judgment extends no further than to a decision, whether in any particular production, or performance, the rules of the art have been observed. This may be illustrated in the case of an epic poem. Aristotle has fully and with precision laid down the rules, according to which this species of writing should be composed, deriving them from Homer, the great master of the art. It is evident, that one, who has made himself familiar with these rules, may sit in judgment on the Æneid of Virgil, and the Paradise Lost of Milton. With his line and his compass, he may take the dimensions of an Epic Poem, as readily and easily as of a building. In fact, he does nothing more than apply to the work he examines, the measures which have been taken from some other work that has been admired, and in this way decide as to the merits of the poem. This is the lowest kind of criticism, and he who exercises it, may be called a man of technical taste.

Taste of Comparison.

It is also sometimes the case, that the productions of some admired author, or artist, are the standard, to which all attempts of the same nature must be brought. The admirer of Byron, whose mind is filled with his delightful horrors, and who is wont to admire his master-strokes of passion, in examining the productions of other poets, will pronounce on their excellence, from their comparative effect on his own mind, and will approve or condemn, as they agree with those of this great master of the art. This may be distinguished as the taste of comparison. It is often found among those, who devote their time to visiting galleries of paintings, and other collections of works in the fine arts. This kind of taste is a source of enjoyment to its possessor, and is often found united with merit as an author or artist. Some men

succeed better, when they take the taste of another for their guide, than when they rely on their own. — "Velles eum suo

ingenio dixisse, alieno judicio.”*

Philosophical taste.

But the man of taste, in the true use of the word, does not, like the mere critic of technical skill, only apply the rules of his art. Neither, in forming his decisions, does he bring every object of which he judges, to some favorite standard of excellence. Truth and nature are the models which he has studied, and he has found them alike in the objects of creation around him, in the scenes of real life, and in the creations of genius. Like Numa of old, he has his Egeria in the woods, and after holding high converse with this mysterious revealer of the secrets of nature, he comes forth to the world, and discloses, as if by inspiration, the principles of the empire of taste, and the laws of her dominion. To him belongs the prophetic eye of taste. He can not only decide with correctness on the scene spread before him, but surveying the visions of his own mind the scenes that exist only in the world of imagination, he can anticipate with unerring certainty their beauty and effect. There is also an unchanging uniformity in the decisions of philosophical taste. Even the eternal principles of morality are not more fixed and determinate. What met the approbation of the man of philosophical taste two thousand years ago, meets the approbation of the man of philosophical taste now, and will continue to be thus admired till the end of time. On this principle Quinctilian has said, " Ille se profecisse sciat, cui Cicero valde placebit." On this principle Homer, and Virgil,

* You commend the genius of the writer, but prefer, that it should be guided by another's taste, rather than by his own.

† Whoever can discern the excellences of Cicero, may hence learn that he has himself made proficiency as an orator.

and Demosthenes, and Cicero, have been admired, wherever they have been known. Here also is the only foundation of hope to the aspirant after literary immortality.

The Fine Arts are so closely connected with the subject of taste, that I subjoin to this chapter a short account of what is meant by them.

The Fine, Elegant, or Polite Arts, for these epithets are synonymous, are so called in distinction from the Useful Arts.

The former are designed to please; the latter aim at the supply of human wants. It is true, that works in the useful arts may be so constructed as to please, at the same time that they subserve our necessities. And on the other hand, works that please and are designed to please, may be useful.

Hence it may be difficult in regard to some productions in the arts, to say to which they belong, the Useful, or the Elegant; still there is ground for the distinction that has been made, and according to the design-to please, or to be useful, we say that some arts are elegant and others useful.

Of the Fine Arts, some are imitative, and others symbolical. Some exhibit an exact representation of the object or scene they would present before the mind; such are Painting and Sculpture. These are called imitative fine arts. Others make use of signs which have been agreed upon among men for the representation of objects; such as Music and Poetry. These, in distinction from the former, may be called symbolical fine arts.

It has been stated, that the design of works in the fine arts, is to please. This may be effected in two different ways. The object or scene brought before the mind, may be such as is suited to excite grateful emotions, or the mind may be pleased with the skill that is shown in the execution of the work. In the former case, when the object or scene

represented has no original in nature, but is a creation of the artist's mind, while we regard the object of the work, and notice how the different parts of it tend to the promotion of this object, we are said to observe the primary beauties, or the beauties of design. But whether the scene or object represented be an exact copy of some original in nature, or a creation of the artist's, if the attention is directed only to the skill shewn in the execution of the work, we are said to observe secondary beauties, or the beauties of execution. The art of writing or composition, whether elegant or useful, is one of the symbolical arts. There is no exact imitation of what is designed to be brought before the mind, but objects and scenes are represented by words as symbols, This must evidently increase the difficulty of the artist, or writer; for though he may have in his own mind distinct views of what is fitted to excite emotions of taste, and may connect these views with the signs which he uses, yet, if the reader do not attach the same views to the signs used, they will fail to excite in his mind the emotions designed to be produced. Much then will depend upon the skill with which these signs are used, and hence it is, that in literary productions, so much attention is paid, with the design of pleasing, to the execution of the work.

We may here also see a reason, why the beauties of design in literary productions, are said to be addressed to the imagination of the readers. As we have seen in the last chapter, it is by the aid of the imagination that the artist is able to design those objects and scenes, which are the creations of his own mind. When these creations have been formed, they are represented by the signs that are used. Now it is obviously the imagination of the reader, which must interpret these signs. They are intended to set his imagination in exercise, and to cause it to present before the mind an object or scene, similar to that which the writer had in

view when using these signs; and if the reader have no powers of imagination, the attempt of the writer to place before him a scene fitted to excite grateful emotions will be vain.

It is an easy inference from what has been said in this chapter, that the cultivation and improvement of taste in the several fine arts, will be promoted by a familiarity with models of excellence in those arts. He who would cultivate a taste for painting, or music, or fine writing, will seek after the works of those who excel in these different departments. But it may here be remarked generally in respect to taste, that it is improved by whatever gives enlargement and improvement to the mind. Taste, as judgment, calls into exercise various intellectual faculties; comparisons are to be instituted, inferences to be made, and conclusions to be drawn; and the more perfectly this work is performed, the higher is the order of taste possessed. Education, then, furnishing mental discipline, and accustoming the mind to processes of analysis and investigation, is conducive to the improvement of the taste. And since, as has been stated, much that comes under the cognizance of taste is addressed to the imagination, especially in the symbolical fine arts, the cultivation of this faculty of the mind will conduce to the same result