absolute, yet given by speculative philosophy, turns out, on examination, to be a mere piece of verbalism--a formula of abstraction which leaves out the differences, and thus eviscerates the problem to be solved, or which, confounding affirmation and negation, abolishes knowledge. And as for a scientific solution of the problem, we may say this at least with safety, that none has as yet been given.

Even the lower position of a mechanical equivalent of each state of consciousness is not likely to fare better, if we may judge from a recent attempt at a statement of the question made by a physicist of note.1 It is, first of all, broadly laid down that all we can know of the universe is a state of consciousness. Applying this particularly to what we speak of as the material universe, the phænomena of nature are simply states of consciousness. At the same time, it is maintained that there is, and will ultimately be found, "a mechanical equivalent" of each state of consciousness. There is "a correlation of all the phænomena of the universe with matter and motion." This language obviously points to a dualism. What precisely is "the mechanical equivalent of consciousness" here referred to? It is something in correlation with the state of consciousness; it is its mechanical equivalent, as there is a mechanical equivalent of heat. But in the same breath we are told that our knowledge is entirely restricted to states of consciousness. Is this mechanical equivalent known to us? In that case, it can be but a state of consciousness. Indeed we are expressly told that "matter" and "force," so far as known to us, and, in other words, so far as they are anything to us, are simply states of consciousness. Then what sort of mechanical equivalent or correlation have we here? Not two things at all,-not the mechanical force and the state of consciousness, but simply two states of consciousness, the one which we call, viz., feeling,

1 Professor Huxley, Lay Sermons- Descartes,' p. 339.

the other which we name its mechanical equivalentperhaps a pound weight falling through a foot. We have not, therefore, explained the state of consciousness, or resolved it into anything different from itself. We have simply said that one state of consciousness, which we call a mechanical equivalent, is followed by another, which we call feeling or volition. This is not to

explain the state of consciousness by anything in mere correlation with it; it is merely to say that there is a certain or regulated succession in the states of consciousness themselves. But each state is as far from being resolved into a correlative mechanical equivalent as ever it was; nay, more, we have given up the whole hypothesis of dualism, while we retain its language, and think we have effected a reconciliation of materialism and spiritualism. In saying that all we know or can know is a state of consciousness, we preclude ourselves from asserting anything that is not a state of consciousness, and any mere hypothetical matter or force or motion which we postulate as in correlation, is illegitimately assumed as a fact-nay, illegitimately even conceived as an idea.

VIII. INNATE IDEAS.

The predicate "innate" has been a source of great debate in connection with the philosophy of Descartes. But any one who intelligently apprehends its first principles, will readily see both what it means and what is the extent of its application in his philosophy. It will be found to amount to this, that there is no mental modification whatever in our consciousness, which, according to Descartes, is not innate. But it is innate not in the sense of being actually developed, or an actual modification of consciousness; innate only in the sense of being a potentiality capable of development into a form of consciousness, yet waiting certain conditions

ere this takes place. In this sense, every idea of perception, and every state of sensation is innate. The supposed outward world, and the organic impressions which precede perception and sensation lie wholly beyond consciousness. Yet, but for their action in the view of Descartes, neither perception nor sensation would occur. At the same time, their influence ceases at the threshold of consciousness; and when their action is completed, there originate in the mind out of its own nature the conscious idea of extension, and the conscious sensation of colour or sound. These ideas and sensations are wholly innate, in the sense that they are evolutions of the consciousness alone; that they are not transmitted to the mind by the action of outward objects or by the organic impressions. They are the forms of a new and independent power, which arise simply on occasion of external stimuli, but which these stimuli serve in no way to create. Perceptions are innate, due to the independency of the mind, on the theory of Descartes, hardly less than they are innate on the doctrine of the spontaneous monadic development of Leibnitz.

But there is another class of mental modifications with Descartes. These are not perceptions or sensations. They are "truths," or common notions," or universal principles,—such as the law of substance and quality and of non-contradiction. These too are innate, -especially innate. They are innate potentialities, over and above mere perceptions or sensations. They too become actual in experience-but, unlike sensation, they are not immediately preceded by organic impressions. The moment the doctrine of Descartes is thus correctly apprehended, the whole polemic of Locke against "Innate Ideas" is seen to be irrelevant. If the doctrine is to be validly assailed, it must be on wholly other grounds than those stated by Locke.1

1 All that is stated here will be found proved and illustrated in the Appendix to the present volume, Notes I. II. and VI. See especially

IX. MALEBRANCHE (1638-1715).1

In accordance with the usual Hegelian formula as applied to history, an attempt is made to show that the system of Descartes is part of the evolution of what is called "thought." It is assumed, accordingly, that there is but a single conception at the root of the philosophy of Descartes,—that this runs all through his thinking, —and that it is carried to its necessary development by the force of "the immanent dialectic," through Malebranche and Spinoza. One of the worst features of the Hegelian mode of looking at the history of speculation comes out here. Assuming that speculative thought develops necessarily through a series of specified moments, it must either find the single moment in a given system or reject the system as unspeculative. The result of this method is, on the one hand, an attempt to make a system express one of the moments; or, on the other, arrogantly to pass by the system as of no account. We have thus frequently instead of "pure thought" pure phantasy in dealing with a system of philsophy, and a wilful blindness to the facts of history and experience. In the case of Descartes the Hegelian mistake is twofold. It is wrongly assumed that the philosophy of Descartes represents a single thought, or a single moment of thought, and it either incorrectly

pp. 198, 199, 207. These are now reproduced exactly as they appeared in the Appendix to the Translation of The Meditations, published in 1853. The information therein contained, and the relative passages, have since been generally utilised by writers on Descartes and Cartesianism; and not unfrequently the quotations are credited to those who thus make use of them as introduced for the first time into our Cartesian literature.

1 His writings appeared from 1674 to 1715. Spinoza lived from 1632-1677. His writings appeared from 1663 to 1677. Malebranche, as in some respects nearer in doctrine to Descartes, is first considered.

or inadequately describes the main thought which animates his philosophy.

-

With Descartes, according to Hegel, we have to renounce every prejudgment in order to gain a pure beginning. The spirit of the philosophy of Descartes is consciousness as the unity of thought and being.1 The "I" in the philosophy of Descartes has the meaning of thought, not the individuality (Einzelnheit) of selfconsciousness.2 Descartes appeals to consciousness for his first principle; but he only naïvely gets at the consequences of it, or at least at the propositions of philosophy. He does not at first properly state the principle out of which the whole content (Inhalt) of philosophy is to be derived. The identity of being and thought, altogether the most interesting idea of modern times,-Descartes has not farther proved, but for it has singly and alone appealed to consciousness, and provisionally placed it in the front. For with Descartes the necessity is not in any way present to develop difference out of the "I think." Fichte first proceeded to this, and out of this point of absolute certainty to derive all determinations.3 Then of course we must expect to find that Descartes takes being in its wholly positive sense, and has no conception that it is the negative of self-consciousness. Then there is constant talk of the pure consciousness contained in the concrete "I." And Descartes is criticised in respect that the certainty of self-consciousness does not properly pass over to truth, or the determined. This passing over is done "externally" and reflectively only. Consciousness does not determine itself.5

In plain language, the whole basis and method of Descartes are criticised from an assumption that human knowledge is possible from a mere universal or abstract

1 Werke, xv. p. 305.--Gesch. d. Phil. Descartes.

2 Ibid., p. 308.

4 lbid.

3 Ibid., xv. p. 310.

5 Ibid., p. 313.