Page images
PDF
EPUB

Restraints on to the landlord, because, if he thought fit, he sporting by statute, &c. might restrain his tena nt from sporting y express covenant.

On principles of policy also the restrictive regulations appear to be justifiable and prudent. The avowed policy of the legislature has sometimes been the prevention of idleness and dissipation in husbandmen, artificers, and others of low degree, which would be the unavoidable consequence of universal licence (f); and at other times the preservation of the game, which would soon be extirpated by general liberty of sporting, and which the modern statutes without reserve state to be the object of the enactment. And though no legislative interference can, perhaps, be available totally to prevent idleness or to encourage industry, yet any provision which excludes inferior persons from pursuing game is at all events advantageous, if it tends to prevent an indulgence of idle habits in that pursuit; for habitual poachers are generally obnoxious members of society in other respects (g). The husbandman, the artificer, or mechanic, who frequently indulges in the sports of the field, rarely becomes an industrious member of society, and any law which

(ƒ) 2 Bla. Com. 412.
(g) See observation of Ld.
Hardwicke in Roy v. Duke

of Beaufort, 2 Atk. 190.post, Appendix, 1082, 3.

deters a person from such pursuits must be bene- Restraints on ficial to the community.

sporting by statute, &c.

of the object

tions.

The existing regulations as to game principally Enumeration relate to the preservation of them in particular of the princi places-to the persons who are qualified, or pro pal regulahibited from killing them-to the time, and to the mode of killing them-to the disposal of them when taken-to the persons authorized to interfere in the preservation of game, and the modes of their interference-to the criminal punishments and the penalties for the infraction of the law, and the mode of enforcing themto the civil remedies for injuries to the exclusive right to game, independently of penalties-and, lastly, those regulations which were introduced for the purposes of the revenue, and which relate to game certificates. We will, in the following chapters, consider these subjects in the order as they arise.

CHAPTER II.

Franchse defincid

Forests.

OF THE PLACES PRIVILEGED AS TO GAME, AS
FORESTS, CHASES, PARKS, FREE WARRENS,
MANORS, HARE AND RABBIT WARRENS, PRI-
VATE GROUNDS, AND DECOYS.

THERE
are certain districts and places which
by grants from the crown, and by different legis-
lative provisions, are peculiarly privileged for the
preservation of game. There are also regula-
tions for the preservation of game in other places,
though not particularly privileged. Those of
the first description are franchises, such as forests,
chases, parks, and free warrens; and those of the
latter are manors, hare and rabbit warrens, pri-
vate grounds and decoys.

A franchise is defined to be a royal privilege, or branch of the royal prerogative subsisting in the hands of a subject by grant from the king (a). A forest is the highest franchise relating to game, a free chase is the next in degree, a park the next, and the last a free warren.

A forest comprehends in it a chase, a park, and a free warren, for which reason the beasts of chase and the beasts and fowls of warren are

(a) 3 Cruise. 278.

privileged within a forest, as well as the beasts of Forests. the forest (b).

Forests (of which it is said there are 69) (c) are defined to be waste grounds belonging to the king, replenished with all manner of beasts of chase or venery, which are under the king's protection, for the sake of his royal recreation and delight; and to that end, and for preservation of the king's game, there are particular laws, privileges, courts, and officers belonging to such forests (d). Before the passing of the charta de foresta the king assumed the power of making and granting forests over the lands of his subjects without their concurrence; but this statute, which Lord Coke (e) insists was only declaratory of the common law, put a stop to the exercise of such pretended privilege. But a power of making a forest over his own land, though not exercised, still exists in the king (f). And though Sir William Blackstone states that a forest in the hands of a subject is properly the same thing as a chase, being subject to the common law, and not to the forest laws (g), yet it appears that a forest, when granted by letters patent to a subject, is not necessarily a chase, and that when it is granted by the name of a forest, habendum cum omnibus incidentibus et pertinen

(b) Manwood. tit. Chase, 50. tit. Forests, 147, 148. (c) 4 Inst. 319.

(d) 1 Bla. Com. 289.Manwood. tit. Forests, 143.

Com. Dig. tit. Chase, A.
(e) 4 Inst. 300.
(f) 4 Inst. 300.

(g) 2 Bla. Com. 38. cites 4
Inst. 314.

Forests.

Purlieus.

tiis, the grantee takes it as a forest, with all courts and officers except the justice in eyre, and this too may be granted to a subject by express words (h). But if the jurisdiction be not added in the grant, it then becomes a chase, and trespasses in it are punishable only by the common law (i). Beasts of forest are stated by Lord Coke (j) to be hart, hind, buck, hare, boar, and wolf, but legally all wild beasts of venery are such. It has recently been decided (k) that there may be a valid custom in a manor within the limits of an ancient forest belonging to the crown, for the lord, with the assent of the homage, to grant parcels of the waste, to be held in severalty by copy of court roll, and enclosed, in exclusion of persons having rights of common; for the crown may still exercise the same rights of forest over it as before; and whether the deer be excluded must depend upon the nature of the enclosures; and if the fences are erected higher than are permitted by the laws of the forest, the forest officers may still interfere and break them down.

A purlieu, which is derived by Lord Coke (1) from pur, clear, entire, and exempt, and lieu, a place, is land adjoining to a forest, known by

(h) Com. Dig. tit. Chase, A. 2.-Post, Appendix, 875, 6, 7. 879, 880.

(i) Manwood. tit. Forest, 153-4 Inst. 314.-Co. Lit. 233. a.-3 Cruise. 292.

(j) Co. Litt. 233. a.

(k) Boulcott v. Winmill, 2 Camp. 261.-Post, Appendix, 1357.

(1) 4 Inst. 303.

« PreviousContinue »