GENERAL PREFACE TO BACON'S

PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS

By ROBERT LESLIE ELLIS

(1) OUR knowledge of Bacon's method is much less complete than it is commonly supposed to be. Of the Novum Organum, which was to contain a complete statement of its nature and principles, we have only the first two books; and although in other parts of Bacon's writings, as for instance in the Cogitata et Visa de Interpretatione Naturæ, many of the ideas contained in these books recur in a less systematic form, we yet meet with but few indications of the nature of the subjects which were to have been discussed in the others. It seems not improbable that some parts of Bacon's system were never perfectly developed even in his own mind. However this may be, it is certain that an attempt to determine what his method, taken as a whole, was or would have been, must necessarily involve a conjectural or hypothetical element; and it is, I think, chiefly because this circumstance has not been sufficiently recognized, that the idea of Bacon's philosophy has generally speaking been but imperfectly apprehended.

(2) Of the subjects which were to have occupied the remainder of the Novum Organum we learn something from a passage at the end of the second book.

Nunc vero," it is said at the conclusion of the doctrine of prerogative instances," ad adminicula et rectificationes inductionis, et deinceps ad concreta, et latentes processus, et latentes schematismos, et reliqua quæ aphorismo XXI ordine proposuimus, pergendum".* On referring to the twenty-first aphorism we find a sort of table of contents of the whole work. "Dicemus itaque primo loco, de prærogativis instantiarum; secundo, de adminiculis inductionis; tertio, de rectificatione inductionis; quarto, de variatione inquisitionis pro naturâ subjecti; quinto, de prærogativis naturarum quatenus ad inquisitionem, sive de eo quod inquirendum est prius et posterius; sexto, de terminis inquisitionis, sive de synopsi omnium naturarum in universo; septimo, de deductione ad praxin, sive de eo quod est in ordine ad hominem; octavo, de parascevis ad inquisitionem; postremo autem, de scalâ ascensoriâ et descensoriâ axiomatum."† Of these nine subjects the first is the only one with which we are at all accurately acquainted.

(3) Bacon's method was essentially inductive. He rejected the use of syllogistic or deductive reasoning, except when practical applications were to be made of the conclusions, axiomata, to which the inquirer had been led by a systematic process of induction. "Logica quæ nunc habetur inutilis est ad inventionem scientiarum. . . . . Spes est una in inductione verâ." 1 It is to be observed that wherever Bacon speaks of an "ascending" process, he is to be understood to mean induction, of which it is the character to proceed from that which is nobis notius to that which is notius simpliciter. Contrariwise when he speaks of a descent, he always refers to the correlative process of deduction. Thus when in the Partis secundæ Delineatio he says, ... "meminerint homines in inquisitione activâ necesse esse rem per scalam decensoriam (cujus usum in contemplativâ sustulimus) confici: omnis enim operatio in individuis versatur quæ

[* Trans. below, "But now I must proceed," etc.]

[† Trans. below, "I propose to treat them in the first place ", etc.]

1 Nov. Org. i. 11. and 14.

13

infimo loco sunt," we are to understand that in Bacon's system deduction is only admissible in the inquisitio activa; that is, in practical applications of the results of induction. Similiarly in the Distributio Operis he says, "Rejicimus syllogismum; neque id solùm quoad principia (ad quæ nec illi eam adhibent) sed etiam quoad propositiones medias "*. Everything was to be established by induction. "In constituendo autem axiomate forma inductionis alia quàm adhuc in usu fuit excogitanda est, eaque non ad principia tantùm (quæ vocant) probanda et invenienda, sed etiam ad axiomata minora, et media, denique omnia."2

(4) It is necessary to determine the relation in which Bacon conceived his method to stand to ordinary induction. Both methods set out "a sensu et particularibus," and acquiesce "in maximè generalibus "3; but while ordinary induction proceeds per enumerationem simplicem," by a mere enumeration of particular cases, et precario concludit et periculo exponitur ab instantiâ contradictoriâ", the new method "naturam separare debet, per rejectiones et exclusiones debitas; et deinde post negativas tot quot sufficiunt super affirmativas concludere " 4. A form of induction was to to be introduced, “quæ ex aliquibus generaliter concludat ita ut instantiam contradictoriam inveniri non posse demonstretur " 5. In strong contrast with this method stands "the induction which the logicians speak of ", which "is utterly vicious and incompetent ". . . . "For to conclude upon an enumeration of particulars, without instance contradictory, is no conclusion, but a conjecture". . . . "And this form, to say truth, is so gross, as it had not been possible for wits so subtile as have managed these things to have offered it to the world, but that they trusted to their theories and dogmaticals, and were imperious and scornful towards particulars 6." We thus see what is meant by the phrase "quot sufficiunt" in the passage which has been cited from the Novum Organum; it means "as many as may suffice in order to the attainment of certainty", it being necessary to have a method of induction, "quæ experientiam solvat et separet, et per exclusiones et rejectiones debitas necessario concludat "7. Absolute certainty is therefore one of the distinguishing characters of the Baconian induction. Another is that it renders all men equally capable, or nearly so, of attaining to the truth. "Nostra verò inveniendi scientias ea est ratio ut non multum ingeniorum acumini et robori relinquatur; sed quæ ingenia et intellectus ferè exæquet " 8; and this is illustrated by the difficulty of describing a circle liberâ manu, whereas every one can do it with a pair of compasses. "Omninò similis est nostra ratio." The cause to which this peculiarity is owing, is sufficiently indicated by the illustration: the method "exæquat ingenia ", "cùm omnia per certissimas regulas et demonstrationes transigat".

(5) Absolute certainty, and a mechanical mode of procedure such that all men should be capable of employing it, are thus two great features of the Baconian method. His system can never be rightly understood if they are neglected, and any explanation of it which passes them over in silence leaves unexplained the principal difficulty which that system presents to us. But another difficulty takes the place of the one which is thus set aside. It becomes impossible to justify or to understand Bacon's assertion that his method was essentially new. Nam nos," he says in the preface to the Novum Organum, si profiteamur nos meliora afferre quam antiqui, eandem quam illi viam ingressi, nullâ verborum arte efficere possimus, quin inducatur quædam ingenii, vel excellentiæ, vel facultatis comparatio, sive contentic. ... Verùm cùm per nos illud agatur, ut alia omnino via intellectui aperiatur illis intentata et incognita, commutata tota

[* Trans. below, "I therefore reject the syllogism," etc.]

2 Nov. Org. i. 105.

3 Nov. Org. i. 22.

6 Advancement of Learning. The corresponding passage in the De Augm. is in the 2nd chap. of the 5th book. 7 Distrib. Operis, § 10.

8 Nov. Org. i. 61., and comp. i. 122. Also the Inquisitio legitima de Motu, and Vale. rius Terminus, c. 19.

jam ratio est ", etc.* He elsewhere speaks of himself as being "in hâc re plane protopirus, et vestigia nullius sequutus "9. Surely this language would be out of place, if the difference between him and those who had gone before him related merely to matters of detail; as, for instance, that his way of arranging the facts of observation was more convenient than theirs, and his way of applying an inductive process to them more systematic. And it need not be remarked that induction in itself was no novelty at all. The nature of the act of induction is as clearly stated by Aristotle as by any later writer. Bacon's design was surely much larger than it would thus appear to have been. Whoever considers his writings without reference to their place in the history of philosophy will I think be convinced that he aimed at giving a wholly new method, a method universally applicable, and in all cases infallible. By this method, all the knowledge which the human mind is capable of receiving might be attained, and attained without unnecessary labour. Men were no longer to wander from the truth in helpless uncertainty. The publication of this new doctrine was the Temporis Partus Masculus; it was as the rising of a new sun, before which " the borrowed beams of moon and stars" were to fade away and disappear 10.

(6) That the wide distinction which Bacon conceived to exist between his own method and any which had previously been known has often been but slightly noticed by those who have spoken of his philosophy, arises probably from a wish to recognize in the history of the scientific discoveries of the last two centuries the fulfilment of his hopes and prophecies. One of his early disciples however, who wrote before the scientific movement which commenced about Bacon's time had assumed a definite form and character-I mean Dr. Hooke-has explicitly adopted those portions of Bacon's doctrine which have seemingly been as a stumbling-block to his later followers. In Hooke's General Scheme or Idea of the Present State of Natural Philosophy 11, which is in many respects the best commentary on Bacon, we find it asserted that in the pursuit of knowledge, the intellect "is continually to be assisted by some method or engine which shall be as a guide to regulate its actions, so as that it shall not be able to act amiss. Of this engine no man except the incomparable Verulam hath had any thoughts, and he indeed hath promoted it to a very good pitch." Something however still remained to be added to this engine or art of invention, to which Hooke gives the name of philosophical algebra. He goes on to say, "I cannot doubt but that if this art be well prosecuted and made use of, an ordinary capacity with industry will be able to do very much more than has yet been done, and to show that even physical and natural inquiries as well as mathematical and geometrical will be capable also of demonstration; so that henceforward the business of invention will not be so much the effect of acute wit, as of a serious and industrious prosecution " 12. Here the absolute novelty of Bacon's method, its demonstrative character, and its power of reducing all minds to nearly the same level, are distinctly recognized.

(7) Before we examine the method of which Bacon proposed to make use, it is necessary to determine the nature of the problems to which it was, for the most part at least, to be applied. In other words, we must endeavour to determine the idea which he had formed of the nature of science.

Throughout his writings, science and power are spoken of as correlative"in idem coincidunt"; and the reason of this is that Bacon always assumed that the knowledge of the cause would in almost all cases enable us to produce the observed effect. We shall see hereafter how this assumption connected itself with the whole spirit of his philosophy. I mention it now because it presents

[* Trans. below, "For if I should profess that I," etc. "As it is, however," etc.]

9 Nov. Org. i. 113.

10 See, for instance, the Præfatio Generalis, where Bacon compares his method to the mariner's compass, until the discovery of which no wide sea could be crossed; an image probably connected with his favourite device of a ship passing through the pillars of Hercules, with the motto "Plus ultra ".

11 Published posthumously in 1705.

12 Present State of Nat. Phil. pp. 6, 7.

itself in the passage in which Bacon's idea of the nature of science is most distinctly stated. Super datum corpus novam naturam, sive novas naturas, generare et superinducere, opus et intentio est humanæ potentiæ. Datæ autem naturæ formam, sive differentiam veram, sive naturam naturantem, sive fontem emanationis, (ista enim vocabula habemus quæ ad indicationem rei proxime accedunt) invenire, opus et intentio est humanæ scientiæ." This passage, with which the second book of the Novum Organum commences, requires to be considered in detail.

In the first place it is to be remarked, that natura signifies" abstract quality" -it is used by Bacon in antithesis with corpus or "concrete body". Thus the passage we have quoted amounts to this, that the scope and end of human power is to give new qualities to bodies, while the scope and end of human knowledge is to ascertain the formal cause of all the qualities of which bodies are possessed.

Throughout Bacon's philosophy, the necessity of making abstract qualities (nature) the principal object of our inquiries is frequently insisted on. He who studies the concrete and neglects the abstract cannot be called an interpreter of nature. Such was Bacon's judgment when, apparently at an early period of his life, he wrote the Temporis Partus Masculus 13; and in the Novum Organum he has expressed an equivalent opinion: "quòd iste modus operandi, (qui naturas intuetur simplices licet in corpore concreto) procedat ex iis quæ in naturâ sunt constantia et æterna et catholica, et latas præbeat potentiæ humanæ vias 14". Quite in accordance with this passage is a longer one in the Advancement of Learning, which I shall quote in extenso, as it is exceedingly important. "The forms of substances, I say, as they are now by compounding and transplanting multiplied, are so perplexed as they are not to be inquired; no more than it were either possible or to purpose to seek in gross the forms of those sounds which make words, which by composition and transposition of letters are infinite. But on the other side to inquire the form of those sounds or voices which make simple letters is easily comprehensible, and being known induceth and manifesteth the forms of all words which consist and are compounded of them. In the same manner, to inquire the form of a lion, of an oak, of gold-nay of water, or air-is a vain pursuit; but to inquire the forms of sense, of voluntary motion, of vegetation, of colours, of gravity and levity, of density, of tenuity, of heat, of cold, and all other natures and qualities which like an alphabet are not many, and of which the essences upheld by matter of all creatures do consist,-to inquire, I say, the true forms of these, is that part of metaphysique which we now define of." And a little farther on we are told that it is the prerogative of metaphysique to consider "the simple forms or difference of things" (that is to say, the forms of simple natures), "which are few in number, and the degrees and co-ordinations whereof make all this variety".

We see from these passages why the study of simple natures is so important-namely because they are comparatively speaking few in number, and because, notwithstanding this, a knowledge of their essence would enable us, at least in theory, to solve every problem which the universe can present to us.

As an illustration of the doctrine of simple natures, we may take a passage which occurs in the Silva Silvarum. "Gold," it is there said, "has these natures greatness of weight, closeness of parts, fixation, pliantness or softness, immunity from rust, colour or tincture of yellow. Therefore the sure way, though most about, to make gold, is to know the causes of the several natures before rehearsed, and the axioms concerning the same. For if a man can make a metal that hath all these properties, let men dispute whether it be gold or no 15."

Of these simple natures Bacon has given a list in the third book of the De

13 Mr. Ellis alludes, I think, to the De Interpretatione Naturæ Sententia XII., which M. Bouillet prints as part of the Temporis Partus Masculus. My reasons for differing with M. Bouillet on this point, and placing it by itself, and assigning it a later date, will be found in a note to Mr. Ellis's Preface to the Novum Organum.-J. S.

Augmentis. They are divided into two classes: schematisms of matter, and simple motions. To the former belong the abstract qualities, dense, rare, heavy, light, &c., of which thirty-nine are enumerated, the list being concluded with a remark that it need not be carried farther, " neque ultra rem extendimus ". The simple motions-and it will be observed that the word "motion" is used in a wide and vague sense-are the motus antitypiæ, which secures the impenetrability of matter; the motus nexûs, commonly called the motus ex fugâ vacui, &c.; and of these motions fourteen are mentioned. This list however does not profess to be complete, and accordingly in the Novum Organum (ii. 48) another list of simple motions is given, in which nineteen species are recognised.

The view of which we have now been speaking-namely, that it is possible to reduce all the phenomena of the universe to combinations of a limited number of simple elements-is the central point of Bacon's whole system. It serves, as we shall see, to explain the peculiarities of the method which he proposed. (8) In what sense did Bacon use the word "Form"? This is the next question which, in considering the account which he has given of the nature of science, it is necessary to examine. I am, for reasons which will be hereafter mentioned, much disposed to believe that the doctrine of Forms is in some sort an extraneous part of Bacon's system. His peculiar method may be stated independently of this doctrine, and he has himself so stated it in one of his earlier tracts, namely the Valerius Terminus. It is at any rate certain, that in using the word "Form " he did not intend to adopt the scholastic mode of employing it. He was much in the habit of giving to words already in use a new signification. "To me," he remarks in the Advancement of Learning," it seemeth best to keep way with antiquity usque ad aras, and therefore to retain the ancient terms, though I sometimes alter the uses and definitions." And thus though he has spoken of the scholastic forms as figments of the human mind 16, he was nevertheless willing to employ the word "Form" in a modified sense, "præsertim quum hoc vocabulum invaluerit, et familiariter occurrat " 17. He has however distinctly stated that in speaking of Forms, he is not to be understood to speak of the Forms" quibus hominum contemplationes et cogitationes hactenus assue. verunt " 18.

As Bacon uses the word in his own sense, we must endeavour to interpret the passages in which it occurs by means of what he has himself said of it; and this may I think be satisfactorily accomplished.

We may begin by remarking that in Bacon's system, as in those of many others, the relation of substance and attribute is virtually the same as the relation of cause and effect. The substance is conceived of as the causa immanens of its attributes 19, or in other words it is the formal cause of the qualities which are referred to it. As there is a difference between the properties of different substances there must be a corresponding difference between the substances themselves. But in the first state of the views of which we are speaking this latter difference is altogether unimaginable: "distincte quidem intelligi potest, sed non explicari imaginabiliter " 20. It belongs not to natural philosophy, but to metaphysics.

These views however admit of an essential modification. If we divide the qualities of bodies into two classes, and ascribe those of the former class to substance as its essential attributes, while we look on those of the latter as connected with substance by the relation of cause and effect—that is, if we recognise the distinction of primary and secondary qualities-the state of the question is changed. It now becomes possible to give a definite answer to the question, Wherein does the difference between different substances, corresponding to the difference between their sensible qualities, consist?

The answer to this question of course involves a reference to the qualities which have been recognised as primary; and we are thus led to the principle that in the sciences which relate to the secondary qualities of bodies the primary ones are to be regarded as the causes of the secondary 21.

16 Nov. Org. i. 51.

17 Nov. Org. ii. 2.

18 Nov. Org. ii. 17.

19 See Zimmermann's Essay on the Monadology of Leibnitz, p. 81, (Vienna, 1807). 20 Leibnitz, De ipsâ Naturâ. 21 Whewell, Phil. Ind. Science, [book iv. ch. i.]. C

B.W.