mode deemed consistent with the principles of the Constitution, and the settled practices under it."

Thus equally with the early Federalists did the Republican (Democratic) President stand up for all granted rights against invasions and aggressions from every source.

The attention of Congress at this session was mainly directed to measures relating to the war, and the financial interests of the country, then greatly embarrassed. Mr. Gallatin had recommended the doubling of import duties and the laying of internal taxes, but his views were not looked upon favorably, nor had his plans been satisfactory. The treasury notes authorized by Congress had greatly depreciated, the government loans were effected at high rates, and all the banks except a few in New England had stopped specie payments. The management of military affairs was held to be of the most improvident and extravagant character; but Congress and the Administration were unable to grasp the great subject. Mr. Madison was afraid the country would not stand war and heavy internal taxation at the same time; and so, little was accomplished at this session to allay well-founded discontent, or check the merely factious opposition of the determined political enemies of the Administration.

CHAPTER XXI.

WAR OF 1812-FAILURE AT THE NORTH-RIVER THAMESPERRY'S VICTORY-INDIAN WARFARE OF 1813.

W

HILE the army had mainly only met defeat and disgrace, as has been seen, the little navy, despised by England, and little expected of it at home, had become a source of pride and joy to the whole country.

Another source of some gratification to the Nation. at the close of the first campaign was the appearance of a class of more worthy and able military men; still the end of unfortunate experiences in this direction had not been reached at this period. It was really destined to be the "ill-luck" of the country throughout this war to have its military affairs mainly conducted by incompetent general officers, and the Administration disturbed and inharmonious.

Notwithstanding the cry from every source as to the unreadiness of the country, few wars were ever begun with more favorable conditions, for at least temporary success, than was this one on the part of the United States. Before the declaration of war she had an army nearly equal in number to the whole strength of the British troops then in America, far on its way to invade and conquer Upper Canada; and before the season was far advanced, she had but little short of fifteen thousand soldiers on the Canadian frontier, when Sir George Prevost, the governor-general, had

not at his command, all told, one-third of that number. In the summer and fall of 1812, at least ten thousand of these soldiers should have moved in an overwhelming column, and overrun and taken possession of all the British territory to the mouth of the St. Lawrence.

On the first day of June, 1812, the United States had eight war frigates ready for service, two more which could have been ready shortly, seven or eight war-sloops, brigs, and schooners, with one hundred and fifty of Mr. Jefferson's gun-boats, and other small vessels. Of these vessels, three were of 44, three of 38, one of 36, one of 32, three of 28, two of 18, three of 16, three of 14, and one of 12 guns.

England then had use for her great navy in other parts of the world, and on the American coast she had only a small fleet stationed at Halifax, under Admiral Herbert Sawyer, and composed of the Guerriere, Shannon, and Pomone, each of 38 guns, the Belvidera of 36 guns, the Eolus of 32, the Africa of 64 guns, with a number of war sloops and brigs. At her Jamaica and Leeward Island stations she had two ships of the line, one of 74, and one of 64 guns.

If Mr. Madison and his Cabinet had taken a view of the strength of our navy which the circumstances warranted, and united it at New York or Boston on the first day of June, it could have borne the news of the declaration of war to the unsuspecting fleet before Halifax, then not a match for the "little navy."

Mr. Hamilton, the Secretary of the Navy, was favorable to trying the strength of his department at the outset, and Mr. Madison was without prejudice and ready to employ every available resource of the country, no man knowing better than he did the

remarkable successes of the American marine in the Revolution. Unfortunately at the outset of the war, the Cabinet was swayed largely by the opinions of Mr. Gallatin, who had a very exalted notion of the English navy. Charles J. Ingersoll, a peculiar historian of the war, said that Mr. Gallatin knew too much about European affairs to be well informed concerning those of this country. Gallatin was one of Mr. Jefferson's philosophical" discoveries, but his greatest service to this country was, perhaps, in the work on which Mr. Madison sent him in 1813.

Before the 18th of June, 1812, arrived, instead of a well-devised plan, ready to be set in operation for the navy, really superior to the British then on the coast, it had been decided by the President and his Cabinet that all the war frigates should be run into the ports and made into kind of batteries in the harbor defenses.

The report of this foolish project created no little consternation among naval officers. Brainbridge and Stewart, being out of employment, went to Washington to ask appointments, and were notified by Mr. Hamilton of the course decided upon by the Administration. But through their entreaties, he determined to introduce them to the President. Mr. Madison heard their arguments with great interest. They assured him that the Americans really had some important advantages over the British, and that under equal circumstances the chances would be in their favor in nine cases out of every ten. Among other things they mentioned the burning desire of the American seamen to avenge their wrongs, their great anxiety to fight their proud and intolerant foe, their superior skill and patriotism, the fact that their guns were sighted, a thing

unknown in the British navy, and their superior discipline, which latter item was hardly probable, however.

The President was impressed with the new view presented to him, and on the strength of it, called a meeting of the Cabinet to reconsider the case. Mr. Gallatin still held out that the navy was worthless, and the original intention should be carried out. Brainbridge and Stewart now put their arguments in writing and appealed to the President, as the responsible head of the Government, not to lose the advantage of such a valuable auxiliary, at a time when it could be of such great benefit, at least temporarily. Mr. Madison, whose judgment on any subject was superior to that of any membr of his Cabinet, and who really favored the employment and strengthening of the navy, concluded to act without his Cabinet, and accordingly notified Mr. Hamilton, who was pleased with the turn in the case, to have the vessels immediately prepared for sea.

Through fear of being shut up in the harbors, most of the commanders were preparing, in the absence of orders to the contrary, to go to sea and so put themselves out of the way of being reached by injurious orders from the Government.

Notwithstanding the turn in the affair, no plan of campaign was arranged upon, and so the vessels went out, one by one, to make the most of their inclinations. and skill. But no little credit was due to the President for what had been accomplished, although Mr. Gallatin was still continued in a position where he was a clog upon the welfare of the country.

The fall and winter campaign of 1812, in the West, was mainly one of disaster to the American cause, but