taken on the 9th. The capture of this important work hastened the reduction of the place. Although the marquis d'Allegre, who was intrusted with the defence, made as vigorous a resistance as his means permitted, he was reduced to propose a capitulation on the 15th of May.

"I have this minute," writes the duke to Godolphin, "signed the capitulation of Bonn, and I think if we had not been so uneasy as we are at what is doing on the Meuse, we might in four or five days more have made this garrison prisoners of war; but as it is, we have only stopped a german regiment and two independent companies. I stay this afternoon to give such orders as are absolutely necessary, and hope to be early on friday with the army on the Meuse. The garrison here is to march out the same day, so that I shall not see them. Having been a good deal disturbed these two last nights, my head aches very much, so that you will excuse me if I say no more, but refer you to the capitulation sent to Mr. Secretary."*

CHAPTER 17.

1703.

Military operations after the surrender of Bonn-Grand plan for the attack of Antwerp and Ostend-Foiled by the misconduct of the dutch generals-Defeat of Opdam at Ekeren-Proposal of Marlborough to resume the intended attack-Again disappointed by the dutch generals—Return of Marlborough to the Meuse.

LEAVING

a detachment to take possession of Bonn, Marlborough hastened to the succour of Overkirk, who was threatened by a superior force. On the 17th of May he effected a junction with the dutch commander, and established his head quarters at Hoechst, a monastery in the vicinity of Maestricht.

He now resumed with redouble zeal the plan he had formed, before he was compelled to undertake the siege of Bonn, which was by a well combined and rapid movement to transfer the war into the heart of Brabant and West Flanders. Indeed before the termination of the siege, the dutch generals, Cohorn, Spaar, and Opdam, had been dispatched to assume the command in the district of Bergen-op-Zoom, and accelerate the necessary preparations. Collaterally with this design a scheme was formed in England, and approved by Marlborough, to alarm the french coast by a descent near Dieppe; for which purpose troops were collected at Portsmouth, and were to be joined by a reinforcement from Holland. Of this extensive system of operation we find a hint in his letter to Godolphin, from the camp near Maestricht, May 8-19.

"I shall to-morrow send an express to the Hague to see how far they have prepared for what I call the great design; so that we may not lose time in endeavouring to put it in execution. Before I left Bonn, measures were taken for the embarking 20 battalions of foot, if it be possible to get boats enough, and 21 squadrons of

horse are to march the nearest way to Bergen-op-Zoom, where they are to join the 20 battalions that go by water. These troops are to take the most advantageous post near Antwerp, after which there will be care taken to join more troops to them. If this design of Antwerp can be brought to perfection, I hope we shall make it very uneasy for them to protect Brussels and the rest of their great towns. I am speaking as if we were masters of Antwerp, but as yet the two marshals threaten."

In the mean while Marlborough endeavoured to engross the attention of the french commanders, and by offensive movements to prevent them from detaching succours to the intended point of attack. After reviewing and organising the army, which amounted to 59 battalions, and 129 squadrons, he broke up his camp, traversed the Yaar under the walls of Maestricht, and directing his march towards the heights of Hautain, which stretch between that river and the Meuse, he nearly surprised a considerable part of the enemy's army, who were foraging on the spot. His unexpected approach alarmed the french. Leaving two battalions to destroy the gates and works of Tongres, they made so precipitate retreat, that when the confederates reached the camp of Thys, they had already gained an advance of two leagues.

His laudable zeal was not, however, seconded by those with whom he was obliged to act. Instead of fulfilling his orders for the invasion of West Flanders, Cohorn, to whom the superintendance of the previous arrangements was consigned, obtained the consent of the states to employ the troops on that frontier, in making an irruption into the country of Waes, where he hoped to levy large contributions. Marlborough, whose plan had embraced the reduction of Antwerp and Ostend, saw with regret that all his views would be frustrated, if this imprudent change was suffered to take effect; and thus expresses his vexation.

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

66

Camp of Thys, May 20-31. "I am afraid the diversion M. Cohorn is gone to make in Flanders, will not oblige them to make any great detachment, for

his design is not on Ostend, as I desired, but to force their lines, by which he will settle a good deal of contribution which these people like but too well; for it is certain if they had taken Ostend, it would have been of great use to the common cause, and they might easily afterwards have settled the contributions; so that had I been at the Hague, I am very confident they would have preferred the taking of Ostend before that of forcing the lines.

"It is no wonder that Cohorn is for forcing the lines; for as he is governor of West Flanders, he has the tenths of all the contributions. He is also afraid that if we should besiege Huy, the french would take that opportunity of sending so many men as would hinder him from executing his design; so that he has begged of me to undertake nothing, but keeping as near to the french army as is possible till his expedition is over. After which we are to endeavour to take post, so as that we may have it in our power to make the siege of Antwerp.

"At this time the strength of the french army is 118 squadrons and 61 battalions, ours consists of 125 squadrons and 59 battalions; but our battalions are stronger than theirs, so that I think we have a good deal the superiority, which is very plainly the opinion of the french, since they always decamp when we come near them."

The affairs of the confederacy on the Upper Rhine were not in a more encouraging posture, than those in the Netherlands, as from the success of the french and bavarians, the most pressing demands for succours were made both in England and Holland. Marlborough himself was too well acquainted with the inefficiency of the german troops, and the tardiness of german generals, to acquiesce in this application. He strongly remonstrated against any reduction of his own army, which he observed "would only answer the purpose of bringing things here into the same condition as they are there:" and he insisted with great warmth on the impolicy of granting any farther reinforcement than 20 battalions and 8 squadrons, which had been already detached for that quarter.*

• To lord Godolphin, Thys, May 24, June 4, 1703.

Notwithstanding these discouragements he did not relax in his design; but directing his views to Antwerp and Ostend, he communicated new instructions to Cohorn.

On this subject he again writes in terms of confidence to Godolphin from the camp of Thys.

66

June 7. After expressing a sanguine hope that he should be master of Antwerp by the 10th of July, O. S. he adds, My heart is so set upon the taking of Ostend, that if I find it is practicable, I hope in due time I shall have the queen's assistance in having that place attacked. But of this no resolution must be taken till we first see what we can do with Antwerp, for I think the french will venture very much to hinder our taking that place. I have not been out of my chamber till Saturday night, having been very much out of order, but I hope in God it is now all over."

*

In conformity with these views he broke up from Thys on the 20th, and moved to Hanef; but the enemy again catching the alarm, made a hasty retreat to a position on the Mehaigne, between Tourine and Avesnes, within half a mile of their lines. We may judge of his feelings at this moment, from the tenor of his correspondence.

To LORD GODOLPHIN.

66

Hanef, June 3-14.

"I think we might here have made a very good campaign, but we have already lost time, so that I am not in very good humour, but I endeavour all I can not to let it be seen. If this army can get to Brabant, I shall have a mind to go to the Hague for a day or two, it being impossible to write all that is necessary to tell them for the good of the common cause, but pray let nobody know this but the queen and prince.

June 7-18. I writ yesterday to Cohorn, by which you will see I have not given over the thoughts of Ostend. Every thing goes now so very ill in Germany, that I wish we were able to spare them such a detachment as might do them good. We have now above 1,000 men sick, and as the season advances for fruit, we must expect much greater numbers, so that I have directed