Thus it came about that the first elections for a Union parliament, held in September 1910, were fought practically on the old lines; and to-day we appear to be as far from the 'one-stream' policy as we were then. But appearances may be deceptive. Experience and education, not unmixed with lessons of the Great War, are at work; and, although no practical steps have yet been taken to bridge the gulf, there are not wanting signs of an impending change. The Dutch themselves have recently split into two factions; the one, styled the Nationalist Party, under General Hertzog, wishes to disregard the pledges given at Vereeniging; the other, called the South African Party, under General Smuts, respects them. The latter party, on account of its loyal attitude and more progressive outlook, has attracted to its ranks considerable support from the inhabitants of British birth or origin, with the general result that the English-speaking section has partly lost its identity in the South African Party, and is otherwise about equally represented by the Unionist and Labour members.

It is devoutly to be wished for South African progress and happiness that some means may be found of speedily bringing about more stable conditions in the political arena. The republican propaganda need not be viewed with undue apprehension, because a considerable section of the Dutch, born and bred under the British flag, would be against its disappearance. The whole of the English, of course, are of the same mind; and the natives would be most unquestionably opposed to the formation of what they would regard as a Dutch Republic. They have a lively recollection of their description as scepsels (creatures) in the old Transvaal grondwet (constitution). I am impelled to say at this point that Mr Bonar Law could hardly have given weighty consideration to the statement he made in the House of Commons on March 30 of this year (in the debate on Irish Home Rule), that, if the self-governing dominions chose to-morrow to say, "We will no longer make a part of the British Empire," we would not try to force them.' The Cape of Good Hope is one of the most important strategic points in the whole Empire; and its secession would probably be viewed at home and in the rest of the British Empire somewhat in the same light

as that in which the North viewed the proposed secession of the South from the United States of America.

General Botha came over to England to attend the Imperial Conference in 1907 and 1911; and upon these as on all other occasions his romantic figure marked him out for special popularity in this country. The keynote of his attitude in regard to Imperial affairs has been freedom of action for the Dominions in their domestic policy, and unity in all external matters. His quarrel with Hertzog originated over the latter's unbridled antiimperial speeches, particularly in connexion with the South African contribution to the Navy, and his 'twostream' policy, under which he advocated racialism of the worst kind. Botha finally expelled him from his Cabinet. From that event sprang the consolidation and rise of what is now known as the Nationalist Party, led by Hertzog and represented in the House of Assembly to-day by no less than forty-four seats. It would be incorrect to say that the whole of the Nationalist Party would like to see the British flag expelled from South Africa. Some at least of the followers of Hertzog are sufficiently versed in the world's affairs to realise the defenceless position of a country like South Africa, in its present state of population and development, against attack by any first-rate Power, without the support of the British Empire. Still, the great majority of the members of that party are unsophisticated farmers from the back-veld, with little knowledge of the world, a belief that South Africa is the hub of the universe, a partiality for the patriarchal views of President Kruger, and a conviction that the Dutch of South Africa are exclusively the people' and should be endowed with exclusive rule. Power in the hands of a Government set up by such a party would bring about a repetition of many of the errors that led to the troubles of the past and might end in civil war.

In the Johannesburg labour troubles of July 1913, Botha at first failed to realise the penalty that always waits upon supineness on the part of the Government. The forces of disorder were allowed to accumulate, and the gold-mining industry was brought to a standstill. Extremist sections marched from mine to mine and forced the workers to come out on strike, until by the

end of the week everything was closed down and the market-square at Johannesburg, which holds tens of thousands of people, contained a seething mass of strikers and sight-seers, inextricably mixed up. At nightfall on the evening of Friday, July 4, the turbulent and destructive elements burned down the Park Station and the 'Star'' offices, and were only prevented from wrecking the Corner House by the police using their fire-arms. On the following day, General Botha and General Smuts came over to the Rand and found that order could not be restored without a great expenditure of innocent blood besides that of the disturbers of the peace. Botha, not having realised the effect of previous inaction, was, I think, justified in refusing to face the horror then confronting him. He, therefore, surrendered to the strikers. Work was resumed on the following Monday under conditions better imagined than described. The white miners, who regard themselves as the workers, in spite of most of the work being done by the natives, were masters of the situation and did exactly what they liked. Within six months, a further strike was threatened, and indeed begun; but, profiting by the experience previously gained, the Government took adequate precautions, and the stoppage of the industry lasted only half a day. On this occasion, the leaders of the movement did not succeed in gaining anything by the turmoil they had created. The strikes of July 1913, and of January 1914, are remarkable examples of the effect of weak or of strong government; and no one, I think, grasped the situation more clearly than Botha.

While it would be out of place here to discuss at length the subject last referred to, it is worth while to point out that the white man in South Africa (who enjoys the position of a supervisor, on the one hand, but claims, on the other, all the rights of combination, copied from the procedure in England) is placing himself in a very dangerous situation, because he has but to teach the native worker (which he is doing) to follow his example, and some day he will find himself as well as his fellow-citizens in a most precarious position.

So much has been written of General Botha's course

of action since the outbreak of the world-war that it would be superfluous to dwell at length upon that period, but that he never wavered for one moment from his allegiance to the Empire is unquestionable. That the necessity for crushing rebellion among his own compatriots must have been abhorrent to him is equally certain. He was a man whose cast of mind turned to compromise, conciliation, and persuasion as the way of winning through. To be forced to pursue and destroy men of his own race, even in open rebellion, must have caused him the keenest pain, but he never hesitated. Great Britain was at war, and South Africa was at war; there could be no question in his mind of optional neutrality. He appealed to Mr Steyn, former President of the Orange Free State, to use his influence to bring the rebels to reason, but the answer was unfavourable, as Mr Steyn objected to General Botha's invasion of South-West Africa. Botha brought that campaign to a rapid conclusion in a series of brilliant tactical moves, with but little loss of life. He then deputed his chief lieutenant, General Smuts, to take control of the East African campaign, which proved to be a much more lengthy and arduous undertaking. Finally, when the horrors of the struggle in Europe and elsewhere were brought to a close by the Armistice of November 1918, General Botha came over to England for the Peace Conference, visiting countries in Europe where problems had to be studied in anticipation of the Treaty of Peace. He was welcomed here with all the marks of affection and esteem to which he had been accustomed on previous occasions, and, of course, had he so desired, would have received almost any honour or decoration to which he might have aspired. No doubt partly in deference to the views of his compatriots, he declined any titular distinction, but became a member of His Majesty's Privy Council, having previously accepted an honorary Generalship in the British Army, which he valued very highly as a mark of distinction rarely granted. His intimate friends were aware that the state of his health left much to be desired, but no one anticipated his early death, which took place at midnight on Aug. 27, 1919.

The briefness of this narrative necessitates the omission of a great many points in this distinguished

man's career which might otherwise have been included. Suffice it, in conclusion, to say that, in the history of his own people, no man is entitled to, or likely to be accorded, anything like the position of eminence that his memory should receive and, in the world of men, history will no doubt place him among the elect. His friends will always look back upon Louis, as he was familiarly called, as a most agreeable companion and as a fine example of sagacious and sturdy manhood. General Smuts paid the following touching tribute to General Botha's memory at the grave of his dead friend and leader:

'After the intimate friendship and unbroken co-operation of twenty-one years, I have the right to call Botha the largest, most beautiful, and sweetest soul of all my land and days, great in life and happy in death.'

Lastly, General Botha's breadth of view and benevolent outlook were evinced in his farewell interview, published through Reuter in July 1919; and the following extract is memorable:

'As Great Britain led the war, so she has led the peace, and we look to her to secure its just fulfilment. I do not pretend to agree with all the peace terms. Who does? But I would say to the Germans: Show by your conduct that you intend to carry out the terms in the spirit and in the letter, and you will find salvation. Evasion and shiftiness will not be tolerated, but in honesty of purpose and of fulfilment may repose for you relief. . . . While we all lift up our hearts in thankfulness that the nightmare of the last five years is past, let us remember that with the victors rests the supreme gift of mercy. Should Germany in the near future produce evidence of a changed heart and a contrite spirit, it should be the privilege of Great Britain, just as she has led in war, also to lead in the mercy of peace. The peace must not be marred by vengeance. I go back to South Africa more firmly convinced than ever that the mission of the British Empire now and in the time to come lies along the path of freedom and high ideals. Britain is the corner-stone upon which our civilisation must rest.'

LIONEL PHILLIPS.