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PAGE Williamson v. Russell .

170 Woolf v. Chalker . . . . . . 114 Willingham r. Rushing .. 178 Woolley v. Paxson . . . 555 Wills v. Wills . . . . . . . 603 | Woonsocket Inst. for Savings Wilmoth v. Wilmoth . . . 478 v. Ballou . . . . . . . . Wilson v. New Bedford ... 84 Worcester v. Worcester . . . 611 - v. Turner . . .

624 Worseley's Estate . . . . . 381 Winfrey v. Clarke . . . . . 178 Wright v. Charley . . . . . 603 Wingate v. Smith. . .

173 - v. Gooden . . . 591 Winsor v. Mills . . . . . . 624 — - v. Mayer . . .

639 Winter's Estate . . . . . . 612 - - v. Methodist Epis. Church 553 Winters v. Winters..

160 Wolfer r. Hemmer . . . 478, 624 Wolffe v. Wolffe . . .

Yocum v. Zahner . . . . . . 381

Young's Estate . . . . . . 465 Wood v. Baron . . ..

Young v. Harkleroad . . . . 764 - v. Bullard . . . . 612, 697

. ..

. .

- v. Harvey .

. . -v. Seaver

. 113 - v. Stoner 172

. . . . . . 591 Woodman v. Hubbard ..

- 2. Woodman. 591, 592 Woodruff v. Snedecor...336 | Zillmer v. Landguth . . . . . 624 Woods v. Woods . . . . . . 817 | Zimmer v. Sennott . . . . . 478 Woodside v. Ridgeway.

8 Zimmerman v. Zimmerman . . . 465 Woodyear v. Schaefer . . 160, 161 | Zoebisch v. Tarbell . . . . . 114





No 1. — ALLEN v. HILL.

(33 Eliz.)



WHERE a person having an estate upon condition, continues to hold after the condition is broken, he is, until the remainderman enters, a tenant at sufferance; if he is in possession by agreement with the owner so long as both he and the owner please, he is a tenant at will, strictly so called: but if he is a tenant at a yearly rent, with no express stipulation as to terms of tenancy, he is a tenant from year to year.

Allen v. Hill.
Cro. Eliz. 238–239.

Devise. Cesser of Estate. Tenant by Sufferance.

[238] If a house be devised to A. for life,“ proviso, if she departs therefrom she shall have a rent," the life estate is determined by her departure, and till the entry of him in remainder she continues tenant at sufferance only.

Ejectione firmæ, for a house in Cornhill, London. Upon a special verdict the case was, Fr. Benson being seised of the house in fee, 4 Eliz., devised it to Agnes his wife for life; and after to the heirs of his body, the remainder to Th. Benson his brother in fee: “ Proviso, that if the said Agnes clearly departs out of London, and dwell in the country, that then she shall have a rent out of the said house, &c.” And found further, that Francis died with


No. 1. — Allen v. Hill, Cro. Eliz. 238, 239.

out issue, and that Th. Benson died, and that R. is his heir; and that afterwards, 15 Eliz., Agnes totaliter departed from London, and went to Milton in Suffolk. And after the said R. before entry made by him and the executor 07 Francis released to Agnes; and afterwards entered, and let to the plaintiff; and that Agnes married one Huggins; and the defendant entered by his commandment. — The substande of the matter was, If this proviso doth determine the estiitė before entry? for if so, she was tenant at sufferance, and the release could not enure to her estate; for it was agreed, it was a good proviso to make her estate to determine; although there be no words“ to cease,” or “ that it shall be void;”

out being in a will, it is implied in the words,“ that then she .: shall have a rent;” which cannot be, if her estate be not deter

mined. — The Justices said, she is but tenant at sufferance; for if the devise had been express, that if she doth such an act her estate shall cease; after such an act done, though she continue in possession, and dieth, this is no freehold in her; and here is as much in substance. And Wray said, it was held at an assembly of all the Justices, that if tenant pur auter vie continue in possession after the death of cestuy que vie, he is but tenant at sufferance, and his dissent shall not take away an entry; which Gawdy agreed, and that 18 Edw. IV. pl. 25, is not law.

But there was a default in the verdict; for it was found that she totaliter departed from London, and went to Milton in Suffolk; but it was not found that she dwelt out of London; and this is part of the condition: and this not being found, it is not found that the condition is broken: and then, notwithstanding any matter found, the entry of the defendant is lawful. And it was moved, that as to it a venire facias de novo should issue to examine this point better, if she dwelt in the country; for it was said in this point, the verdict was not well examined. — But the Court held, that the verdict is full, upon which a judgment might be given, and then no venire facias de novo is to be awarded; for it

is found for the defendant, when it is not found that the [* 239] condition is broken : * and for this cause only it was

adjudged for the defendant. But then it was objected, that the life of Agnes was not found, and then the defendant cannot enter. Fenner said, it shall be intended she is living; for the jury did not doubt of it; for they find, that if his entry upon the matter found is lawful, that he

No. 2. — Richardson v. Langridge, 4 Taunt. 128, 129.

is not guilty: so they doubted of nothing but that point; and so it was adjudged in 28 Eliz. in this Court. And judgment was, quòd querens nihil capiat per billam.

Richardson v. Langridge. 4 Taunt. 128–132 (13 R. R. 570).

Agreement to let so long as both parties please. Tenancy at will. [128] If an agreement be made to let premises so long as both parties please, and reserving a compensation, accruing de die in diem, and not referable to a year, or any aliquot part of a year, it does not create a holding from year to year, but a tenancy at will, strictly so called.

And though the tenant has expended money on the improvement of the premises, that does not give him a term to hold until he is indemnified.

Trespass for breaking and entering a stable of the plaintiff, and breaking to pieces the doors and locks, and tearing down, damaging, and destroying the bins, troughs, and mangers of the plaintiff, and locking up the stable, and expelling the defendant from his possession. The defendant pleaded, first, not guilty; secondly, that, R. Crossley, being seised in fee of the premises by indenture demised to the defendant, among other things, the stable, for a term of twenty-one years yet unexpired, by virtue whereof the defendant entered and was possessed, and by reason of such possession justified the acts complained of in the declaration. The plaintiff confessing the seisin of Crossley, and the lease to the defendant, replied, that the defendant afterwards, and during the said term of twenty-one years, demised to the plaintiff the said stable with the appurtenances, to hold to the plaintiff during a certain term, that is to say, for so long a time as they, the plaintiff and the defendant, should respectively please, the plaintiff rendering to the defendant a certain compensation between them in that behalf agreed upon for the same, by virtue of which demise the plaintiff entered and was possessed, until the defendant afterwards and during the continuance of the said term, and interest of the plaintiff therein of his own wrong committed the said several trespasses. The defendant apprehending that the demise laid in the plea was descriptive of a holding from year to year, instead of rejoining * that he had determined [* 129] his will, rejoined, that he did not demise the said stable to the plaintiff in manner and form as the plaintiff had alleged, and

No. 2. — Richardson 9. Langridge, 4 Tannt. 129, 130.

tendered issue thereon, in which the plaintiff joined. Upon the trial of this cause, at the Maidstone Summer Assizes, 1811, before Lord ELLENBOROUGH, Ch. J., the evidence was, that the defendant having taken a lease of a close of land, and built a shed therein, in August, 1810, let the same by parol to the plaintiff, who was a carrier, upon an agreement made without any reference to time, that the plaintiff should convert it into a stable, and that the defendant should have all the dung made by the plaintiff's horses. The plaintiff, after having for some time occupied it in its original state, laid out about six pounds in putting up a rack and manger, and converting the building to a stable: about the end of the following April the defendant requested him to leave the premises, and upon his refusing to do it till he could suit himself elsewhere, the defendant, in the plaintiff's absence, and without having given him any written notice to quit, forced open the door, took down the rack and manger, and carried it out of the stable, and took and used the manure which had been made upon the premises during the plaintiff's occupation of them, and which was of considerable value. The defendant's counsel contended, that the evidence proved a strict tenancy at will (which, though it made good the defendant's case, the plaintiff by his replication himself alleged, and the defendant by his rejoinder denied), and that therefore the defendant was entitled at any time to determine his will, and to enter upon the premises and resume the possession when he pleased, without any notice to quit. The counsel for the plaintiff contended that this must be a yearly holding, or that at all events the defendant, having put the plaintiff into possession, and suffered him to contract an expense, by erecting a rack and manger, could not countermand the permis

sion at his pleasure; upon the same principle on which, in [* 130] the case of Winter * v. Brockwell, 8 East, 308 (9 R. R. 454),

it was held, that a licence once executed, if it be to a thing whereby the party incurs expense, cannot be revoked, unless the grantor tenders to the grantee all the expense which he has incurred in executing the licence. Lord ELLENBOROUGH, Ch. J., thought that the demise being, so long as each party should respectively please, warranted the defendant in putting an end to the holding when he pleased, and in evicting the tenant without any notice : whereupon the plaintiff, either not adverting to the terms of his issue, or probably fearing that though he had literally proved

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