ART. X. Ariftotle's Ethics and Politics, &c. tranflated by Dr. Gillies, (Continued from vol. xiii, p. 463.) THE HE fervice rendered by Dr. Gillies to the public, in this masterly work on the Philofophy of Ariftotle, cannot eafily be too highly eftimated. From the various works of that extraordinary man, he has felected the two which are most important to the caufe of virtue and public order; and giving them in a free tranflation, certainly beft calculated to convey the real fenfe of fuch a writer, he has prefixed a general analyfis of his works; that the reader may not enter into the confideration of thofe admirable books without a preparatory knowledge of the author's principles and mode of philofophizing. We cannot hesitate to fay, that this plan is the best that has ever yet been devifed, for diffufing correct ideas refpecting Ariftotle himself, and thofe fubjects which he was fo fingularly qualified to illuftrate; particularly the much-agitated doctrines of government, which no other writer has ever difcuffed with equal knowledge of human practice, or comparable infight into human nature. It would be grofs injuftice to Dr. Gillies not to add, that the plan is as well executed as it is ably conceived; and that they who, with fuch means of inftruction offered to them, continue to brood over their own crude and imperfect ideas, and still presume to agitate political queftions, deferve fomething very different from pity, for their obftinate and wilful ignorance, The analysis of Ariftotle's works is conducted with regu larity, clearnefs, and judgment. The analyfer begins with the views of the author refpecting the fources of human knowledge. From this part we inferted a fpecimen, very honoura ble to the philofopher, in our former article on this work*, He then arranges the objects of human thought, and the works of Aristotle referring to themt, into three grand divifions: God, Nature, and Man. Ariftotle's Theology may be referred Brit. Crit. vol. xiii, p. 461. + For Ariftotle, as is juftly faid in the opening of this Analysis, Difdaining the conqueft of particular provinces, daringly invaded the whole empire of philofophy." P. 39. to his Metaphyfics, a name unknown to him; but given to that part of his works by his editors, as being proper to follow his phyfical writings. His Hiftory of Nature extends to a large portion of his works, for compoling which, no man, till the late extraordinary improvements in that fcience, could ever poffefs equal advantages. His Philofophy of Man, confidered as a focial and rational being, is alfo highly fatisfactory; and to this head are aptly referred the two great trearifes on Ethics and Politics, here tranflated, as well as thofe on Logic, Rhetoric, and Poetry. The latter of these three divifions, is that which Dr. Gillies first notices, by speaking of the Organon of Ariftotle, or his art of Logic; which, by defining the proper ufe of terms and words, prepares the way to accuracy in the abftrufer branches of philofophy. The word Organon, as every Greek scholar knows, is equivalent to inftrument; and under this name the logic of Ariftote was long extravagantly magnified, as the great engine of difcovery, and the fole inftrument of univerfal Icience. But Ariftotle, as Dr, G. moft juftly obferves, never viewed it in this falfe and flattering light, nor ever beltowed upon it thofe pompous titles. It will be doing fervice to the public, to diffufe the accurate ideas of this analyfer, upon a fubject fo frequently mifunderstood.. "The various tracts compofing the Organon, as it is called, are not even given by him as parts of one and the fame work. They all re late, however, to one and the fame fubject; fince dialectic, in the strict and proper fenfe, is merely the art of dialogue, that is, the art of converfing, Ariftotle's Organon, therefore, rightly understood, is-nothing more than an endeavour to teach the rational and skilful employ ment of that characteristic faculty of man, by which he expretes, through appropriate figns, not only his perceptions of fenfe, but what is indefinitely more various, the comparisons, abftractions, and conclufions of his own mind concerning them. It is in this fenfe that logic, or dialectic, in the order of communicating liberal and univerfal knowledge, ought to precede the more abitrufe and loftier branches of philofophy, becaufe, by carefully analyfing the figns by which internal operations, as well as external objects, are expreffed, we remount at once to the origin and fource both of our notions and of our percep tions; discover their intimate connections with each other; and unfold, even to the unexperienced minds of youth, a vaft intellectual treafure, of which, without being aware of it, they were already in poffeffion." Vol.i, p. 56, In explaining the Categories, Dr. G. very clearly ftates the correct notions of Ariftotle, in oppofition to the fyftem of ideas fupported by Pythagoras and Plato, and unfortunately adopted by by Locke, and other modern philofophers, to the great con1afion and detriment of Metaphyfical Science. Dr. Reid, in has very fagacinus Enquiry into the Human Mind, has parti cularly laboured to difcredit the ideal doctrine; fhowing very plainly, that while it is retained no folid anfwer can be given, either to the paradoxes of Berkeley, or the fil more open aud general fcepticism of Hume. The former of these writers overturned the material world, the latter difcarded alfo the world of fpirits, leaving nothing in nature but ideas and impreffions; but both argued foundly and conclufively, upon the data given by Locke. Ariftotle, on the contrary, took care precilely to warn his pupils, that ideas, immutable effences, and all fuch general terms, are merely the work of human thought, expreffed and embodied in language. General terms, he exprefsly fays, denote nothing befides the particulars comprised under them. They are invented for the fake of convenience, but have no antitypes in Nature. To call ideas exemplars or patterns, and to say that other things are made in imitation or by participation of them, is merely empty found, and poetical metaphort." Yet the Platonic doctrine of ideas has most abfurdly been afcribed alfo to Ariftotle, who is its direct opponent; and Dr. G. fhows, in a long and elaborate note (p. 60) that even Harris and Lord Monboddo have fallen into this general error, notwithstanding the very plain terms in which the philofopher expreffes his opinion. With equal clearness this analyfer goes through the remaining parts of Ariftotle's Organon, thereby conveying the general principles of Logic in the most diftinct and comprehensive manner. The pallage in which he takes a general view of this part of his author's works, being likely to correct the prevalent ideas on this fubje&t, we shall infert this alfo, as we did the introductory paragraph. "In as few words as feemed confiftent with perfpicuity, I have thus Endeavoured to explain the nature and defign of Ariftotle's Organon; a work, which has often been as fhamefully mifreprefented, as it was long moft grofsly mifapplied. In that fcholaftic jargon, which info lently ufurped during many centuries the name of Philofophy, fyllogifs were perveried to purposes for which their inventor declares them totally unfit, and employed on fubjects in which his uniform practice thews, that he confidered them as altogether useless. Our acquaintance with the properties of things, he perpetually inculcates, moft be acquired by patient obfervation, generalized by comparifon and induction; but when this foundation is once laid, the words by In his Treatife of Human Nature. + Metaphyf, xi, c. 5a which which our generalizations are expreffed, deferve not merely to be regarded as the materials in which our knowledge is embodied, or the channels by which it is communicated, but to be considered in the two following refpects, as the principles or fources from which new know ledge may be derived. Firt, by means of a skilful arrangement of accurate and well-chofen terms, many proceffes of reafoning may be performed by difcerning the relations and analogies of words, with a certainty as great, and with a rapidity far greater, than thefe proceff.s could poffibly be carried on, were we obliged, in every step of our pro grefs, to fix our attention on things. Every general torm is confidered by Ariftotle as the abridgment of a definition, and every definition is denominated by him a Collection, because it is the refult always of obfervation and comparison, and often of many obfervations and many comparifons. The improvements in mathematics have advanced from age to age, chiefly by improving the language, that is, the figns, by which mathematical truths are expresled; and the molt important dif coveries have been made in that noble fcience, by continually fimpli fying the objects of our comparisons; or, in other words, by finding clear expreffions for ratios, including the refuits of many others. In all other sciences, this investigation is of the utmolt importance; and, in many of them, our knowledge will be found to advance almost exactly in proportion to the fuccefs with which our language is improved. When terms, therefore, are formed and applied with that propriety which perpetually fhines in the Stagirite's writings, his general formu las of reafoning afford an analytic art, which may be employed as an engine for raifing new truths on thote previously established; and if modern languages do not afford the fame advantage, precifely in the fame degree, it is not from the inefficacy of words as figns, but from the inefficacy of figns ill chofen and ill arranged; from impro priety of application, contempt of analogy, and abuse of metaphor." Vol. i, p. 78, From the Logic of Ariftotle, his analyst proceeds to the Metaphyfics, in which he demonftrates the Being of one God, in opposition to Atheists on one hand, and Polytheists on the other. To the books of this great work he gives a new and judicious arrangement, yet nearly fimilar to one which had been given by Samuel Petit, in his Mifcellanea*. It is certainly the more valuable, from the concurrent opinion of two authors labouring feparately. According to the prefent arrangement, there are only ten books of the Metaphyfics, inftead of fourteen, and the new order may be conveniently illuftrated by the annexed scheme. * It is mentioned in a note, that Dr. Morton of the British Mu feum, a diligent ftudent of Aristotle, firft informed Dr. Gillies of this soincidence of his judgment with that of Petit, Order Much light is undoubtedly thrown on the fubjects of thefe abftrufe books, by the arrangement here ftated, and by the remarks of the analy fer. We find here the view of Ariftotle's Hiftory of Nature, which is alfo analyzed by Dr. Gillies with confiderable care and accuracy. Here again he takes occafion to point out how very unfairly the Stagyrite has been treated by the greatest modern philofophers; who attribute to him doctrines which he ftrongly oppofed, and cenfure him for the fame potions which he cenfured in others. Of this, the following Note contains fome curious inftances. "It is pleafant to find Hobbes, in the 4th chapter of his Leviathan, and in many other parts of his works, combating, under the name of Ariftotle's philofophy, abftract effences, fubftantial forms, and innumerable other doctrines, metaphyfical as well as moral and political, with nearly the fame arguments by which Ariftotle, their fuppofed author, had long before victoriously refuted them. Malbranche, and the French Philofophers in general, treat the Stagyrite with not lefs unfairness, and speak of his opinions with not lefs ignorance. I fcarcely except Rapin, whofe account of Aristotle, hitherto regarded as the beft, is difgraced by great inaccuracies. It is not eafy to conceive how a writer, who had not acquired his notion of Aristotle's writings at fecond hand, fhould fo totally mistake their aim as Rapin does in fpeaking of the Ethics to Eudemus." See Comparaifon de Platon & Ariftotle, p. 345, edit. Amfterdam, 1686." Vol, i, p. 116, On the fubject of Zoology, twenty-five books only out of fifty are preferved in the works of Ariftotle; but even these Taken from his works written exprefly on the fubject; but only referred to in this fixth (formerly eighth) book of his Metaphyfics. comprehend |