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their own children, or else that they be advoutresses.
For their children, the tragedies likewise of dangers from them have been many; and generally the entering of the fathers into suspicion of their children hath been ever unfortunate. The destruction of Mustapha (that we named before) was so fatal to Solyman's line, as the succession of the Turks from Solyman until this day is suspected to be untrue, and of strange blood; for that Selymus the Second was thought to be supposititious. The destruction of Crispus, a young prince of rare towardness, by Constantinus the Great, his fatber, was in like manner fatal to his house, for both Constantinus and Constance, his sons, died violent deaths; and Constantius, his other son, did little better, who died indeed of sickness, but after that Julianus had taken arms against him. The destruction of Demetrius, son of Philip the Second of Macedon, turned upon the father, who died of repentance : and many like examples there are, but few or none where the fathers had good by such distrust, except it were where the sons were in open arms against them; as was Sel ymus the First against Bajazet, and the three sons of Henry the Second, king of England.
For their prelates, when they are proud and great, there is also danger from them; as it was in the times of Anselmus and Thomas Beckett, archbishops of Canterbury, who with their crosiers did almost try it with the king's
Eword; and yet they had to deal with stout and haughty kings, William Rufus, Henry the First, and Henry the Second. The danger is not from that state, but where it hath a dependence of foreign authority; or where the churchmen come in and are elected, not by the collation of the king, or particular patrons, but by the people.
For their nobles, to keep them at a distauce it is not amiss; but to depress them may make a king more absolute, but less safe, and less able to perform any thing that he desires. I have noted it in my History of king Henry the Seventh, of England, who depressed his nobility, whereupon it came to pass that nis imes were full of difficulties and troubles; for the nobility, though they continued loyal uuto him, yet did they not cooperate with bim in his business; so that in effect he was iain to do all things himself.
For their second nobles, there is not much danger from them, being a body dispersed : they may sometimes discourse high, but that doth little hurt; besides, they are a counterpoise to the higher nobility, that they grow not too potent; and, lastly, being the most immediate in authority with the common people, they do best temper popular commotions.
For their merchants, they are "vena porta;" and if they flourish not, a kingdom may have good limbs, but will have empty veins, and nourish little. Taxes and imposts upon them do seldom good to uue king's revenue, for that
which he wins in the hundred, he loseth in the shire; the particular rates being increased, but the total bulk of trading rather decreased.
For their commons, there is little danger from them, except it be where they have great and potent heads; or where you medule wità the point of religion, or their customs, or means of life.
For their men of war, it is a dangerous state where they live and remain in a body, and are used to donatives, whereof we see examples in the janizaries, and pretorian bands of Rome; but trainings of men, and arming of them in several places, and under several commanders, and without donatives, are things of defence and no danger.
Princes are like to heavenly bodies, which cause good or evil times; and which have much veneration, but no rest. All piecepts concerning kings are in effect comprehended in those two remembrances, “memento quod es homo ;” and “memento quod es Deus, cr vice Dei;” the one bridleth their power, and the other their will.
The greatest trust between man and man is the trust of giving counsel; for in other confidences men commit the parts of life, their lands, their goods, their children, their credit, some particular affair; but to such as they
make their counsellors they commit the whole: by how much the more they are obliged to all faith and integrity. The wisest princes need not think it any diminutiou to their greatness, or derogation to their sufficiency, to rely upon counsel. Gnd himself is not without, but hath made it one of the great names of his blessed Son, “The Counsellor.” Solomon hath pronounced, that “in counsel is stability." " Things will have their first or second agitation : if they be not tossed
arguments of counsel, they will be tossed upon the waves of fortune, and be full of inconstancy, doing and undoing, like the reeling of a drunks
Solomon's son found the force of counsel, as his father saw the necessity of it: for the beloved kingdom of God was first rent and broken by ill counsel ; upon which counsel there are set for our instruction the two marks whereby bad counsel is for ever best discerned, that it was young counsel for the persons,
and violent counsel for the matter. The ancient times do set forth in figure both the incorporation and inseparable conjunction of counsel with kings, and the wise and politic use of counsel by kings : the one, in that they say Jupiter did marry Metis, which signiieth counsel: whereby they intend that sovereignty is married to counsel : the other in that which followeth, which was thus : they say, after Jupiter was married to Metis, she conceived by him and was with child, but Jupitor suffered her not to stay till she brought
forth, but eat her ud; whereby he became himself with child, and was delivered of Pallas arned out of his head. Which monstrous fable containeth a secret of empire, how kings are to make use of their council of state : that, first, they ought to refer matters unto them, which is the first begetting of impregnation : but when they are elaborate, moulded, and shaped in the womb of their council, and grow ripe and ready to be brought forth, that then they suffer not their council to go through with the resolution and direction, as if it depended on them ; but take the matter back into their own hands, and make it appear to the world, that the decrees aud final directions (which, because they come forth with prudence and power, are resembled to Pallas armed) proceeded from themselves; and not only from their authority, but (the more to add reputation to themselves from their head and device.
Let us now speak of the inconveniences of counsel, and of the remedies. The inconveniences that have been noted in calling and using counsel, are three : first, the revealing of affairs, whereby they become less secret; secondly, the weakening of the authority of princes, as if they were less of themselves; thirdly, the danger of being unfaithfully counselled, and more for the good of them that counsel than of him that is counselled; for which inconveniences, the doctrine of Italy, and prar tice of France in some kings' times, hath