our Nature? Had the Firmnefs of our Minds been greater, our Compaffion had certainly been lefs. For it is ever found, that as the fofteft Metals are most eafily diffolved; fo the tendereft Minds fooneft melt into Pity. This, perhaps, is the Reason, why that Sex, whofe Characteristic is, by no means, Strength, are most liable to the Impreffions of this afflicting Paffion. Pity, returned Philocles, can hardly be faid to flow from Weakness in the fame Sense that you fuppofe focial Affection to do: In the latter, Weakness is the Attribute of that Subject, from whence the Affection is fuppofed to proceed; Men united, because they found themfelves too weak to fubfift in a feparate State-But in the former, Weakness can only be the Attribute of that Subject, on which the Paffion is fuppofed to operate. It is not the Weakness of the diftreffed Object, but of him who beholds it, which produces the fympathizing Sorrow. Imbecillity therefore cannot give Rife to focial Inclinations, in in the fame Way you imagine it does to Compaffion. The only Inference, that can fairly be drawn from your Argument, feems to be, that the Tenderness of Senfations, or Weakness (if you will call it fo) is the Means whereby the Paffion operates upon any Subject: But it does not therefore follow, that it is the Fountain of the Paffion; or that it is grounded on no other Principle in Nature. For why should Sophronius afcribe this Sufceptibility of Compaffion, to a Weakness of Mind? Is it not far more reasonable to derive it from the quick Feeling of the Sentiments of Humanity, and the fudden Exertion of generous Sympathy? Examine the Condition of your own Breast under a lively Sense of Pity; and tell me whether you do not always find, that it gives you an exalted Idea of the Generofity of your Temper, when it is touched in this kind and benevolent Way? And though it may, perhaps, draw Tears from your Eyes; yet they are the Tears of manly Affection, and not the Meltings of weak Effeminacy. For furely, Sophronius, there can be no Weakness in Compaffion, purely and abftractedly confidered; fince the nobleft Souls are open to the strongest Impreffions of this Kind. Homer, who had a complete Infight into Human Nature, and fo well understood what it was that gave the finishing Excellence to a Character, represents the Hero of his Poem, the great Achilles himself, melting into Pity at the Miseries of a venerable aged Monarch, on his Knees begging him to restore the Body of his Son Hector. Nay, he not only makes him relent, but even endeavour to affuage the Sorrows of the unhappy Prince, with with the moft tender, as well as rational, Confolations [9]. Pity then, in the Eftimation of this judicious Poet, who was always true to Nature, is perfectly compatible with an elevated and fublime Spirit. Nay, is it not an Attribute afcribed even to the Deity himself? How then can it be derived from fo mean an Original? It is, indeed, a Softness, but not (as you call it) an Imbecillity of Heart. Juvenal, I remember, fomewhere extols it as the beft and moft lovely Paffion belonging to human Nature, and the diftinguishing Characteristic of our Species [r]. [9] Αυλικό από θρόνα ωριο, γεροντα δε χειρος ανιση, Οικίείρων πολιον τε καρη, πολιον τε γενειον "From the high Throne divine Achilles rofe: Iliad xxiv. Pope's Tranfi. There is not, as Mr. Pope obferves, à more beautiful Paffage than this, in the whole Iliad. Homer, to fhew that Achilles was not a mere Soldier, here draws him as a Perfon of excellent Senfe, and found Reafon. And it was a Piece of great Judgment thus to defcribe him: for the Reader would have retained but a very indifferent Opinion of him, if he had had no Qualification, but mere Strength. It also fhews the Art of the Poet, thus to defer this Part of his Character to the Conclufion of the Poem: By thefe Means, he fixes an Idea of his Greatnefs upon our Minds, and makes his Hero go off the Stage with Applaufe. [x] « POPE'S Homer, B. xxiv. p. 168. ed. 1736. Molliffima corda "Humano generi dare fe natura fatetur, You must be fenfible, returned Sophronins, that whatever Notion the Poet might advance to flatter, Mankind, or beautify his Compofition; yet the Generality of the Ancients derived Pity from no higher a Source than that, which I have affigned. Seneca calls it the Fault of a poor pufillanimous Spirit; and affirms, that the baseft Tempers are moft fufceptible of this Paffion. The wife and good, fays he, will not pity, but he will relieve; bu the will run to the Aid of the diftreffed. So far is he from dropping a fympathizing Tear with the unhappy; that he is not moved even by his own Calamities, but, like a folid Rock, reverberates the Storm, and ftands fecure [s]. But how does it appear, faid Philocles, that Pity has the fame Idea in our Language, which Mifericordia had in the Roman? Perhaps this might mean a fenfeless effeminate Confternation, that feizes weak Minds on the Prospect of any thing difaftrous, and deprives them of the Capacity to relieve the Misery they behold, "Compaffion proper to Mankind appears; "Which Nature witness'd when she gave us Tears." Exalts our Race above the brutal Kind. [s] Clementiam, manfuetudinemque omnes boni præftabunt: misericordiam autem vitabunt: eft enim vitium pufilli animi ad fpeciem malorum alienorum fuccidentis. Itaque peffimo cuique familiariffima eft. Anus & mulierculæ funt, quæ, &c. Ergo non miferebitur fapiens, fed fuccurret, fed proderit. Ne in fuis quidem accidet calamitatibus, fed omnem fortunæ iram reverberabit, & ante fe franget, SENECA de Clem. lib. II. edit. Dan. Elz. 1672; There There is a Paffage in the Author I just now mentioned, returned Sophronius, which makes it evident, that he understood by Mifericordia, the very fame Thing, which we do by the Word Pity. [t] He tells us," that a wife Man will look upon a Beggar "labouring under all the Diftreffes of Poverty and "Infirmities of old Age, with a Countenance unal"tered, and his Heart unmoved at the Sight of the "Calamity." From hence it is plain, that, in the Judgment of this Philosopher, it was a Weakness, to be moved and disturbed with the Mifery of another. Cicero is alfo clearly of the fame Opinion, as may be proved from feveral Paffages in his philofophical Works [2]. And though, in some of thofe Places, he is giving us the Sentiments of the Stoics; yet he does not hesitate to approve of their Opinion [x]. Nay, the very Definition, which both he and Seneca give of Pity, is "A Disorder of the Mind arifing from the View of another Perfon's Mifery [y]. [] Vultum quidem non dejiciet, non animum, ob ærufcantis alicujus aridam ac pannofam maciem, & innixam baculo fenectutem.. Sed omnibus dignis proderit, & deorum more, calamitofos propitius refpiciet. SENECA. Ibid. [u] Videamus quanta fint, quæ à philofophiâ remedia animorum morbis adhibeantur -variæ funt curationes; alia invidenti, alia miferant. CICERO, Tufc. Difp. lib. IV. p. 231. edit. Ald. Man, & paffim. [x] Sententiis tamen utendum eft eorum (viz. Stoicorum) qui maximè forti, &, ut ita dicam, virili utuntur ratione. Ibid. [y] Mifericordia eft ægritudo animi ex alienis rebus adverfis. Ibidem. And that by ægritudo he meant a Disorder or wrong State of Mind, is plain from another Paffage, where he fays. -Ægritudo eft animi, adverfante ratione, contractio. Ibid. 218. |