Opinion of the Court.

197 U. S. have been abandoned." But having reference to the previous part of the section, "such charge," relates to the one under which the accused has been committed or held to bail. The section prescribes the time within which the grand jury must act, and failing so to do, it is decreed that the prosecution shall be deemed to have been abandoned, and the effect upon the accused is not that he shall be discharged from prosecution for the offense, but that he shall be set free, if imprisoned, or his bail discharged, if released on bond. The statute, it is observed, acts upon persons committed to prison, and, with like effect, upon those not incarcerated but only held to bail. We think it would require clear and specific language to indicate a legislative intent to bar the prosecution of all offenses for the failure of the grand jury to act within nine months of the arrest of the accused, when the latter is at large upon bond. Again, if the contention of counsel for the accused is adopted, one will be discharged from further prosecution if the grand jury does not act upon the case, but if the grand jury does act, and the charge against the accused is found to be unwarranted, he is still subject to indictment until the three years of the statute of limitations have run, while the person whose case has not been wholly investigated will be forever released from the offense. Furthermore, section 1044 does not apply to capital offenses, for such are expressly excluded from the operation of that section; but section 939, under consideration, makes no exception, and applies alike to all offenses, and would operate to discharge a person accused of murder as well as one accused of petty theft. But, it is urged, section 939 permits the court to control and extend the time for taking action by the grand jury, thereby indicating the purpose of Congress to make this statute one of limitation. But we do not think the control of the time for taking action before the grand jury, given in this paragraph, enlarges the statute so as to make it applicable beyond the effect prescribed, which is upon the liberty of the accused or his freedom from the requirement to give bail. It is urged that if the construction insisted upon

by the Government is given to this statute the accused may be discharged for failure of the grand jury to act, and then immediately rearrested, so that the statute will be defeated of its purpose to protect the accused. The question of whether one who has made application to the court, and been discharged for failure to find an indictment against him within the time limited, could again be arrested without indictment, is not involved in this case. The question is, Is the prosecution of the offense finally barred by this statute, so that the accused may not be held to answer upon an indictment found after the nine months' period has clapsed? It is urged by counsel for the respondents that the power given the court to enlarge the time for taking action by the grand jury is not limited, and that the time may be extended beyond the period of three years fixed by the general statute of limitations. We cannot agree to this contention. We think the general statute of limitations has not been repealed or modified by this scction. The purpose of statutes of limitation is to finally bar all prosecution, and the purpose of the act under consideration, as we view it, is to control the prosecution by requiring action by the grand jury, and in default thereof release the person of the accused or discharge him from bail, so far as the pending prosecution is concerned. While the construction of this section is not free from difficulty, we think the view herein expressed best effectuates the purpose and intention of Congress in enacting this statute, viewed in the light of the language used and the objects intended. This view of the case renders it unnecessary to pass upon other questions raised in the record.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals will be reversed and the cause remanded with directions to reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of the District, of Columbia and remand the cause to that court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

VOL. CXCVII-31

Statement of the Case.

197 U. S.

In re COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS,
PETITIONER.

ORIGINAL.

No. 15. Argued February 27, 28, 1905.-Decided April 10, 1905.

In a proceeding brought by a State on petition for writs of prohibition, mandamus or certiorari, to restrain the justices of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia from proceeding further in an action brought by a citizen of the District of Columbia against the Secretary of the Treasury to enjoin him from issuing to the Governor of the petitioning State a duplicate warrant, held, that this court has no original jurisdiction and as the controversy was not one between a State and citizens of another State, and under the act of February 9, 1893, 27 Stat. 434, establishing the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, this court has no appellate jurisdiction as it cannot review judgments and decrees of the Supreme Court of the District directly by appeal or writ of error. In cases over which this court has no original or appellate jurisdiction it cannot grant prohibition, mandamus or certiorari as ancillary thereto.

By an act of Congress of the United States approved July 27, 1861, 12 Stat. 276, c. 21, it was provided:

"That the Secretary of the Treasury be, and he is hereby, directed, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to pay to the Governor of any State, or to his duly authorized agents, the costs, charges, and expenses properly incurred by such State for enrolling, subsisting, clothing, supplying, arming, equipping, paying, and transporting its troops employed in aiding to suppress the present insurrection against the United States, to be settled upon proper vouchers, to be filed and passed upon by the proper accounting officers of the Treasury."

On March 20, 1888, the legislature of Massachusetts passed the following resolution:

"Resolved, That the Governor and council are hereby authorized to employ the agent of the Commonwealth for the prosecution of war claims against the United States, to prose

cute also the claim of the Commonwealth for a refund of the direct tax paid under act of Congress approved August fifth in the year eighteen hundred and sixty-one, and of the interest paid upon war loans during the period from eighteen hundred and sixty-one to eighteen hundred and sixty-five, also to fix his compensation which shall be paid out of any amount received therefrom."

On July 12, 1899, the executive council of the Commonwealth passed a resolution authorizing the attorney general to employ John B. Cotton to prosecute said claim. Mr. Cotton was a citizen of the District of Columbia.

Thereupon a form of contract was prepared and executed by the then Governor of Massachusetts, in behalf and under the seal of the Commonwealth, and by Cotton; and a duplicate original thereof was deposited with the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States.

The prosecution of the claim was at once entered upon, and after five years was finally adjudicated, audited and passed.

On or about May 2, 1904, the Treasury Department issued and delivered to Cotton, as the duly authorized agent of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, war settlement warrant No. 11343, payable "to the Governor of the State of Massachusetts, or order," for the sum of $1,611,740.85, and addressed "P. O. address, c. o. John B. Cotton, agent and att'y, Washington, D. C."

Mr. Cotton notified the state attorney general of the delivery of the warrant to him, and that he was entitled to a lien upon the warrant for the amount of his fees under his contract; and the Governor was informed to the same effect. Mr. Cotton also notified the Secretary of the Treasury that he claimed a lien upon the warrant for compensation in accordance with his contract. Subsequently, the Governor, Hon. John L. Bates, addressed a communication to the Secretary of the Treasury, in which he demanded that the warrant be cancelled and that a duplicate thereof be forwarded to him as Governor of the

Commonwealth. The Secretary declined to comply with the demand. Later Mr. Cotton filed a bill in the Suprenie Court of the District of Columbia against "Leslie M. Shaw, Secretary of the Treasury, and John L. Bates, Governor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts," in which he asserted his right to an attorney's lien upon the papers of his client, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, including the warrant in question, and prayed, among other things, that said Leslie M. Shaw might be restrained and enjoined from cancelling the warrant which had been delivered to him, and from drawing or issuing a duplicate thereof to said Bates, and "that the defendant, John L. Bates, may be restrained and enjoined from asking, demanding or receiving from the defendant, Leslie M. Shaw, or any of his assistants, subordinates or clerks, a second or duplicate warrant as aforesaid."

The State of Massachusetts was not named as a party to this suit, and no relief was prayed against the State.

Upon the filing of this bill one of the justices of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia entered a rule on the Secretary of the Treasury, requiring him to show cause why the relief prayed against him should not be granted, which was duly served, but has not yet come on for hearing. No process was served upon defendant Bates, who has since ceased to be Governor, and he has never appeared in the suit, nor has the Commonwealth of Massachusetts intervened therein in any

way.

'The Commonwealth of Massachusetts then filed a petition in this court, on leave, for writs of prohibition, mandamus and certiorari, to restrain the justices of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia from taking further proceedings or entertaining jurisdiction in the equity suit.

In response to a rule entered on that petition, the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia showed cause, and submitted, for reasons set forth, that, as the case stood, the court ought not to be prevented from exercising jurisdiction.