all, on her own terms; finally, that, much as you regret it you cannot repress the suspicion that sympathy with the Armenians is not quite so disinterested as it appears that Armenian autonomy and a Turkish Constitution are desired fully as much because they would check a Russian advance as because they would serve Armenia and Turkey. There is indeed plenty to be said for the Russian policy from the Russian point of view. At any rate, good or evil, that is Russia's policy, and England has to face it.

To return, therefore, to the situation of the two Great Powers opposed to each other, and the other four ready to acquiesce in any solution they agree upon, but determined to follow Russia if they disagree, for the simple and sufficient reason that Russia's way means European peace, while England's way, if persevered in, means possibly a European war. What is England to do?

It is clear that England cannot do nothing. The fast-rising wave of public opinion will soon sweep away the barriers of inactivity. I hear that the London editor who has done most to rouse and direct this opinion is overwhelmed with letters of support and exhortation. Alone among the nations of Europe, England feels the shame of the present state of things. Alone she is disinterested in the matter. Alone she has subscribed and distributed large sums of money. British charity has rebuilt Armenian villages and fed starving Armenians. A British Commissioner is carrying alms to Crete. Where is French charity, German charity, Italian charity, Russian charity? You may seek them in vain. The plain fact is that other people do not feel these things as we do. It is a ground of splendid pride, but it has its dangers. It isolates us. We are as insular in these particular virtues as in our geographical situation. The poor may rise up and call us blessed, but the nations of the Continent dislike us cordially because we are in a position to do these things. And if we carry our philanthropy too far they will coalesce against us. Englishmen, who know their own intentions in such matters to be pure and unselfish, cannot realise the dangers which these intentions create. They would not abandon them if they did realise, but the fact remains. From the point of view of national welfare, in a question like this of succouring the Armenians, the truth

is that Britain ought either to be resigned to less or prepared to do more. Charity may be pushed to the point at which it means war, and the charitable en gros should realise this from the outset.

Still it remains that Britain cannot do nothing. All her traditions forbid it. Hear Freeman once more from his

grave :

Is the honour of England dead? Does no man among the rulers or the people of England feel his cheeks tingle at the insult that England and all Europe has received at barbarian hands? There were times when English swords would have leapt from their scabbards at far lighter ignominy than that which England and Europe bore then. Surely they never bore greater shame than when their representatives were brought together simply to hear that a barbarian power which lingers on only by their sufferance would have none of their counsels and none of their reproof The Turk snapped his fingers in the face of England and of Europe; he showed England and Europe the way to the door; and England and Europe have walked out quietly. There is, at least there was, such a feeling as national self-respect. In the Government, in the people, which can tamely endure such treatment as this from a power which needs our upholding, that self-respect would seem to be wholly dead. In the new code of conduct we are told that right and humanity are to be offered up to the Moloch of interest. It would seem that the honest sense of shame, to say nothing of the feeling of knightly honour, are to be cast into the fire along with them.

And Lord Stratford de Redcliffe once wrote a similar call to England, though in his own more measured language :—

Like

The Eastern question is a fact, a reality of indefinite duration. a volcano, it has its intervals of rest; but its outbreaks are frequent, their occasions uncertain, and their effects destructive. The chief Powers of Christendom have all, more or less, an interest in the fortunes of an Empire which from being systematically aggressive has become a tottering and untoward neighbour. Its struggles for life, the agonies of its dissolution, could not fail to throw all Europe into a state of hurtful agitation, if not into one of general hostilities. Ambitions, jealousies, apprehensions, and other conflicting passions would be roused into fearful activity, and the consequence of a fermentation so violent and extensive may well be dreaded.

Under these circumstances, for England to be an idle looker-on seems hardly credible. Such an attitude with reference to interests so positive and perils so imminent would be a virtual abdication of her high position and its attendant duties. True it is that of two evils she has only to choose the lesser, but the choice of either would be better than indifference alike degrading and dangerous.

Certain things England can do, with every prospect of But will the present temper of Englishmen be

success.

content with these? If not, then indeed is our country embarked upon a perilous road. Is it desired that England shall inform the Powers that, failing their co-operation, she alone will dethrone the Sultan, place a successor upon his throne, restore the Constitution of Midhat, and guarantee order in Armenia? Leaving the other Powers out of account for the moment, how could England do all this? The Sultan has 15,000 men at Yildiz alone, all of whom would fight to the death. The first shot fired at Constantinople would mean the explosion of anti-Christian hatred throughout the Turkish Empire. We should have to fight the whole Turkish army, unless we could secure the co-operation of the Sheikh-ul-Islam. And can it be supposed that the Continental Powers, among whom the Tsar's tour is producing so remarkable an access of mutual goodwill, would tolerate in silence the spectacle of a British fleet bombarding Constantinople? The Austrian official Press is already warning England against the "gross deception" that she is practising upon herself if she believes this. According to the Russian Press, "Great Britain alone. continues to be the object of unabated mistrust and ill-will.” German hostility may be taken for granted, and France would of course follow a Russian lead. Italy unfortunately hardly The day after a British fleet forced the Dardanelles, identical notes from all the Powers would be presented in London calling upon England to stop short, upon pain of finding a combined European force opposed to her. Then our last state would be immeasurably worse than our first. We should be committed to a tremendous war against overwhelming odds, or subjected to a disastrous humiliation. We cannot save the Armenians at such a cost. Is it supposed that Lord Salisbury will take such a risk? I do not believe it for one moment. The moment has passed. In the early summer of 1895 such action might have been successful. To-day no British statesman ought to think of running this inconceivable risk, in a matter where the interests of his country are not vitally at stake. Therefore I sympathise strongly with the position of Lord Rosebery, whose party seems to expect from him the advocacy of a course which he must well know is impossible. In colloquial phrase, England cannot

do more than she can. It is not difficult to conceive circumstances in which the "pitiless exigency of prestige" might compel England to rush headlong, and cœur léger, upon Imperial disaster, but the state of Turkey, horrible though it is, does not present them.

Then what can England do? So far as my limited judgment goes, she must for the present hold her war-dogs upon the leash. I should regard an understanding with Russia as the best of all possible solutions, and if Lord Rosebery had not been turned out of office by a chance vote upon an absolutely insincere issue, I believe we should have had this before now. But for the moment it seems hopeless. Failing accord with the Powers, I would have England send Sir Philip Currie to Yildiz with a message to the Sultan that henceforth England looks upon him as a barbarian and an outlaw, and that she will no longer entertain diplomatic or other relations with him; that the British Embassy would be immediately withdrawn from Constantinople, and that his passports would be handed simultaneously to Costaki Pasha in London; that all necessary commercial business would be transacted by the Consul-General, and that if direct British interests were threatened the Admiral of the British fleet in Levantine waters would act at his own discretion. It is probable that this step would be followed by identical action on the part of the United States. The Sultan, I am convinced, would fall into abject fear at being left thus alone with Russia-for that is what it would amount to--and the Continental Powers would be placed in a very embarrassing position as the supporters of savagery. Another massacre would absolutely force their hands. At the same time England might send to each a note explaining her attitude, stating what steps she would be prepared to share, and giving pledges of her own disinterested

ness.

By such a course England has nothing to lose and everything to gain. The correspondents of the newspapers would keep her quite as well supplied with information as her Embassy did, and her conscience should be clear. If any action should be undertaken by other Powers to her detriment, she could then act as forcibly as she liked. A European war

would be a vaster horror than an Armenian massacre, and the welfare of her own sons and the momentous issues of freedom committed to her charge must not be imperilled because she alone of the Powers is horror-stricken at the infamy of the Turk. She is not yet called upon to sacrifice herself upon the altar of her own virtues.

In the presence of this overwhelming problem, and far away from the centre of information-fifty-six miles from a railway station, and with a post once in two days-I must be excused this month from writing of other important matters of foreign affairs.

HENRY NORMAN.

Editor: F. ORTMANS.