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Lectures on the Nyáya Philosophy: Embracing the Text of the Tarka Sangraha ...
James Robert Ballantyne
No preview available - 2018
abides in earth adscititious affirmation antecedent apprehended argue argument arises Aristotle atoms belong Benares buddhi cloth colour comparison conclusion distance with refer duction effect efficient cause employment enumerated established ether example existence fallacy final cause fire flatulence fluidity formal cause fourfold gaydl gold is solidified Gotama ignited indispensable instance instrumental cause intimate union invariable attendance Kandda karors kettle drums knowledge Kurdn Logic major premiss matter mind modern mountain is fiery Musal Naiydyikas nature of sound negation of gravity nine substances non-existence NYAYA Nydya philosopher object odorous odour opinion organ of sense organized body perception philosophy premises production proposition proposition Logic proved proximity with reference question reason Reductio ad absurdum rendered resides Rhetoric rieties sanskdra Sanskrit savour smoke solidified light sorts soul special cause supposed syllogism tence term threads three kinds tion transient unseen virtue Viscidity wet fuel wilfully blinded
Page 49 - Laser Print natural white, a 60 # book weight acid-free archival paper which meets the requirements of ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992 (permanence of paper) Preservation photocopying and binding by Acme Bookbinding Charlestown, Massachusetts CD 1995 The borrower must return this item on or before the last date stamped below.
Page 36 - ... to the definition, would, in the present instance, be false. Out of this definition we may carve the premises of the following syllogism : A dragon is a thing which breathes flame : A dragon is a serpent : From which the conclusion is, Therefore some serpent or serpents breathe flame...
Page 24 - For example : having repeatedly and personally observed, in the case of culinary hearths and the like, that where there is smoke there is fire ; having gathered the invariable attendedness of smoke by fire; having gone near a mountain and being doubtful as to whether there is fire in it; having seen smoke on the mountain, a man recollects the invariable attendedness, viz., 'where there is smoke there is fire.
Page 25 - Haughton's Prodromus, p. 215), "that it exhibits a more natural mode of reasoning than is compatible with the compressed limits of the syllogism, and that its conclusion is as convincing as that of the syllogism," the commendation is based simply on a misconception of the syllogism thus disparaged. On the other hand, when it is censured as " a rude form of the syllogism...
Page 31 - The fallacy falls under the first head, when that which is alleged as the proof may be present whilst that which is to be proved is absent : — as for instance, if one should say, ' The mountain is fiery, because the existence of the mountain is "capable of proof/ (the reason assigned would be liable to this Uvf eh i (.t f'lC ' v .ii • A . A v* •• PHILOSOPHY..
Page 18 - To it takes its rise, is an intimate cause (of that effect), as thread* are of cloth, and the cloth itself of its own color. Where this intimate relation exists, that cause which is associated in one and the same object (as a necessarily immanent cause) with such effect or cause, is non-intimate. Thus the conjunction of the threads is the non-intimate cause of the cloth, and the color of the threads that of the color of the i Tarka Snngraha, p.
Page 25 - For example, (1.) The mountain is fiery ; (2.) because it smokes ; (3.) whatever smokes is fiery, as a culinary hearth; (4.) and this does so ; (5.) therefore it is fiery as aforesaid.
Page 30 - ... as] the reason [for inferring the presence of fire]. That which certainly possesses the property in question is called an instance on the same side (sapaksha); as the culinary hearth, in the same example.
Page 48 - Community (samanya) is eternal, one, belonging to more than one, residing in substance, quality, and action. It is of two kinds, the highest and what is lower. The highest is existence (sattwa, primal matter ?) ; the lower is genus (jati, family or race), such as have the nature of substance (elementary substance), and the rest.
Page 23 - In regard to the import of a proposition which the logic of Europe calls a universal affirmative, such as " all men are mortal," the Naiyayika would say that there is pervadedness (vyapti) of humanity by mortality ; — and he would state the proposition thus : " Where there is humanity there is mortality.