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tery, that is, under the shadow of good, and it is this, to free and deliver the will of God from all imputation and aspersion of evil. The first degree is of those who make and suppose two principles contrary and fighting one against the other, the one of good, the other of evil.

The second degree is of them to whom the majesty of God seems too much wronged, in setting up and erecting against him another adverse and opposite principle, namely, such a principle as should be active and affirmative, that is to say, cause or fountain of any essence or being: therefore rejecting all such presumption, they do nevertheless bring in against God a principal negative and privative, that is a cause of not being and subsisting, for they will have it to be an inbred proper work, and nature of the matter and creature itself, of itself to turn again and resolve into confusion and nothing, not knowing that it is an effect of one and the same omnipotency to make nothing of somewhat as to make somewhat of nothing. The third degree is, of those who abridge and restrain the former opinion only to those human actions which partake of sin, which actions they will have to depend substantively and originally, and without any sequel or subordination of causes upon the will, and make and set down and appoint larger limits of the knowledge of God than of his power or rather of that part of God's power (for knowledge itself is a power whereby he knoweth), than of that by which he moveth and worketh, making him foreknow some things idle, and as a looker on, which he doth not predestinate nor

ordain: not unlike to that devise which Epicurus brought into Democritus' opinion, to take away destiny, and make way to fortune, to wit; the start and slip of Attemus, which always of the wiser sort was rejected as a frivolous shift; but whatsoever depends not of God, as author and principle by inferior links and degrees, that must needs be in place of God, and a new principle, and a certain usurping God; wherefore worthily is that opinion refused as an indignity and derogation to the majesty and power of God, and yet it is most truly affirmed, that God is not the author of evil, not because he is not author, but because not as of evil.

OF THE CHURCH AND THE SCRIPTURES. "Thou shalt protect them in thy tabernacle from the tradition "of tongues."

The contradiction of tongues doth every where meet with us out of the tabernacle of God, therefore whithersoever thou shalt turn thyself thou shalt find no end of controversies except thou withdraw thyself into that tabernacle. Thou wilt say it is true, and that it is to be understood of the unity of the church; but hear and note; there was in the tabernacle the ark, and in the ark the testimony or tables of the law what dost thou tell me of the husk of the tabernacle without the kernel of the testimony: the tabernacle was ordained for the keeping and delivering over from hand to hand of the testimony. In like manner the custody and passing over of the Scriptures is committed unto the church, but the life of the tabernacle is the testimony.

OF

THE COLOURS

OF

GOOD AND EVIL.

A FRAGMENT.

A. D. 1597.

See the "Advancement of Learning," and the treatise ❝ De "Augmentis," under the title Rhetoric.

TO THE LORD MOUNTJOYE.

I send you the last part of the best book of Aristotle of Stagira, who, as your Lordship knoweth, goeth for the best author. But saving the civil respect which is due to a received estimation, the man being a Grecian, and of a hasty wit, having hardly a discerning patience, much less a teaching patience, hath so delivered the matter, as I am glad to do the part of a good house-hen, which without any strangeness will sit upon pheasants eggs. And yet perchance some that shall compare my lines with Aristotle's lines, will muse by what art, or rather by what revelation, I could draw these conceits out of that place. But I, that should know best, do freely acknowledge, that I had my light from him; for where he gave me not matter to perfect, at the least he gave me occasion to invent. Wherein as I do him right, being myself a man that am as free from envying the dead in contemplation, as from envying the living in action or fortune: so yet nevertheless still I say, and I speak it more largely than before, that in perusing the writings of this person so much celebrated, whether it were the impediment of his wit, or that he did it upon glory and affectation to be subtile, as one that if he had seen his own conceits clearly and perspicuously delivered, perhaps would have been out of love with them himself; or else upon policy, to

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