Faith as its standard, intend to include slaveholding under the term oppression, so that it can be the subject of discipline if the Court of the Church, to which is intrusted the power to try offences, should think proper to regard it in the same light? The undersigned admits, that, if it can be proved by documentary evidence, such as cannot be questioned, that, when the Confession of Faith was adopted by the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, slaveholding in any case was intended to be included under the term oppression, then slaveholding exists under the circumstances specified, and the individual sustaining the relation may be prosecuted under the charge of oppression. It is proper to judge of the import of the terms of the Constitution by the manifest intent of its framers, or of those who first adopted it. The undersigned then would ask, where is the evidence that the first General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, or that the Synod preceding the first General Assembly, designed to include slaveholding under the term oppression, when they adopted the Confession of Faith as their standard? So far from such evidence being on record, the circumstances connected with the formation of the first General Assembly, and the history of the Synod preceding it, would lead to the conclusion that those judicatories could not have understood the term oppression to include slaveholding. When the General Assembly was first organized, twelve out of the thirteen States were slaveholding States. A considerable portion of the members of the Assembly represented churches existing in those States; and it is not an unreasonable supposition that some of the members of that body were slaveholders. Can it be possible that they intended to include slaveholding-the mere relation of master and slave-under the term oppression; or to intimate that the relation itself, existing under any circumstances, could be a bar to Christian communion, and could be a subject of discipline? The undersigned is persuaded, that, if such an idea had been entertained and expressed, the General Assembly would not have been organized in 1789. He is constrained, therefore, to believe that no one is justified in inferring, from the use of the term oppression, the right of any judicatory of the Church to regard slaveholding, in any case, an offence in the sense in which the term is used in the Book of Discipline. In denying to the General Assembly the power to regard slaveholding, in any case, an offence in the sense in which the term is used in the Book of Discipline, it is proper to observe, that we concede that the abuses of this relation, like those of every other relation in life, when brought before the Assembly in the way prescribed by the Constitution, may be treated as offences in the sense in which the term is used in the Book of Discipline. Cruelty, correcting inferiors unduly, withholding from them what is necessary to subsistence and comfort, and disregarding the spiritual interests of those committed to our care, are sins prohibited in the standards of the Presbyterian Church; and may, therefore, be made subjects of discipline, whether they exist in connection with slaveholding, or the relation of husband and wife, of parent and child, or of master and apprentice. The undersigned considers, that there is an obvious distinction between slaveholding and the evils incident to the relation; and that, whilst the latter, being prohibited in the standards of the Church, may be the subject of discipline, the former, not being referred to in the Confession of Faith, cannot be treated as an offence in any case. The master, to whom a child is bound as an apprentice, may treat him cruelly; and, if he is a member of the Church, he may be disciplined by the Church Session for cruelty. But who would say that he is liable to the discipline of the Church for sustaining the relation itself? The husband and parent may be chargeable before a church judicatory, for cruel treatment towards his wife and children. But can a lawful marriage and parental relation exist, in any circumstances that would render the individual subject to discipline for sustaining the relation? There may be circumstances, when individuals would commit sin in the sight of God by entering into the marriage relation. But the Church judicatory can take cognizance only of the abuses of the relation, and not of the relation itself. In referring to these various relations in life, the undersigned would not be understood as placing slaveholding upon an equal footing with them in every respect. His object is to illustrate a principle that he considers vital to the question under consideration, to wit: that, while a delinquency in performing the duties arising from the relation of master and servant, and which are designated in the standards of the Church, may render a slaveholder liable to the discipline of the Church, he cannot, under any circumstances, be disciplined for sustaining the relation itself. The essential idea of slaveholding is, that one individual is invested with the right of exercising legal power over the service of another without his consent; or to express the sentiment in the language of a distinguished author of our Church, it is "the exacting of personal services without consent." It is a relation established by the laws of the land, and is recognized in the Word of God as existing among the members of the Church under the Old Testament dispensation, and among those whom the Apostles admitted into the Christian Church. It is implied, in the resolutions passed by the Assembly at Detroit, that the relation in itself is not sinful. It may be abused, and, like other innocent relations in life, it may be entered into through improper motives, which may render the individual criminal in the sight of God. If the master abuses his authority by a cruel treatment of his servants, he is as subject to the discipline of the Church, as is the husband for the cruel treatment of his wife, or the parent for the unmerciful conduct towards his child. In the view of the undersigned, it was in consequence of overlooking this distinction between a relation that is confessedly innocent in itself, and the wicked abuses of that relation, that the Assembly at Detroit was led to declare slaveholding, in certain circumstances, an offence in the sense in which that term is used in the Book of Discipline. Had the Assembly declared that the abuses of the slaveholding relation—such as may exist in other relations in life, and not the relation itself-was an offence in the sense in which the term is used in the Book of Discipline, whilst the undersigned would consider the mode in which the declaration was made irre He recognizes gular, the sentiment itself would meet his concurrence. the right of the lower judicatories, to institute discipline against a slaveholder for cruelty towards his slaves: and the right of the General Assembly to issue a judicial case involving the charge of cruelty, brought regularly before it, or upon the basis of common rumor. If a Synod neglects to enjoin upon its presbyteries, to institute inquiry as to cruelties alleged to be practised by its members, it can be cited to appear before the Assembly to answer to the charge of delinquency; and the Assembly, if they think proper to do so, can enjoin upon the Synod to consider the subject, and to issue it as, in the view of the Synod, circumstances may require. This, in the judgment of the undersigned, is the extent of the power conferred by the Constitution upon the Assembly in reference to slaveholding, and to other innocent relations in life. The abuses of the relation may be treated as offences, when the charge is brought before the Assembly in the way prescribed by the Constitution, but not the relation itself. The second objection to the resolutions passed by the Assembly at Detroit (to which the undersigned would briefly advert) is, that the interpretation of the Constitution is a judicial act; and, inasmuch as the Assembly can exercise its judicial power with respect to offences only when a case is brought before it from a lower court, by reference, complaint, or appeal, or as a Court of Review-and as the Assembly at Detroit was not called upon to decide a judicial case, or to act as a Court of Review, that body transcended its power, when it declared slaveholding, in certain cases, to be an offence, in the sense in which the term is used in the Book of Discipline. That the interpretation of the Constitution by a Court of the Church is a judicial act will not be questioned; for a body possessing both advisory and judicial power, to interpret the Constitution in its advisory capacity, would be an anomaly in the history of well-ordered governments. In the Constitution of the Presbyterian Church, provision is made for securing a judicial decision of the General Assembly, in respect to other cases than offences, by overtures from the lower courts. Hence, when the Assembly interprets the Constitution, in reference to the subjects brought before it by these overtures, it acts in a judicial capacity. But neither the Constitution, nor the practice of previous General Assemblies, authorizes the Assembly to interpret the Constitution in regard to offences, unless either a case of discipline is brought before the body by reference, or complaint, or appeal; or unless the Assembly acts as a Court of Review. Apart, therefore, from the anomalous proceedings of a Court of the Church declaring abstractly what is an offence in the sense in which the term is used in the Book of Discipline, the undersigned considers that the Assembly in Detroit transcended its power in making this declaration, when there was no judicial case presented for its decision, and when it was not called upon to act as a Court of Review. For these reasons the undersigned, whilst he cordially concurs in the views of the majority of the Committee as to the mode in which offences recognized in the Constitution are to be brought before the Assembly, believes that the action of the Assembly at Detroit, which is sanctioned by the majority, was a violation both of the letter and spirit of the Constitution of the Church. In his judgment, it is the assertion of a principle which, if carried out to its legitimate results, would place the rights and character of every minister and private member of the Church in the hands of an irresponsible court, governed by prejudice and caprice, and acting without regard to the written Constitution by which all profess to be controlled. It would justify a Southern Session or Presbytery in disciplining a member or minister for Abolition sentiments, if the promulgation of such views should be regarded as pernicious in their tendency, and thus inconsistent with the demands of humanity. It would subject a Millenarian or an anti-Millenarian to a prosecution for heresy, according as his Presbytery would consider the one or the other in that light. In a word, it is a principle which, if acted upon, would be utterly subversive of the foundation upon which the Presbyterian Church rests-to wit: A written Constitution, designating distinctly what, in the view of the Church, is essential to Orthodoxy and morality. The following resolutions express the views of the undersigned, as presented in this report: Resolved, That the General Assembly, in virtue of its advisory power, can bear its testimony against anything it may regard as a sin in the sight of God, but that testimony has no authoritative or binding effect upon the lower judicatories. Resolved, That the General Assembly can regard nothing as heresy, or an offence in the sense in which that term is used in the Book of Discipline, which is not distinctly stated to be such in the Confession of Faith of the Presbyterian Church. Resolved, That as slaveholding is not alluded to either directly or indirectly, in the Confession of Faith of the Presbyterian Church, the relation itself of master and servant cannot, in any case, be a cause of discipline before any judicatory. Resolved, That cruelties, in the common acceptation of the term, practised by those sustaining the relation of masters to servants, being directly prohibited in the Confession of Faith, may be cause of discipline, as well as when practised by those sustaining other innocent relations in life. Resolved, That the General Assembly cannot interpret the Constitution of the Church in regard to offences, unless a case is brought before it from a lower court, by reference, complaint, or appeal; or unless the Assembly acts as a Court of Review. Resolved, That if a judicial case, involving what the Constitution of the Church specifies as an offence, is brought regularly before the Assembly by a lower court, it belongs to the Assembly to issue the case; and if the Assembly is well informed that a Synod countenances the prevalence of what the Confession of Faith represents as "heretical sentiments and corrupt practices," it can cite the Synod to its bar, and require it to take up the subject and consider it; but it is left with the Synod to determine, whether to require the Presbytery to take further action in the matter, or to stay all further proceedings as circumstances may require. A. H. H. BOYD. REV. THORNTON A. MILLS presented for himself and others a Protest which having been read was ordered to be placed upon the minutes, and, is as follows: The undersigned respectfully protest against the action of the General Assembly, in ordering the report of the minority of the Committee on the constitutional power of the Assembly, with reference to slaveholding in our churches, to be placed upon the minutes, for the following reasons: 1. It is without precedent. If we are correctly informed, when a majority report has been adopted by the Assembly, no counter minority report has ever been placed beside it on the minutes. 2. It is calculated to place the Assembly, in a false position, and create serious misapprehension. The act was avowedly done as a matter of courtesy; yet to many, it will appear to imply a doubt as to the correctness of the resolutions on slaveholding, adopted by the General Assembly which met at Detroit in 1850. These resolutions undoubtedly express the sentiments of our Church, and of a great majority of this Assembly; and from them we are persuaded there can be no retrocession. 3. The three leading positions of the minority report, viz.: [1.] That the Assembly has no ultimate controlling power over the Synod. [2.] That nothing, which is not specifically stated as an offence in our constitution, can be judicially treated as such; [3.] That the action of the Assembly, which met at Detroit, was judicial in its character, and therefore improper ; We consider as unsound; and the placing of them upon the minutes, calculated to convey a false impression as to the attitude of the Assembly. These positions evidently found no favor with a very large mojority of the body. GEO. W. WARNER, THORNTON A. MILLS, E. BENEDICT, WM. W. WILLIAMS, |