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No. 2. — Richardson v. Langridge, 4 Tannt. 180, 181.
his issue, and was entitled to a verdict thereon, the defendant would be entitled to judgment non obstante veredicto, submitted to a nonsuit.
Best, Serjtu, on this day moved for a rule nisi to set aside the nonsuit and have a new trial. He first contended that there was at this day no such estate possible in law as a strict tenancy at will; where no longer term was defined, all was tenancy from year to year. At all events the taking of the dung was equivalent to an acceptance of rent; and after an acceptance of rent, a halfyear's notice to quit was necessary. Doe ex dem. Shore v. Porter, 3 T. R. 16 (1 R. R. 627), Lord KENYON, Ch. J., says, “ The tenancy from year to year succeeded to the old tenancy at will, which was attended with many inconveniences. And in order to obviate them the Courts very early raised an implied contract for a year, and added that the tenant could not be removed at the end of the year, without receiving six months' previous notice.” Right, on the Demise of Cutting v. Darby, 1 T. R. 163 (1 R. R. 171), BULLER, J., “ The reason is (of the rule of law, which construes what was formerly a tenancy at will of lands into a tenancy from year to year) that the agreement is a letting for a year at an annual rent: then if the parties consent to go on after that time, it is a letting from year to year." And again, “ the * moment the year [* 131] began, the defendant had a right to hold to the end of that year; therefore there should have been half a year's notice to quit before the end of the term." He also referred to the case of Winter v. Brockwell, and urged that at least, the tenant having erected the rack and manger at a considerable expense, was entitled to a term long enough to indemnify him.
MANSFIELD, Ch. J. – That case has not the slightest resemblance to the present case. You must find some Act of Parliament, or some decision of the Courts, that two persons cannot agree to make a tenancy at will. But it is a maxim, that modus et conventio vincunt legem. Have you any case where the Courts have declared that there must be a tenancy from year to year, the parties having expressly agreed that the holding shall be so long as both parties please ? and of that there is evidence here: you say that Lord ELLENBOROUGH was of opinion that the evidence did not prove a tenancy for a year: the nonsuit then must have proceeded on the ground that there was such an agreement as the Nos. 1, 2. — Allen v. Hill; Richardson v. Langridge. — Notes.
plaintiff has himself stated. Here you speak, all along, of an indefinite agreement. If there were a general letting at a yearly rent, though payable half-yearly, or quarterly, and though nothing were said about the duration of the term, it is an implied letting from year to year. But if two parties agree that the one shall let, and the other shall hold, so long as both parties please, that is a holding at will, and there is nothing to hinder parties from making such an agreement.
HEATH, J. – I am of the same opinion. It is said that an indefinite hiring of a servant is an hiring for a year, but those cases
do not apply. That presumption is founded upon the uni. [*132] versal custom of hiring servants at *statute fairs, which is
usually for a year. There is no custom that if a man lets premises to another he shall let them for a year.
CHAMBRE, J., denied the proposition, that at this day there is no such thing as a tenancy at will: the taking of the dung by the landlord gave the tenant no term in the premises. Surely the distinction has been a thousand times taken; a mere general letting is a letting at will: if the lessor accepts yearly rent, or rent measured by any aliquot part of a year, the Courts have said, that is evidence of a taking for a year. That is the old law, and I know not how it has ever come to be changed. The Courts have a great inclination to make every tenancy a holding from year to year, if they can find any foundation for it, but in this case there is none such.
The Court refused the rule.
ENGLISH NOTES. Tenancy by sufferance may also be constituted by the tenant of a person who has a particular estate holding over without agreement after that estate is ended. Doe d. Martin v. Watts (1797), 7 T. R. 83, 4 R. R. 387.
But where there is a lease for a year which is renewed by tacit agreement, that is a tenancy from year to year requiring six months' notice to quit. Right v. Darby (1786), 1 T. R. 159, 1 R. R. 169. Such Nos. 1, 2. – Allen v. Hill; Richardson v. Langridge. — Notes.
1 By stat. 5 Eliz. c. 4, s. 3, “No per- or already employed in trade, are compel. son shall be retained or hired to work for lable to be retained to serve in husbandry any less time than a year,” in any one of by the year: probably the practice, which thirty trades therein mentioned; and by is well-founded in physical causes, depend. sect. 7, the persons therein described, being ing on the revolution of seasons, was curnearly all who are not either independent, rent long before this statute.
a tenancy is sometimes called a tenancy at will, as it formerly was; but it differs from such a tenancy at will, strictly so called, as was constituted in Richardson v. Langridge (supra). The half-year's notice necessary by implication of law as decided in Right v. Darby (supra) was extended by the 33rd section of the Agricultural Holdings Act, 1883 (46 & 47 Vict. c. 61), into a year's notice. The section does not apply to a tenancy under an agreement expressly stipulating for a shorter notice. Barlow v. Teal (C. A. 1885), 15 Q. B. D. 501, 54 L. J. Q. B. 564, 54 L. T. 63, 34 W. R. 54.
A tout holds over to treat him as.es
AMERICAN NOTES. A tenant at sufferance being one who comes lawfully into the possession of land, but holds over after his interest is ended, the landlord, if he pays no rent, has the option to treat him as a tenant or as a trespasser. Schuyler v. Smith, 51 New York, 309; Cram v. Springer Lithographing Co., 31 New York Supplement, 679; Frost v. Akron Iron Co., 33 id. 654; Williams v. Ladew, 171 Pennsylvania State, 369 ; School District v. Batsche, 106 Michigan, 330; Voss v. King, 38 West Virginia, 607; Mayo v. Fletcher, 14 Pickering (Mass.), 525, 531 ; Merrill v. Bullock, 105 Massachusetts, 486; Kimbrough v. Kimbrough, 99 Georgia, 134; Wolffe v. Wolffe, 69 Alabama, 549 ; Kaier v. Leahy, 15 Pennsylvania County Court, 243; Poole v. Engelke, 61 New Jersey Law, 124; Moore v. Smith, 56 id. 446. In order to make him a trespasser, the landlord must first make an entry upon the premises, or give him notice to quit. Danforth v. Sargeant, 14 Massachusetts, 491; Keay v. Goodwin, 16 id. 1, 4; Rising v. Stannard, 17 id. 282; Sampson v. Henry, 13 Pickering (Mass.), 36; Low v. Elwell, 121 Massachusetts, 309; Dorrell v. Johnson, 17 Pickering (Mass.), 263 ; see State v. Latimer, 26 South Carolina, 208. The terms of the original letting presumably continue when his occupation is with the landlord's consent. Brewer v. Knapp, 1 Pickering (Mass.), 332 ; Voss v. King, supra; Wheat v. Brown, 3 Kansas Appeals, 431; Hall v. Myers, 43 Maryland, 446; Goldsbrough v. Gable, 152 Illinois, 594; Roley v. Crabtree, 72 Illinois Appeals, 581 ; Belinski v. Brand, 76 id. 404; Allen v. Bartlett, 20 West Virginia, 46; Johnson v. Doll, 32 New York Supplement, 132; Gardner v. County Commissioners, 21 Minnesota, 33. If the landlord does not consent, such a tenant does not become a tenant for years or at will. Condon v. Brockway, 157 Illinois, 90; Meno v. Hoeffel, 46 Wisconsin, 282; Perine v. Teague, 66 California, 446; Kuhn v. Smith, 125 id. 615; Usher v. Moss, 50 Mississippi, 208. He is liable for rent if his sub-lessee holds over beyond his own term. Hall Steam-Power Co. v. Campbell PrintingPress & Manuf. Co., 28 New York Supplement, 662; Manheim v. Seitz, 47 id. 282; Berkowsky v. Cahill, 72 Illinois Appeals, 101. In such case the sublessee becomes a tenant at sufferance under the original lessor. Evans v. Reed, 5 Gray (Mass.), 308 ; Lyebrook v. Hall, 73 Mississippi, 509 ; Campau v. Michell, 103 Michigan, 617. And when a tenantry at will is terminated by the landlord making a conveyance or written lease of the demised premises, the tenant at will becomes a tenant at sufferance under the grantee or new lessee. Benedict v. Morse, 10 Metcalf (Mass.), 223; Hildreth v. Conant, id. 298; Kelly Nos. 1, 2. — Allen v. Hill; Richardson v. Langridge. — Notes.
v. Waite, 12 id. 300 ; Curtis v. Galvin, 1 Allen (Mass.), 215; Pratt v. Farrar, 10 id. 519; Emmes v. Feeley, 132 Massachusetts, 346; Hooton v. Holt, 139 id. 54; Streeter v. Ilsley, 147 id. 141; Lash v. Ames, 171 id. 487; Taylor v. O'Brien, 19 Rbode Island, 429 ; see German State Bank v. Herron (Iowa), 82 Northwestern Rep. 430. A lessee under a lessor who has a mere life estate is charged with notice of his landlord's title, and, upon the latter's death, he becomes at once a tenant at sufferance. Peters v. Balke, 170 Illinois, 304; Guthmann v. Vallery, 51 Nebraska, 824.
A tenant is sometimes justified in holding over after his term has expired, as where the landlord has agreed to buy his erections on the land, in which case he can hold lawfully, by paying the rent, until that agreement is performed. Franklin Land Co. v. Card, 84 Maine, 528. A tenant who continues to occupy the land, with an agreement, express or implied, for a new lease, is a tenant at will until the lease is executed. Emmons v. Scudder, 115 Massachusetts, 367 ; Utah Optical Co. v. Keith, 18 Utah, 464. If one, entering upon land under a void verbal lease, pays rent at regular intervals, he is a tenant from year to year or from month to month. Brownell y. Welch, 91 Ilinois, 523; Marr v. Ray, 151 id. 340; Tuttle v. Langley, 68 New Hampshire, 464; McIntosh v. Hodges, 110 Michigan, 319; Barrett v. Cox, 112 id. 220; Vernon v. Gilbert, 61 New York Supplement, 896; Koplitz v. Gustavus, 48 Wisconsin, 48; Williams v. Ackerman, 8 Oregon, 405; see McMaster v. New York Life Ins. Co., 90 Federal Rep. 40. One who enters upon the occupation of land under a contract of purchase which contains no stipulation for rent, does not become the owner's tenant or liable for rent, without a new agreement to that effect, if it turns out that such owner cannot give him a good title. Ankeny v. Clark, 148 United States, 345; Moore v. Smith, 56 New Jersey Law, 446; Dean v. Comstock, 32 Illinois, 173; Foley v. Wyeth, 2 Allen (Mass.), 131; Dunham v. Townsend, 110 Massachusetts, 440; Barton v. Smith, 66 Iowa, 75; Davis v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 111 California, 490. If the owner of land and another occupy it jointly by agreement, the latter is not a tenant at sufferance. Johnson v. Carter, 16 Massachusetts, 443, 446 ; see Kimbrough v. Kimbrough, 99 Georgia, 134. The tenant is none the less a tenant at suffer. ance because in the written lease under which he entered, he agreed to peaceably yield up the premises at the expiratiou of his term, and beyond such term, so long as he should hold the premises, to continue to pay the stipulated rent. Edwards v. Hale, 9 Allen (Mass.), 462. In New York, it is held that a holding over by one of several partners under a lease made to the firm, the other partners retiring, does not so renew or continue the tenancy after the expiration of the original term as to entitle such partner to the benefit of a covenant for renewal in the lease. James v. Pope, 19 New York, 324 : Buchanan v. Whitman, 151 id. 253, 257. A mortgagor, who by agreement holds the property until condition broken, is a tenant at sufferance to the mortgagee, if he holds over after condition broken. Mayo v. Fletcher, 14 Pickering (Mass.), 525, 531; Kinsley v. Ames, 2 Metcalf (Mass.), 29; Hollis v. Pool, 3 id. 350; Woodside v. Ridgeway, 126 Massachusetts, 292.
One important distinction between a tenancy at will and a tenancy at sufferance is that in the former the tenant is entitled to notice to quit or demand No. 1. - In re Jones.— Rule.
for possession, and in the latter not. Ellis v. Paige, 1 Pickering (Mass.), 43 ; Howard v. Merriam, 5 Cushing (Mass.), 563, 571; Whitney v. Gordon, 1 id. 266; Kinsley v. Ames, 2 Metcalf (Mass.), 29; Evans v. Reed, 5 Gray, 308 ; Gladwell v. Holcomb, 60 Ohio State, 427; Klingenstein v. Goldwasser, 58 New York Supplement, 342; Blanchard v. Bowers, 67 Vermont, 403; Chapman v. Tiffany (N. H.), 47 Atlantic Rep. 603; Peters v. Balke, 170 Illinois, 304 ; Belinski v. Brand, 76 Mlinois Appeals, 404; Paget v. Electrical Engineering Co. (Minn.), 84 Northwestern Rep. 800; Corby v. McSpadden, 63 Missouri Appeals, 648; Howard v. Blanton (Ky.), 49 Southwestern Rep. 461; Davis v. Carew, 1 Richardson (S. C.), 275; Stewart v. Murrell, 65 Arkansas, 471.
At common law a tenant at sufferance is not liable to pay rent, though the landlord may recover damages in tort for the detention of the premises. Flood v. Flood, 1 Allen (Mass.), 217; Sargent v. Smith, 12 Gray (Mass.), 426; Hogsett v. Ellis, 17 Michigan, 351, 368. But now, by statute, he is liable to pay rent in Massachusetts, and in New York, South Carolina, and Georgia, double rent, if he does not deliver up the premises according to a notice to quit given to him. Public Statutes of Massachusetts, c. 121, s. 3; 1 Revised Statutes of South Carolina, s. 1940; 2 Code of Georgia (1895), s. 3124. See Bunton v. Richardson, 10 Allen (Mass.), 260 ; Weston v. Weston, 102 Massachusetts, 514; Pettis v. Brewster, 94 Georgia, 527; Regan v. Fosdick, 43 New York Supplement, 1102.
TENANT FOR LIFE.
[And see “ APPORTIONMENT,” 3 R. C. 282 et seq.; and see No. 1, “SETTLED LAND Acts," 24 R. C. 42 et seq.]
No. 1. — IN RE JONES.
(C. A. 1884.)
No. 2. — IN RE STRANGWAYS.
HICKLEY V. STRANGWAYS.
(C. A. 1886.)
RULE. The present beneficial right to the unencumbered income (if any) of land is characteristic of and essential to the estate of a tenant for life, or person having the powers of a tenant for life.