In the earlier years of the war, each of the nations fighting against Germany was compelled to carry on a separate war. Great Britain, France, Russia, and, later, Italy, each with its separate military command, and its individual types of munitions, maintained its separate front. And this was true, not only of the military activities of the Allies, but of their whole economic life, and also (and most important) of their systems of transport and supply, which included the import of food and raw materials on which they were all so largely dependent. As the war went on, the lesson of coöperation was forced upon them; but not until the third and fourth years did they finally admit that not only all their strength, but the joint use of all their strength, was essential. And after it was admitted, a long time elapsed before it was understood.

With the increasing absorption of the people and industries of the Allied nations in the business of war on so vast a scale, they required an enormous increase of importations. And by the spring of 1917 the German submarine campaign had produced a tonnage situation so acute that, in that year and in 1918, it was possible for the Allies to import only those bare necessities which permitted them to live and carry on the war, and it became essential that all waste of tonnage should be avoided. It was that condition which finally forced organized and efficient machinery for international coöperation.

In the earlier years of the war, the help in money and ships which Great

Britain gave to France and Italy was given sporadically, as the need arose, and for the most part without defined plan. Help was given - but often at the last moment, to ward off catastrophe. The decisions as to economic cooperation between the Allies were thus often dictated by panic rather than by plan, and at times, by competition between panics. The ships which Great Britain allotted to France and Italy were operated without any general plan for the economical use of tonnage

and thus a cargo of wheat going from the East to England might pass in the Mediterranean a cargo of wheat going from America to Italy. Neither ship need have entered that dangerzone at all. The lack of unified control of ships involved a disastrous waste of tonnage. More, since Great Britain (herself strong and free from invasion) was usually in the position of donor called on by the other Allies for aid, and was also the judge of how much could be spared from her own need, it was inevitable that there should at times have been misunderstandings between the Allied governments on one hand the feeling of unequal sacrifice, on the other, the suspicion of unequal effort. Each of the Allies was surprisingly ignorant of the economic needs and the economic sacrifices of the others, and often underestimated both. Nor were the usual methods of communication well designed to avoid such misunderstanding.

To meet these conditions, and largely because of them, there was gradually developed a comprehensive system and

machinery of international coöperation in providing the ships and the imports. It is with that system of international coöperation in the matter of transport and supply that this paper deals.

The earliest conspicuous instance in which effective machinery for coöperation between the Allies was worked out was the Wheat Executive. The Wheat Executive was formed in 1917, by representatives of Great Britain, France, and Italy, sitting together in London. Its function was to make a comprehensive plan for the breadstuff supply of the Allied nations and to supervise the execution of the plan. The Wheat Executive proceeded in its work on very simple and sound lines first, to ascertain the respective needs of the Allies, and then to ascertain and divide the available supply. The representative of each country presented the minimum cereal needs of his people, tabulating the rate of consumption, the home-production, and the deficit to be imported. This statement was criticized by the representatives of the other Allies, and a yearly programme of importation for all the Allied countries was outlined. Then the possible sources of supply were examined and apportioned to the programme, and the deficit shared. The programme was thus established on the firm foundation of the respective needs of the Allies.

With this programme proposed by the Wheat Executive and approved by the respective governments, that body was then in a position to go to the British Ministry of Shipping and ask for an allotment of tonnage, furnishing reasons for the request which no one was in a position to refute. Where before there had been three applicants clamorous for ships, who must be appeased, each (for the sake of safety) overemphasizing his story of the dangers of starvation, there was now one request with a reasonably clear programme.

Once that programme was established, the Wheat Executive performed two other functions: it formed buying and shipping agencies in the exporting countries, which served all the Allies without competition, and simplified the system of financial credits between the Allies and the relations of the treasuries. It also kept watch over the execution of its programmes, and saw that the supplies were shipped and received and the deficiencies fairly shared.

It must not be supposed that this system, which at the end of the war controlled a large and complex business organization all over the world, was built up at once. No programme, however carefully made, could be more than a sound general guide; no system of division could work with entire fairness. But, on the whole, the Wheat Executive worked well, and for the cereal year September 1, 1917, to September 1, 1918, at the time when the Allied countries were nearest to starvation and the submarine campaign was at its height, the Wheat Executive performed its function with surprising success. This success did not come because that body had broad powers; indeed, its members exercised very little direct authority. Their success seems to have come from two things: first, that in daily conference the members representing Great Britain, France, and Italy came to know and trust each other and thus to found an antidote against misunderstanding; and second, they discovered that, as usual, the difficulties of their task lay in ascertaining the facts of their problem that, once the facts were understood, it was not so difficult to persuade their governments to adopt a comprehensive and sensible plan of action. The Wheat Executive was by no means the first international organization on economic matters, but it initiated the first satisfactory machinery for international coöperative action.

controllers of Great Britain, France, and Italy (who were responsible to their people for food-shortages) agreed as to their respective shares of the food which should be imported, and agreed to share further cuts to provide space to bring American soldiers to France. It was a remarkable example of how helpful the work of a fact-finding body can be, even if the power of final decision be not delegated to it.

The Allied Maritime Transport Council did not control the various programme committees. The FoodCommittees reported to the several food-controllers, and the Raw Material Committees to the Ministers of Munitions and the War Industries Board. Inasmuch, however, as ships were the limiting factor, it was essential that, when the committees had reduced their programmes so far as seemed to them possible, there must be further reduction if the total programmes exceeded the amount of transport available. The result was that the Transport Council, in 1918, received the programmes of all the committees, and made adjustments to bring the supplies within the carrying capacity of the ships; but in practice that meant re-routing of the world's tonnage.

Moreover, it was not only the programmes of the Allied countries that were dealt with. Through control of the sources of supply, a very real control was exercised over neutrals. An effort was made to ascertain their needs, and to see that those needs were supplied as equitably as possible, having in view the world-shortage and the conflicting needs of the Allies and of other neutrals. The control over neutral imports, and (largely) the acquisition of neutral ships for war-service, were in the hands of the Blockade Committee, with which a representative of the United States War-Trade Board sat in a central coördinating committee,

which was charged with planning the blockade against Germany.

It must be constantly remembered that the representatives of the various countries on the programme committees and the Allied Maritime Transport Council did not have power finally to bind their respective governments. They could only recommend action; but since the decisions depended largely upon the facts, the finding of the fact tended more and more to determine the decision. Many newspaper references to the Allied Maritime Transport Council and the programme committees, and some books and magazine articles have given the impression that they were international bodies controlling the vital necessities of life. This is not accurate. Each nation settled its own affairs, but its manner of exercising its control was greatly affected especially in the European countries which had been longer in the war- by the findings of the programme committees and the Transport Council.

A few cases will illustrate the range of subjects covered by these inter-Allied bodies and the nature of their recommendations. Early in the war, as we have said, wheat from India went through the Mediterranean to England, passing on the way wheat going from the United States to Italy. Under the Wheat Executive and programme committees, wheat from India stopped at Italy, and the corresponding amount of wheat that would have gone from America to Italy went to England or France. This was not only a saving of ships, but an avoidance of an unnecessary submarine risk in the dangerous Western Mediterranean. During the first years of the war England's oil-supply had come in very large quantity from the oil-fields of the Far East. American oil companies had built up a large market in China, and were carrying oil from the Atlantic seaboard to

China. A re-routing, which was about to go into operation when the armistice was signed, was arranged through the Petroleum Conference, by which the American oil should go to England and the oil from the far eastern points should go to China. Early in 1918 Italy was desperately short of coal. Through the Transport Council an arrangement was made by which coal was sent from Southern France to Italy, partly by an all-rail route, and partly by rail to Marseilles and then by ship to Italy. To take care of the coal needs of France, which would have been seriously imperiled by this diversion of coal to Italy, large shipments of Cardiff coal were sent across the Channel to the northern French ports. The March 21 (1918) drive of the Germans precipitated a very serious coal question. The principal coal-supply of France was in the Pas de Calais district. The German military success reduced the output of the mines in this district and prevented the shipment of coal therefrom to the south of France, because of the interruption of traffic on the main railway line to the south. An arrangement was therefore made by which the English army got its coal from the French mines in the northern district, and English coal was sent by ships to the southerly ports of France.

Following the creation of the Maritime Council in 1918, there also came into existence other inter-Allied organizations the Allied Food Council, the Munitions Council, the Blockade Council, and the Finance Council (which dealt only with American purchases, but was formed before any of the others and had a longer service and tradition behind it). These bodies were functioning with varying efficiency when the armistice came. Some of them were very young- certainly they were becoming increasingly valuable and efficient, and played a considerable

part in making possible the supplying of tonnage for the American troopmovement to France. In all, the experience seems to have been the same that a small international body, which sat constantly and concerned itself with the ascertainment of the facts of any situation, was of great assistance in securing intelligent joint action.

In all these international bodies which sat in 1918 the United States was represented, and to all the principles of international coöperation with the Allies in the war the United States assented. In actual practice, however, the United States government did not accept the results of the Allied councils to anything like the same degree as the European Allies; nor can it be fairly said that our action was largely influenced by these councils, or that our government listened to their studies of the facts or their plans. The most difficult task in international action always is the learning that the representatives of other nations can be as high-minded or unselfish as one's self, and that task always takes time.

It is notable, again, that neither in the United States nor in Great Britain and France was there at any time effective coöperation between the military and civilian transport and supply systems. The armies of France and Italy particularly depended almost wholly on the inter-Allied organizations for imports of food (the British army to a much smaller degree and the United States army very little), but no army got to the point of submitting its demands for general criticism, nor did any army seriously consider the general problems of waste of tonnage or supply. Thus, to the end of the war, the British navy sent some of their own coal to their ships in the Pacific at an almost unbelievable waste of tonnage, for no other reason than that the navy is sacrosanct; and every army piled up huge

reserves of food and supplies which were always asserted to be essential to winning the war. Perhaps they were, - certainly no one begrudged anything that might serve the fighting forces or make for their security. The purpose of the reference is, not to indicate selfishness, but simply to point out that the exigencies of the Great War were never enough to drive the armies on the Western front to a common general supply-system- much less to any system of coördinating that supply with the needs of the very hard-pressed civilian populations. Toward the end of the war only, after the unified command came into being, an Allied armysupply board began the job of pooling supplies of all the armies in those commodities, such as forage, of which the armies were shortest. Coöperation between the quartermasters' departments brings up quite the same difficulties as coöperation between nations.

But the surprising thing, to anyone familiar with the work of the international coöperative organizations during the war, was the amount which was actually accomplished by the several widely different nationalities working together in the face of appalling difculties. It is fair to say of these organizations:

First, that they served an important immediate purpose in getting a fair division of essential imports among the Allies and keeping them all united.

Second, that they emphasized again the value of constant 'common counsel,' and the examination of facts in international affairs, as contrasted with the unsatisfactory form of advocacy usually known as diplomacy.

Third, that they were highly instru

mental in convincing the government officials of the European Allies that the project of a league of nations gave promise of success.

Fourth, that the form of the Covenant for the League of Nations proposed by the committee of the Peace Conference was largely influenced by the experience of the inter-Allied bodies described in this chapter. This is clearly brought out in the published statements of the representatives of Great Britain and Italy in the Peace Conference. It has not been emphasized or clarified in any official statement in the United States; and many of the members of our Senate, in their discussions in the session which ended on March 4, 1919, seem to have lost sight of the fact that the main function of the Executive Council of the proposed League is, not to bind any participant by a majority vote, but to study and report on the facts, and by constant common counsel to make easier agreement for action by the nations. Only in a few exceptional cases, which are expressly stated in the proposed Covenant, can the Executive Council, or indeed the League itself, act otherwise than by unanimous agreement. It is in its reliance on the value of the international understanding to prevent disagreement, and its significant omission of anything like an international police force which would attempt to coerce agreement, that the proposed Covenant gives most promise of success. That was the chief lesson of international coöperation during the war. And it is hardly to be expected that the nations of the world at peace will find the problem easier of solution than the nations fighting against Germany found it during the war.