Man by applying himself wholly to ends of Virtue 167 lutions, and observances or exercises; which are not to be regarded so much in themselves, as because they keep the mind in continual obedience. The obliteration of the evil hath been practised by two means, some kind of redemption or expiation of that which is past, and an inception or account de novo, for the time to come. But this part seemeth sacred and religious, and justly; for all good moral philosophy, as was said, is but a handmaid to religion. 16. Wherefore we will conclude with that last point, which is of all other means the most compendious and summary, and again, the most noble and effectual to the reducing of the mind unto virtue and good estate; which is, the electing and propounding unto a man's self good and virtuous ends of his life, such as may be in a reasonable sort within his compass to attain. For if these two things be supposed, that a man set before him honest and good ends, and again, that he be resolute, constant, and true unto them; it will follow that he shall mould himself into all virtue at once. And this indeed is like the work of nature; whereas the other course is like the work of the hand. For as when a carver makes an image, he shapes only that part whereupon he worketh, (as if he be upon the face, that part which shall be the body is but a rude stone still, till such time as he comes to it ;) but, contrariwise, when nature makes a flower or living creature, she formeth rudiments of all the parts at one time: so in obtaining virtue by habit, while a man practiseth temperance, he doth not profit much to fortitude, nor the like: but when he dedicateth and applieth himself to good ends, look, what virtue soever the pursuit and passage towards those ends doth commend unto him, he is invested of a precedent disposition to conform himself thereunto. Which state of mind Aristotle doth excellently express himself, that it ought not to be called virtuous, but divine: his words are these: Immanitati autem consentaneum est opponere eam, quæ supra humanitatem est, heroicam sive divinam virtutem and a little after, Nam ut feræ neque vitium neque virtus est, sic neque Dei: sed hic quidem status altius quiddam virtute est, ille aliud quiddam a vitio.9 And therefore we may see what celsitude of honour Plinius Secundus attributeth to Trajan' in his funeral oration; 3 Aristot. Eth. Nic. vii. 1. 1. 1 There is some mistake here, as the Panegyric referred to was delivered at the beginning of Trajan's reign, and he outlived the speaker. Perhaps prospective prayers may be meant. Vid. Plin. Paneg. c. 94. 168 may regain somewhat of the Image of God. where he said, That men needed to make no other prayers to the gods, but that they would continue as good Lords to them as Trajan had been; as if he had not been only an imitation of divine nature, but a pattern of it. But these be heathen and profane passages, having but a shadow of that divine state of mind, which religion and the holy faith doth conduct men unto, by imprinting upon their souls charity, which is excellently called the bond of perfection, because it comprehendeth and fasteneth all virtues together.2 And as it is elegantly said by Menander of vain love, which is but a false imitation of divine love, Amor melior Sophista lævo ad humanam vitam, that love teacheth a man to carry himself better than the sophist or preceptor; which he calleth left-handed, because, with all his rules and precepts, he cannot form a man so dexterously, nor with that facility to prize himself and govern himself, as love can do: so certainly, if a man's mind be truly inflamed with charity, it doth work him suddenly into a greater perfection than all the doctrine of morality can do, which is but a sophist in comparison of the other. Nay further, as Xenophon observed truly, that all other affections, though they raise the mind, yet they do it by distorting and uncomeliness of ecstasies or excesses; but only love doth exalt the mind, and nevertheless at the same instant doth settle and compose it: so in all other excellences, though they advance nature, yet they are subject to excess; only charity admitteth no excess. so we see, aspiring to be like God in power, the angels transgressed and fell; Ascendam, et ero similis altissimo:3 by aspiring to be like God in knowledge, man transgressed and fell; Eritis sicut Dii, scientes bonum et malum: but by aspiring to a similitude of God in goodness or love, neither man nor angel ever transgressed, or shall transgress. For unto that imitation we are called: Diligite inimicos vestros, benefacite eis qui oderunt vos, et orate pro persequentibus et calumniantibus vos, ut sitis filii Patris vestri qui in cœlis est, qui solem suum oriri facit super bonos et malos, et pluit super justos et injustos. So in the first platform of the divine nature itself, the heathen religion speaketh thus, Optimus Maximus: and the sacred Scriptures thus, Misericordia ejus super omnia opera ejus. 17. Wherefore I do conclude this part of moral knowledge, concerning the culture and regimen of the mind; For 4 Gen. iii. 5. 6 Ps. cxlv. 9. 6 Corresponding Excellencies of Mind and Body. 169 wherein if any man, considering the parts thereof which I have enumerated, do judge that my labour is but to collect into an art or science that which hath been pretermitted by others, as matter of common sense and experience, he judgeth well. But as Philocrates sported with Demosthenes, You may not marvel, Athenians, that Demosthenes and I do differ; for he drinketh water, and I drink wine; and like as we read of an ancient parable of the two gates of sleep, Sunt geminæ somni portæ : quarum altera fertur Sed falsa ad cœlum mittunt insonnia manes:8 so if we put on sobriety and attention, we shall find it a sure maxim in knowledge, that the more pleasant liquor of wine is the more vaporous, and the braver gate of ivory sendeth forth the falser dreams. 18. But we have now concluded that general part of human philosophy, which contemplateth man segregate, and as he consisteth of body and spirit. Wherein we may further note, that there seemeth to be a relation or conformity between the good of the mind and the good of the body. For as we divided the good of the body into health, beauty, strength, and pleasure; so the good of the mind, inquired in rational and moral knowledges, tendeth to this, to make the mind sound, and without perturbation; beautiful, and graced with decency; and strong and agile for all duties of life. These three, as in the body, so in the mind, seldom meet, and commonly sever. For it is easy to observe, that many have strength of wit and courage, but have neither health from perturbations, nor any beauty or decency in their doings: some again have an elegancy and fineness of carriage, which have neither soundness of honesty, nor substance of sufficiency and some again have honest and reformed minds, that can neither become themselves nor manage business : and sometimes two of them meet, and rarely all three. As for pleasure, we have likewise determined that the mind ought not to be reduced to stupid, but to retain pleasure; confined rather in the subject of it, than in the strength and vigour of it. : Demosth. de Fals. Leg. p. 355. 8 Virg. En. vi. 893. 170 Distribution of Civil Knowledge. Neglect and Affectation to be XXIII. 1. CIVIL knowledge is con versant about a subject which of all others is most immersed in matter, and hardliest reduced to axiom. Nevertheless, as Cato the Censor said, That the Romans were like sheep, for that a man might better drive a flock of them, than one of them; for in a flock, if you could but get some few to go right, the rest would follow so in that respect moral philosophy is more difficile than policy. Again, moral philosophy propoundeth to itself the framing of internal goodness; but civil knowledge requireth only an external goodness; for that as to society sufficeth. And therefore it cometh oft to pass that there be evil times in good governments: for so we find in the holy story, when the kings were good, yet it is added, Sed adhuc populus non direxerat cor suum ad Dominum Deum patrum suorum.2 Again, states, as great engines, move slowly, and are not so soon put out of frame: for as in Egypt the seven good years sustained the seven bad, so governments for a time well grounded, do bear out errors following; but the resolution of particular persons is more suddenly subverted. These respects do somewhat qualify the extreme difficulty of civil knowledge. 2. This knowledge hath three parts, according to the three summary actions of society; which are conversation, negotiation. and government. For man seeketh in society comfort, use, and protection: and they be three wisdoms of divers natures, which do often sever: wisdom of the behaviour, wisdom of business, and wisdom of state. The wisdom of conversation ought not to be over much affected, but much less despised; for it hath not only an honour in itself, but an influence also into business and government. The poet saith, Nec vultu destrue verba tuo: a man may destroy the force of his words with his countenance: so may he of his deeds, saith Cicero, recommending to his brother affability and easy access; Nil interest habere ostium apertum, vultum clausum ; it is nothing won to admit men with an open door, and to In the Latin edition the eighth book begins here. 1 Plut. in Vit. Cat. 2 2 Chron. xx. 33. 3 Ovid. A. A. ii. 312. The following is the passage referred to: "Cura ut aditus ad te diurni atque nocturni pateant; neque foribus solum aedium tuarum sed etiam vultu ac fronte quae est animi janua; quae si significat voluntatem abditam esse ac retrusam, par vi refert patere ostium.” Q. Cic. de Petit. Consul. xi. 44. 5 equally avoided in Behaviour. 171 receive them with a shut and reserved countenance. So, we see, Atticus, before the first interview between Cæsar and Cicero, the war depending, did seriously advise Cicero touching the composing and ordering of his countenance and gesture. And if the government of the countenance be of such effect, much more is that of the speech, and other carriage appertaining to conversation; the true model whereof seemeth to me well expressed by Livy, though not meant for this purpose: Ne aut arrogans videar, aut obnoxius; quorum alterum est alienæ libertatis obliti, alterum sua :6 The sum of behaviour is to retain a man's own dignity, without intruding upon the liberty of others. On the other side, if behaviour and outward carriage be intended too much, first it may pass into affectation, and then Quid deformius quam scenam in vitam transferre (to act a man's life)? But although it proceed not to that extreme, yet it consumeth time, and employeth the mind too much. And therefore as we use to advise young students from company keeping, by saying, Amici fures temporis: so certainly the intending of the discretion of behaviour is a great thief of meditation. Again, such as are accomplished in that hour of urbanity please themselves in it, and seldom aspire to higher virtue; whereas those that have defect in it do seek comeliness by reputation; for where reputation is, almost everything becometh; but where that is not, it must be supplied by puntos, and compliments. Again, there is no greater impediment of action than an over-curious observance of decency, and the guide of decency, which is time and season. For as Soloinon saith, Qui respicit ad ventos, non seminat; et qui respicit ad nubes, non metet:7 a man must make his opportunity, as oft as find it. To conclude, behaviour seemeth to me as a garment of the mind, and to have the conditions of a garment. For it ought to be made in fashion; it ought not to be too curious; it ought to be shaped so as to set forth any good making of the mind, and hide any deformity; and above all, it ought not to be too strait, or restrained for exercise or motion. But this part of civil knowledge hath been elegantly handled, and therefore I cannot report it for deficient. 3. The wisdom touching negotiation or business hath not been hitherto collected into writing, to the great derogation of learning, and the professors of learning. 5 He seems to refer to the letter ad Att. ix. 9. |