therefore void in whole, and will not support the action to forfeit the charter. Upon the same objection we held the Anti-Trust Law of 1889 to be constitutional, and there is no such difference between the two laws as would affect the decision of this question. We believe that our decision is correct; that the law is not in contravention of the constitution of the State nor of the United States. Honck v. Brewing

Assn., 88 Texas, 189."

The court then referred to Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540, and in submission to its authority held the law of 1895, so far as it came within the terms of that case, invalid, and would not support an action by the State to recover a penalty for a violation of the law, nor would it, in suits between corporations and individuals, support a defense based upon the fact that the right of action originated in violation of the Anti-Trust Law. "But," the court remarked, "to the extent that the statute of this State is not embraced in the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, we shall adhere to our former decision that it is constitutional and valid, and therefore enforcible by the State."

That is, the court decided the act of 1895 was valid to the extent that it authorized the State to revoke the license of a foreign corporation and to forfeit the charter of a domestic corporation. The other provisions of the act were held invalid, and the right to make this distinction was based on Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas.

State of Texas v. Laredo Ice Co. was instituted to recover penalties for the violation of the Anti-Trust Law of 1899. The ice company was a domestic corporation, and it was proceeded against for having formed a combination to regulate and fix prices. In defense, the company asserted the unconstitutionality of the act.

It is provided in section 14 of the act of 1899 that the provisions of preceding sections and the fines and penalties provided for violations of the act shall be held and construed to be cumulative of all laws now in force in the State: It was

contended, as it is contended here, that this provision made one law of the act and the act of 1895, and that the exemptions of the latter became part of the former and made it unconstitutional. In other words, the effect was (we quote from the opinion of the court) "thereby to give exemption from prosecution under the law of 1899 to those persons who are exempted by the provisions of the law of 1895." The Supreme Court of Texas rejected the contention. Its reasoning was not very direct or circumstantial, but it in effect held that the act of 1899 did not continue the provisions of the prior acts, whether constitutional or unconstitutional, merely because it was declared to be cumulative. And the court decided the law of 1899 to be constitutional, because it did not contain the discriminating features of the prior laws. Under the laws of Texas, therefore, combinations of the kind described in the various anti-trust laws, whether by agriculturalists or organized laborers or others, are forbidden and penalized, and the oil company is not discriminated against.

But it may be said that if the inequalities of prior antitrust acts have been removed by the act of 1899, they still remain in the Revised Statutes of the State and in the Penal Code, and by those Statutes and that Code the excepted classes are exempted from indictment and punishment, while the oil company is subject to both. We need not consider the Statutes referred to or consider how far this discrimination can exist, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court of the State in State of Texas v. Laredo Ice Company. Granting it can exist, the case at bar is not a criminal prosecution. It involves only the anti-trust laws and their prohibitions, and penalties. And in them, we have seen, by the effect of the act of 1899 there is no inequality of operation. It is the effect of that decision also that the laws of the State against combinations and trusts are formed into a harmonious system, of which the criminal provisions in other statutes and the Code are a part, and that their provisions can be adjusted and reconciled so as to have constitutional operation. Judgment affirmed.

Opinion of the Court.

197 U.S.

SOUTHERN COTTON OIL COMPANY v. TEXAS.

ERROR TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS IN AND FOR THE THIRD SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF TEXAS.

No. 38. Argned November 1, 2, 1904.—Decided February 27, 1905.

Decided on the authority of National Cotton Oil Company v. Texas, ante, p. 115.

THE facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. William V. Rowe and Mr. R. S. Lovett, with whom Ar. Ralph Oakley and Mr. James A. Baker were on the brief, for plaintiff in error.1

Mr. C. K. Bell, Attorney General of the State of Texas, for defendant in error.1

MR. JUSTICE MCKENNA delivered the opinion of the court.

The Southern Cotton Oil Company is a New Jersey corporation doing business in the State of Texas by virtue of a permit issued June 3, 1897, under the laws of the State. The object of this suit is to forfeit the permit of the company for the violation of the Anti-Trust Statutes of the State. The violation of the statutes alleged against it is the same as that alleged against the National Cotton Oil Company, the preceding case. The defenses are the same, and were presented by demurrer. The demurrer was overruled, and, the Southern Cotton Oil Company declining to plead further, judgment was entered forfeiting its permit to do business in the State, except such as might be and constitute interstate commerce. The judgment was affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals. A

1

See abstracts of arguments in National Cotton Oil Co. v. Texas, argued simultaneously with this case, pp. 118-127, ante.

197 U. S.

Argument for the United States.

rehearing was denied, and a writ of error from the Supreme Court of the State refused. This writ of error was then sued out. The questions are identical with those presented in the preceding case, and on its authority the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals is

Affirmed.

UNITED STATES v. WHITRIDGE.

CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH

CIRCUIT.

No. 413. Argued January 27, 30, 1905.-Decided February 27, 1905.

Under the proviso of § 25 of the act of Congress of August 27, 1898, 28 Stat. 509, 552, the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized, when he has satisfactory evidence that the rupee price of imported goods stated in the invoice does not mean rupees at bullion value, but as a certain fraction of a pound sterling, to order a reliquidation so as to make the value in United States currency correspond with the actual value of the goods. In determining when the Secretary of the Treasury exceeded his powers under a statute, this court may consider public facts that were known to Congress when enacting the statute and must have been before the Secretary's mind when acting thereunder, even though such facts were not proved on the trial.

THE facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Assistant Attorney General McReynolds, with whom the Solicitor General was on the brief for the United States: As to the facts and history of this case which arose because of the material difference between the gold value of the silver in a rupee-the current coin of India-and its commercial value see § 25, act of 1894, 28 Stat. 552; table compiled by Director of the Mint, April 1, 1900; § 5, Tariff Adm. Act, 1789, 1 Stat. 29, and acts of Congress prescribing values of foreign coins. 1790, § 40, 1 Stat. 167; 1799, § 61, 1 Stat. 673; 1801, 2 Stat. 121; 1834, 4 Stat. 700; 1842, 5 Stat. 496; 1843,

Argument for the United States.

197 U. S.

5 Stat. 625; 1846, 9 Stat. 14; 1873, requiring annual valuation of foreign coins by the Director of the Mint and proclamation of the same by the Secretary of the Treasury; 17 Stat. 602; Rev. Stat., 3564; 1890, 26 Stat. 567, 624; 1894, 28 Stat. 349, 509, 552; Rev. Stat. § 2903; Customs Reg., 1899, art. 409. The policy of the Government as to ad valorem duties is to assess at actual cost or market value and to effect this invoices in currency of the exporting country are required. Acts of 1789, 1 Stat. 41; 1790, 1 Stat. 167; 1799, 1 Stat. 673; 1801, 2 Stat. 121; 1890, 26 Stat. 131.

Reliquidation of any entry may be made within a year after the original entry. Sec. 21, act of 1874, 18 Stat. 190, Comp. Stat. 1986; § 24, act of 1890, 26 Stat. 140, Comp. Stat. 1987; Beard v. Porter, 124 U. S. 437, 441; Neresheimer v. United States, 131 Fed. Rep. 977; § 2652, Rev. Stat. A collector is merely a subordinate of the Secretary of the Treasury. 21 Op. 203; 249, Rev. Stat.; United States v. Ballin, 144 U. S. 1, 10.

As to coinage in India see Act XXIII of 1870, of Indian Government, and Act XX of 1882, making silver legal tender; Act VIII of 1893; Report Director of Mint of 1893, p. 235; of 1900, p. 383; Act XXVI of September 15, 1899, making the sovereign legal tender at rate of 15 rupees. The bullion value of the rupee was greatly affected by the depreciation of silver owing to the closing of the Indian mints. See Lord Herschell's Report of Currency Committee, printed August 18, 1893, by Congress of United States.

Silver rupees since September, 1899, have been in fact only token coins like the silver dollars of the United States, or, in the language of the Financial Statement of India for 19001901, our notes printed on silver, as we may really regard our rupees." Sess. Papers, House of Commons, 1900, vol. 57. For history of the proviso in § 25, act of 1894, see Cong. Rec., vol. 26, 53d Cong., 2d Sess., 6576.

That part of the amendment which preceded the word "provided" was not new legislation. It in substance expressed the effect of the acts of 1873 and 1890, as expounded