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Taste as affected by the intellectual habits.

Taste, as it exists in different individuals, is affected by the intellectual character and habits. We might expect this to be the case from the fact, that it implies discrimination, and that the same intellectual habits will be brought into exercise in judging of what is fitted to excite emotions of taste, as in those instances where judgments are formed on other subjects. It is in this way, that we may in part account for the diversities of taste in different individuals. He whose mind is enriched with various knowledge, and whose intellectual powers have been strengthened and improved, and who is wont to take large and comprehensive views of sub-jects, will manifest the greatness of his mind and the liberality of his views, in his judgment of what is fitted to excite an emotion of taste. He whose attention has been restricted to philosophical speculations, and who has been accustomed to reason with the precision of mathematical accuracy, will in like manner bring his habits of reasoning to subjects of taste, and will be less bold and more severe in his judgment of what is fitted to excite emotions of this kind.

Locke and Burke are striking examples of the justness of these remarks. Locke was an accurate thinker, and a close reasoner. His judgment, where he forms an opinion, is based on careful and minute examination. Hence his taste was severe. He used but little ornament, and that simple and illustrative. Fearful also that it might betray him, he condemned the use of it in the writings of others. Burke, on the contrary, was a man of much refinement. He possessed extensive classical attainments—had large and liberal views of subjects, and, susceptible to a high degree of emotions of taste, he was ever prone to indulge in the excitement of these emotions. But then he approved only of

what is truly beautiful and sublime, and his judgment of what is fitted to excite these emotions, evidently felt the influence of his enlarged and liberal views on other subjects, or, in other words, of his intellectual habits.

Objects on which taste is exercised.

Taste, as thus explained, employs itself in judging both of the objects and scenes in Nature, and of works in the Fine Arts, and in both cases it determines as to the fitness of what is presented before it to produce emotions of beauty. Suppose several individuals, who are susceptible of emotions of beauty, to be travelling through some region of our country, which presents a rich variety of natural scenery. One of them, in advance of the others, upon rising an eminence, is struck with the view opening before him, and is led to exclaim as to the beauty of the prospect. The others, upon coming up, are impressed in the same manner. They declare the scene before them beautiful, and they unite in pronouncing him who first pointed it out, a man of All that is meant by this expression is, that the individual to whom it is applied, is able, from his experience of past emotions, to form a judgment respecting the fitness. of objects in natural scenery to produce emotions of beauty, which is in agreement with the general judgment of mankind.

taste.

Suppose further, that the same individuals, in the course of their journey, stop to examine a gallery of paintings. One of them, in looking round on the different pictures, selects a painting which he pronounces beautiful. The attention of the others being called to it, they express the same opinion, and again they unite in calling the individual who has pointed out the painting, a man of taste. Here, as in the former case, all that is implied is, that the individual

called a man of taste, is able to judge of the fitness of certain works of art to produce emotions of beauty.

But let us now suppose, that instead of speaking of the individual who pointed out the painting to their notice, they are led to speak of the work itself, and to call it a work of taste. This might be said of a work of art, though not of a scene in nature; for in this expression reference is evidently had to the artist by whom the work was executed, and we never think of the Creator as guided by taste in the work of creation. In this then, as in the preceding case, all that is implied is, that the artist has shewn by the design and execution of his work, that he is able to judge correctly. as to the fitness of objects and scenes to produce emotions of beauty. But to shew more fully the nature of taste, and to point out its connexion with the imagination, I shall here describe the manner, in which it guides the artist in designing and executing his work; and in doing this, I shall confine the attention to works in the art of Painting, since the mind conceives most easily and distinctly objects of sense.

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Let us first suppose, that the scene or object represented by the painter, is an exact imitation of some scene or object in nature. In this case, we might be pleased with the work, and say that it discovers good taste. We might be pleased, because the original scene is one fitted to excite emotions of beauty, and we might ascribe good taste to the painter, from his having selected a scene of this kind to be represented. Besides, we might be gratified with the skill that is shewn in the execution of the work. Emotions of beauty might be excited in view of the closeness of the imitation, the justness of the coloring, and the truth of the perspective:

and we might say, that taste has guided the artist in his exhibition of what are usually called secondary beauties of painting.

But the most admired works in the arts of painting are not exact imitations. They are the creations of the painter, and have no archetype in nature. And it is in designing these original works, that the presence of taste is most needed, and her influence felt.

To show in what way taste guides the artist in designing his work, I shall here introduce an account given by Cicero of the course pursued by Zeuxis, when employed by the Crotonians to paint the picture of a beautiful female. The city of Crotona was celebrated for the beauty of its females. Zeuxis requested, that those esteemed most beautiful might be assembled at the same place. From these he selected five, who in his estimation excelled all others in beauty, and by combining in his picture the most striking traits of beauty in each of these five, he executed the task assigned to him.

Now in the whole of this process, taste was evidently the guide of the artist. The selection of the five most beautiful› virgins, the choice of the most beautiful traits in each, are both instances of judgment, founded on the experience of past emotions. But this is only the preparation for his work. What has been thus selected must now be combined together, and so combined, as to produce one harmonious effect. Instead of an assemblage of beautiful limbs and features, an air and proportion must be given to the form, and a cast to the countenance. Here is exercise for the designing powers of the artist, and over this part of the work also taste must preside. Different modes of combination present themselves before his "mind's eye," and of these different combinations, one is to be selected as most beautiful. The making of this selection is evidently an in

stance of judgment, founded on the experience of past emotions of beauty. Zeuxis was familiar with forms of beauty, and had fixed in his mind those principles of judging, which enabled him to decide with readiness and correctness. Hence, no doubt, his celebrity as a painter of the female form.

From this example, we learn, why the most admired productions of the painter are not exact representations of objects and scenes in nature. In natural objects and scenes, that which is suited to excite emotions of beauty, is mingled with objects of indifference and disgust. The artist, under the guidance of taste, collects together these scattered fragments of beauty, and combining them in one view with harmonious effect, presents to us objects and scenes more beautiful than those which can be found in nature.

But it is by no means the case, that the artist is confined to objects and scenes of nature for the materials of these new combinations. It is here that the office of imagination and its connexion with taste, may be seen. By this faculty of the mind, the objects of past sensations are modified and combined anew, and images of objects and scenes, that exist only in this airy creation, rise up before our view. But while gazing on these visionary things, the same grateful emotions of beauty are excited, as when the objects before us have more of reality. Hence, when the artist would represent to us a scene, which shall strongly excite our emotions of beauty, he calls in imagination to his aid. She brings to his view a bright assemblage of forms of beauty. She presents them in different lights; combines and modifies them variously. And while these shifting scenes are flitting before him, he selects, under the guidance of taste, the most beautiful forms and happiest combinations, and fixes them on the canvass for our view.

From these united efforts of imagination and taste, the

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