with the true agreement of the parties, has a claim of equitable cognizance, for the contract must be reformed to meet the intention of the parties, and when corrected may be adjudged a valid claim.

For the purpose of adjudicating such claims this statute gives to the court equitable jurisdiction in order that it may determine what the District ought to pay to the claimant. Although unable to grant a decree for specific performance or exercise the peculiar powers of a court of equity, the Court of Claims may determine the money relief to which the claimant is entitled, whether arising out of an equitable or legal demand. This principle was recognized in United States v. Jones, 131 U. S. 1, 18. The Court of Claims in other cases has exercised the equitable jurisdiction conferred in the act of June 16, 1880, Cullinane v. District of Columbia, 18 C. Cl. 577, 594, and like jurisdiction to reform contracts under the act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 505, South Boston Iron Works v. United States, 34 C. Cl. 174.

We think that the court had jurisdiction to reform the contract upon the facts found.

It is objected that the Court of Claims awarded relief for certain "stiff clay" excavated under claimant's contract. The findings show that this work was not specifically covered by the original agreement, and that the work was accepted by the Commissioners, and the District received the benefit thereof; and the court finds that the excavation of the stiff clay was done under a verbal agreement with the Commissioners after the performance of the original contract, and that the claimant was entitled to the rate established therefor, as paid to other contractors for like work.

The act of June 16, 1880, permits a recovery for work done by order and direction of the Commissioners and accepted by them for the benefit of the District. While it has been held that this would not authorize a recovery for work done under the original contract, at higher prices than had been agreed upon, yet where there was a revival of the contract for distinct

work there might be a recovery at higher rates, which entered into the terms of renewal as understood by the parties, notwithstanding the preëxisting contract. Campbell and Eslin v. District of Columbia, 18 C. Cl. 193.

The act of 1874 gave limited power to the Commissioners, and in the act of February 21, 1871, 16 Stat. 419, providing for contracts of the Board of Public Works, it was distinctly provided that all contracts should be in writing and signed by the parties making the same. And it was held that this statute requires contracts to be actually signed and that mere entries on the journals of the board would not satisfy the statute. Barnard v. District of Columbia, 127 U. S. 409, 411.

But under the statute, June 16, 1880, now under consideration, the intention is manifest to permit the Court of Claims to adjudicate claims for all work done by the order and direction of the Commissioners, and accepted by them for the use, purpose and benefit of the District. For this purpose this is a remedial statute, and it is intended to permit parties to have an adjudication upon their demands where the District had been benefited by work actually done under the order and direction of the Commissioners and duly accepted. And the findings of fact show that the claimant was only permitted to recover for work so performed and accepted. As we have said, this right of recovery might not revive claims for work completed under former contracts, but here the finding is that the new agreement applied to a distinct subject matter and not to work covered by and performed under the original agreement. We find no error in the judgment of the Court of Claims in this regard. And so as to various sums awarded under findings of fact, establishing that more work was made necessary by reason of the change of grade on North Carolina avenue by the Commissioners in 1874, the change of grade making it necessary to further grade Third street, and to do work for that purpose. The findings show that this was done by the direction of the Commissioners and upon terms mutually agreed upon. Under Finding XIV, where the work is found not to

have been done under the original contract, it is found that it was admitted by the defendant to be correct, and is work of which the District has received the full benefit. So as to other findings to which exceptions are made, there is no dispute that the work was actually done to the satisfaction of the Commissioners upon terms agreed upon and the work duly accepted.

As we construe the statute, we think it affords ample authority to grant relief upon the facts found, which findings are conclusive upon us.

It is further urged by counsel for the Government that the pleadings are not sufficient to authorize the judgment, but we think that under the original petition and various amendments thereto the court was authorized to grant the relief adjudged.

The Court of Claims is not bound by special rules of pleading. The main purpose is to arrive at and adjudicate the justice of alleged claims against the United States. United States v. Burns, 12 Wall. 246, 254; United States v. Behan, 110 U. S. 338, 347. U.S.

On the whole record we find no error of law to the prejudice of the District.

MCCLAINE v. RANKIN.

Judgment affirmed.

ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH

CIRCUIT.

No. 58. Argued November 10, 1904.-Decided March 6, 1905.

In the absence of any provision of the act of Congress creating the liability of stockholders of national banks, fixing a limitation of time for commencing actions to enforce it, the statute of limitations of the particular State is applicable.

Although a statutory liability may be contractual, or quasi-contractual

in its nature, an action given by statute is not necessarily to be regarded as brought on simple contract, or breach of simple contract. The liability of stockholders of national banks is conditional, and the right to sue does not obtain until the Comptroller of the Currency has acted; his order is the basis of the suit, and the statute of limitations does not commence to run until assessment made, and then it runs as against an action to enforce the statutory liability and not an action for breach of contract.

As the statute of limitations of Washington has been construed by the courts of that State the time within which such an action must be brought is two years under § 4805, Ballinger's Code, and not within three years under subd. 3 of § 4800.

THE First National Bank of South Bend, Washington, became insolvent and was closed August 10, 1895, and on the seventeenth day of the same month one Heim was appointed receiver, who was succeeded by Aldrich, and Aldrich by George C. Rankin.

August 17, 1896, the acting Comptroller of the Currency levied an assessment against the shareholders of the bank in enforcement of their statutory liability. Adolphus F. McClaine, one of the stockholders, was notified of the levy, and demand was duly made of him to pay the assessment on or before September 17, 1896, and shortly thereafter an action was commenced against him by the receiver to recover the same. Pending the action, efforts to settle the claim were made. Subsequently, the action was dismissed. Thereupon the receiver brought an action against McClaine upon an alleged contract of compromise, which went to trial, and the receiver took a non-suit. The present action was then brought on the assessment, August 15, 1899, and McClaine set up the statute of limitations by demurrer, which the Circuit Court sustained, and dismissed the action. 98 Fed. Rep. 378. The cause was taken to the Circuit Court of Appeals, and the judgment of the Circuit Court reversed. 106 Fed. Rep.

791.

The case having been remanded, the Circuit Court overruled the demurrer, McClaine answered, and a trial was had, resulting in judgment for the receiver, which was affirmed by

the Circuit Court of Appeals. 119 Fed. Rep. 110. This writ of error was then brought.

The following are sections of the statutes of Washington in relation to limitations, as found in Ballinger's Codes:

"SEC. 4796. Actions can only be commenced within the periods herein prescribed after the cause of action shall have accrued, except when in special cases a different limitation is prescribed by statute; but the objection that the action was not commenced within the time limited can only be taken by answer or demurrer.

"SEC. 4797. The period prescribed in the preceding section for the commencement of actions shall be as follows:

"SEC. 4798. Within six years: 1. An action upon a judgment or decree of any court of the United States, or of any State or Territory within the United States;

"2. An action upon a contract in writing, or liability express or implied arising out of a written agreement;

"3. An action for the rents and profits or for the use and occupation of real estate."

"SEC. 4800. Within three years: 1. An action for waste or trespass upon real property;

"2. An action for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, including an action for the specific recovery thereof, or for any other injury to the person or rights of another not hereinafter enumerated;

"3. An action upon a contract or liability, express or implied, which is not in writing, and does not arise out of any written instrument;

"4. An action for relief upon the ground of fraud, the cause of action in such case not to be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud;

"5. An action against a sheriff, coroner, or constable upon a fiability incurred by the doing of an act in his official capacity and by virtue of his office, or by the omission of an official duty, including the non-payment of money collected upon