the worthy favourite of their martial deities; the wretch who had lost his shield was alike banished from the religious and the civil assemblies of his countrymen. Some tribes of the north seem to have embraced the doctrine of transmigration,"1 others imagined a gross paradise of immortal drunkenness." All agreed that a life spent in arms, and a glorious death in battle, were the best preparations for a happy futurity, either in this or in another world.

The immortality so vainly promised by the priests was, in The bards some degree, conferred by the bards. That singular order of men has most deservedly attracted the notice of all who have attempted to investigate the antiquities of the Celts, the Scandinavians, and the Germans. Their genius and character, as well as the reverence paid to that important office, have been sufficiently illustrated. But we cannot so easily express, or even conceive, the enthusiasm of arms and glory which they kindled in the breast of their audience. Among a polished people, a taste for poetry is rather an amusement of the fancy than a passion of the soul. And yet, when in calm retirement we peruse the combats described by Homer or Tasso, we are insensibly seduced by the fiction, and feel a momentary glow of martial ardour. But how faint, how cold is the sensation which a peaceful mind can receive from solitary study! It was in the hour of battle, or in the feast of victory, that the bards celebrated the glory of heroes of ancient days, the ancestors of those warlike chieftains who listened with transport to their artless but animated strains. The view of arms and of danger heightened the effect of the military song; and the passions which it tended to excite, the desire of fame and the contempt of death, were the habitual sentiments of a German mind.73

71 Cæsar, Diodorus, and Lucan seem to ascribe this doctrine to the Gauls, but M. Pelloutier (Histoire des Celtes, l. iii. c. 18) labours to reduce their expressions to a more orthodox sense.

72 Concerning this gross but alluring doctrine of the Edda, see Fable xx. in the curious version of that book, published by M. Mallet, in his Introduction to the History of Denmark.

78 See Tacit. Germ. c. 3. Diodor. Sicul. 1. v. [29]. Strabo, 1. iv. p. 197. The classical reader may remember the rank of Demodocus in the Phæacian court, and the ardour infused by Tyrtæus into the fainting Spartans. Yet there is little probability that the Greeks and the Germans were the same people. Much learned trifling might be spared, if our antiquarians would condescend to reflect that similar manners will naturally be produced by similar situations.

Causes which

the pro

Germans

Such was the situation and such were the manners of the checked ancient Germans. Their climate, their want of learning, of gress of the arts, and of laws, their notions of honour, of gallantry, and of religion, their sense of freedom, impatience of peace, and thirst of enterprise, all contributed to form a people of military heroes. And yet we find that, during more than two hundred and fifty years that elapsed from the defeat of Varus to the reign of Decius, these formidable barbarians made few considerable attempts, and not any material impression, on the luxurious and enslaved provinces of the empire. Their progress was checked by their want of arms and discipline, and their fury was diverted by the intestine divisions of ancient Germany.

Want of

arms

I. It has been observed, with ingenuity, and not without truth, that the command of iron soon gives a nation the command of gold. But the rude tribes of Germany, alike destitute of both those valuable metals, were reduced slowly to acquire, by their unassisted strength, the possession of the one as well as the other. The face of a German army displayed their poverty of iron. Swords and the longer kind of lances they could seldom use. Their frame (as they called them in their own language) were long spears headed with a sharp but narrow iron point, and which, as occasion required, they either darted from a distance, or pushed in close onset. With this spear and with a shield their cavalry was contented. tude of darts, scattered 74 with incredible force, were an additional resource of the infantry. Their military dress, when they wore any, was nothing more than a loose mantle. A variety of colours was the only ornament of their wooden or their osier shields. Few of the chiefs were distinguished by cuirasses, scarce any by helmets. Though the horses of Germany were neither beautiful, swift, nor practised in the skilful evolutions of the Roman manage, several of the nations obtained renown by their cavalry; but, in general, the principal strength of the Germans consisted in their infantry,75 which

A multi

74 Missilia spargunt, Tacit. Germ. c. 6. Either that historian used a vague expression, or he meant that they were thrown at random. [On the framea cp. Delbrück, op. cit., ii. 56-58. He regards it as the same as the old Greek hoplite spear, six to eight feet long.]

75 It was the principal distinction from the Sarmatians, who generally fought on horseback. [On the columns of the Germans, and advantages and disadvantages of this formation, as compared with the Roman phalanx, see Delbrück, op. cit., ii. 45 sqq.]

cipline

was drawn up in several deep columns, according to the dis- and of dis-
tinction of tribes and families. Impatient of fatigue or delay,
these half-armed warriors rushed to battle with dissonant
shouts and disordered ranks; and sometimes, by the effort of
native valour, prevailed over the constrained and more artificial
bravery of the Roman mercenaries. But as the barbarians
poured forth their whole souls on the first onset, they knew
not how to rally or to retire. A repulse was a sure defeat;
and a defeat was most commonly total destruction. When
we recollect the complete armour of the Roman soldiers, their
discipline, exercises, evolutions, fortified camps, and military
engines, it appears a just matter of surprise how the naked
and unassisted valour of the barbarians could dare to encounter
in the field the strength of the legions and the various troops
of the auxiliaries, which seconded their operations. The con-
test was too unequal, till the introduction of luxury had ener-
vated the vigour, and a spirit of disobedience and sedition had
relaxed the discipline, of the Roman armies. The introduction
of barbarian auxiliaries into those armies was a measure at-
tended with very obvious dangers, as it might gradually instruct
the Germans in the arts of war and of policy. Although they
were admitted in small numbers and with the strictest pre-
caution, the example of Civilis was proper to convince the
Romans that the danger was not imaginary, and that their
precautions were not always sufficient.76 During the civil
wars that followed the death of Nero, that artful and intrepid
Batavian, whom his enemies condescended to compare with
Hannibal and Sertorius," formed a great design of freedom
and ambition. Eight Batavian cohorts, renowned in the wars
of Britain and Italy, repaired to his standard. He introduced
an army of Germans into Gaul, prevailed on the powerful cities
of Treves and Langres to embrace his cause, defeated the
legions, destroyed their fortified camps, and employed against
the Romans the military knowledge which he had acquired in
their service. When at length, after an obstinate struggle, he
yielded to the power of the empire, Civilis secured himself and

76 The relation of this enterprise occupies a great part of the fourth and fifth books of the History of Tacitus, and is more remarkable for its eloquence than perspicuity. Sir Henry Saville has observed several inaccuracies,

77 Tacit. Hist. iv. 13. Like them, he had lost an eye.

1

.

.

Civil dissensions of

his country by an honourable treaty. The Batavians still continued to occupy the islands of the Rhine,78 the allies, not the servants, of the Roman monarchy.

II. The strength of ancient Germany appears formidable Germany when we consider the effects that might have been produced by its united effort. The wide extent of country might very possibly contain a million of warriors, as all who were of an age to bear arms were of a temper to use them. But this fierce multitude, incapable of concerting or executing any plan of national greatness, was agitated by various and often hostile intentions. Germany was divided into more than forty independent states; and even in each state the union of the several tribes was extremely loose and precarious. The barbarians were easily provoked; they knew not how to forgive an injury, much less an insult; their resentments were bloody and implacable. The casual disputes that so frequently happened in their tumultuous parties of hunting or drinking were sufficient to inflame the minds of whole nations; the private feud of any considerable chieftains diffused itself among their followers and allies. To chastise the insolent, or to plunder the defenceless, were alike causes of war. The most formidable states of Germany affected to encompass their territories with a wide frontier of solitude and devastation. The awful distance preserved by their neighbours attested the terror of their arms, and in some measure defended them from the danger of unexpected incursions.79

Fomented by the policy of Rome

"The Bructeri (it is Tacitus who now speaks) were totally exterminated by the neighbouring tribes,80 provoked by their insolence, allured by the hopes of spoil, and perhaps inspired by the tutelar deities of the empire. Above sixty thousand barbarians were destroyed, not by the Roman arms, but in our sight, and for our entertainment. May the nations, enemies of Rome, ever preserve this enmity to each other! We have now attained the utmost verge of prosperity,81 and have nothing

78 It was contained between the two branches of the old Rhine, as they subsisted before the face of the country was changed by art and nature. See Cluver. German. Antiq. 1. iii. c. 30, 37.

79 Cæsar de Bell. Gall. 1. vi. 23.

80 They are mentioned however in the ivth and vth centuries by Nazarius, Ammianus, Claudian, &c., as a tribe of Franks. See Cluver. Germ. Antiq. 1. iii. c. 13. 81 Urgentibus is the common reading, but good sense; Lipsius, and some MSS. declare for Vergentibus. [An unnecessary correction.]

left to demand of fortune except the discord of the barbarians." 82 These sentiments, less worthy of the humanity than of the patriotism of Tacitus, express the invariable maxims of the policy of his countrymen. They deemed it a much safer expedient to divide than to combat the barbarians, from whose defeat they could derive neither honour nor advantage. The money and negotiations of Rome insinuated themselves into the heart of Germany, and every art of seduction was used with dignity to conciliate those nations whom their proximity to the Rhine or Danube might render the most useful friends as well as the most troublesome enemies. Chiefs of renown and power were flattered by the most trifling presents, which they received either as marks of distinction or as the instruments of luxury. In civil dissensions, the weaker faction endeavoured to strengthen its interest by entering into secret connexions with the governors of the frontier provinces. Every quarrel among the Germans was fomented by the intrigues of Rome; and every plan of union and public good was defeated by the stronger bias of private jealousy and interest.&

union

Marcus

The general conspiracy which terrified the Romans under Transient the reign of Marcus Antoninus comprehended almost all the against nations of Germany, and even Sarmatia, from the mouth of the Antoninus Rhine to that of the Danube. It is impossible for us to determine whether this hasty confederation was formed by necessity, by reason, or by passion; but we may rest assured, that the barbarians were neither allured by the indolence or provoked by the ambition of the Roman monarch. This dangerous invasion required all the firmness and vigilance of Marcus. He

82 Tacit. Germania, c. 33. The pious Abbé de la Bléterie is very angry with Tacitus, talks of the devil who was a murderer from the beginning, &c., &c.

83 Many traces of this policy may be discovered in Tacitus and Dion; and many more may be inferred from the principles of human nature.

84 Hist. August. p. 31 [iv. 22]. Ammian. Marcellin. 1. xxxi. c. 5. Aurel. Victor [Cæs. 16]. The Emperor Marcus was reduced to sell the rich furniture of the palace, and to enlist slaves and robbers. [This war is generally called the Marcomannic, but its proper name, at first, was the Bellum Germanicum. At a later stage, when the Sarmatians made common cause with the Germans, it was called the Bellum Germanicum Sarmaticum. The Romans took the field in 167, and hostilities lasted, with a short interval of peace, till 180. Cp. Conrad, Mark Aurels Markomannenkrieg, 1889, and below, Appendix 24. The following German peoples took part in it: Marcomanni, Quadi, Narisci, Victovali, Hermunduri, Vandals, Buri; also the (Sarmatian) Jazyges, who dwelt between the Theiss and Danube. Large settlements of the conquered barbarians were made within the limits of the Empire, so that this period has importance for the history of the Roman colonatus. See the full article of Seeck on the Colonatus in Pauly-Wissowa, Encyclopädie.]