LETTER XV STRUCTURE OF THE EXECUTIVE § 1. THE elected members having been returned, the Chief Commissioner would convene them and they would proceed to complete the assembly by co-option. The Chief Commissioner would then send for the member whom he judged to be most capable of commanding the majority of votes and entrust him as Premier with the task of forming a government. Let us suppose that the functions entrusted to the new government are those in the first list, together with the control of municipal government, provincial trunk roads, and agriculture. These functions would require the following portfolios : Primary education. Public works. The Premier would select four colleagues from the assembly, assign one of these portfolios to each of them, retaining the fifth for himself. And, if he were wise, he would do all this in friendly consultation with the Chief Commissioner. The government having been constituted, they would meet the assembly under the presidency of the Chief Commissioner. A speaker would be elected, and the Chief Commissioner would then withdraw. § 2. As the methods of responsible government are strange to this country, it may be as well to explain one side of their working. Ministers, having been appointed, discuss their business and come to decisions amongst themselves in cabinet, a word which does not appear in the formal constitution. These executive decisions are then brought to the executive council, a formal body of ministers over which the Chief Commissioner would preside. The decisions become operative when signed by the Chief Commissioner. Provided they are legal, he must sign them on the advice of the ministers. But, before doing so, a constitutional governor is at liberty to discuss them with his ministers. Responsibility and the power of decision rest with ministers; but they are only too glad to consider the advice of a governor who stands aloof from all parties and has perhaps watched the workings of government under several administrations. Having often been in contact with governors and ministers in the self-governing Dominions, I can testify to the cordial relations which prevail between them. Ministers often regard the governor as their best friend and adviser. He, on the other hand, generally refers to my ministers' in a tone of affectionate enthusiasm. In the situation I am sketching, responsible government in India would begin with an advantage which has been usually wanting in the colonies. The Chief Commissioner would be an expert, with a thorough grasp of all the public affairs of his Provincial State. His instructions would make it perfectly clear that all control and all responsibility in respect of functions transferred to ministers rested with them and not with himself. His experienced advice would be at their disposal, and, just because they were free to reject it, they would be all the more willing to seek and to consider it. His experience could influence them to the full. Responsibility would rest with them. § 3. As the point was raised and gave serious trouble elsewhere, it should be laid down that the Chief Commissioner must not ratify any decision which the law officers of the provincial government advise him to be contrary to law. Otherwise he must sign, if, after hearing his advice, ministers are unable to change their decisions, unless he is prepared to dismiss them and find others to take their place. He should be able to dissolve the assembly only on two conditions: (1) that he can find ministers who will take the responsibility of advising a dissolution, and (2) on instructions from the government of the province. The policy of ministers at the opening of a session would, in accordance with the ordinary tradition, be announced in the Chief Commissioner's speech. But the usual conventions should be dropped, and phraseology should be used such as would make it clear to the electorate that the decisions announced were those of their own ministers and not those of the Chief Commissioner. He should appear merely as reporting the decisions of the ministers, like an impartial chairman reporting the resolutions of a committee. § 4. The Chief Commissioner, assisted by the junior commissioner, would continue to discharge the duties at present associated with his office (other than those transferred to the ministry) as an officer of the provincial government. In that capacity he would control the district officers as at present. He would, thus, be well situated to act as a link and a buffer between the officers of the old government and the new. He would be able to mitigate friction between the district officers and those of the ministry, just as these officers themselves have done in their capacity as chairmen of the district boards and municipalities. He would want his ministry to succeed, and would use his authority with his district officers to get them to smooth difficulties away. But those officers should be specifically divested of all responsibility for functions transferred to the ministry. The discovery which the electors will make, however slowly, that their own ministers are responsible for these things, and that it is through their members that they must seek relief, is the most important item in their education. For the sake of the electors district officers must be warned to decline specifically to touch grievances which come within the jurisdiction of the State ministers. § 5. It may be useful to trace the manner in which the first ministry would assume its functions. Ministers would not take over their functions until they had organized departments for the purpose. Aided by the Chief Commissioner, each minister would select a head of his department from the ranks of existing officials. Aided by that officer he would obtain the necessary subordinates from existing cadres, and so organize his department. When ready to do so he would notify the provincial government that he was prepared to assume control of the functions assigned to him. To take one example, the educational department would then transfer the whole control of primary education to the minister of education and to his new department, built up from materials recruited in the old one. § 6. In the Joint Address it is proposed that the transfer of officers from the provincial staffs to those of the States should be arranged by ministers with the assistance of the Chief Commissioner. In the event of any final difference of opinion, the last word is to be with a permanent civil service commission. The success or failure of the experiment will, I believe, largely depend upon the ability of the first ministers to secure as the permanent heads of their departments the ablest members of the existing services. Decisions must rest with responsible ministers, but it is thus, and thus only, that ministers will have before them the best technical advice upon which to decide. § 7. The estrangement developed of late years between educated Indians and members of the service is deplorable. Like all such estrangements, it is largely due to ignorance of each other, and to want of any regular sphere of work common to both. It is safe to say that two classes of men never work together without coming to think better of each other. The Transvaal civil servant was the target of almost as much criticism and abuse as members of the I.C.S. are here. One Boer leader just before assuming office as a Minister, said in a public speech, that, of all the plagues from which the Transvaal had suffered, the plague of experts was perhaps the worst. Yet soon after he assumed office he confirmed the position of nearly if not quite all the British heads of departments under him. Most of them still retain those positions and speak of him in terms of the highest praise as a political chief. With the new ministers this was the rule, not the exception, and the reason was simple. They felt their own want of experience in technical matters. They wanted to succeed, and so like sensible men they put their prejudices in their pockets, and kept the men who knew the technical details. And before these men had worked together many weeks the mutual prejudice began to evaporate, and made room for mutual confidence and respect. § 8. British officials, it may be said, will not serve under Indian ministers. I can only say that several of them, and those not the least able I have met, have assured me that this would not be so. They have before their eyes the position in which British officials have served from the first under Egyptian ministers. As one of my friends in the service said, it would be a great adventure to him to throw his energies and knowledge into the task of making responsible government a reality in India. Any one, he added, could administer the village on lines worked out by men like Munro, Elphinstone, and Colvin. It is easy enough to continue the methods which they evolved and applied. To their successors of the present day is presented a new and far more delicate problem, and one calling for qualities higher than those demanded by the simpler conditions of the past. § 9. And while we are on this point let me notice that the one real objection brought by Nationalists against this scheme is that the I.C.S. will thwart the work of the State ministries, with the deliberate intention of bringing them to naught, and so seeming to prove their incompetence. Those who use this argument fail to see that it is fatal to any scheme of reforms. If the assumption they make is correct there is nothing before India but revolution. Believe me, it is not correct. The charges you bring against British officials. the people of 1858 to revise The members. here, should really be directed against us, England. It is we who have failed since instructions which have long been obsolete. of the service now have their instructions, and will be found loyal to their spirit as well as their letter. I venture to predict that as they realize the nature of the new enterprise before them, they will come to glory in its pursuit. There are many unofficial Europeans, who would feel more hopeful of this adventure, if their imaginations allowed them to depict the first Indian ministers, selecting as their permanent assistants able members of the I.C.S. and of the collateral services. LETTER XVI LEGISLATIVE POWERS § 1. WE may now consider the manner in which the legislative powers of the States are to be defined. They cannot, like the executive powers, be scheduled at present. In framing a federal constitution the greatest difficulty to be faced is usually that of drawing the line between the legislative powers to be exercised by the provincial governments on the one hand, and by the national government on the other hand. The only true guide is experience, and the best way in which to evoke and crystallize that experience is the device of enabling legislation, promoted by the provincial authority, and passed into law by the central authority. It was thus that the powers of the great municipal corporations of England were built up in the nineteenth century. Cities, like Manchester, Newcastle, and Birmingham had corporations based upon charters granted centuries ago. In the first decades of the nineteenth century the introduction of steam power and the factory system caused an unprecedented growth in their populations, and created all sorts of needs which were not foreseen when the original charters were granted. Such cities, for instance, required to be drained in accordance with modern sanitary science. This involved an interference with private rights and a power to raise loans, which was not within the existing powers of the town council. In order to obtain these powers, the council would present a petition to Parliament in the form of a private Bill, in the clauses of which were defined all the necessary powers of expropriation, of making by-laws, and of raising loans. Such Bills, |