then gain their point, which I hope in God I shall never live to see, for our poor country would then be the miserablest part of all Christendom; for we should not only lose our liberty, but our religion also must be forced, and those gentlemen that would be helping to this, would then be as miserable as others; for the french when they are the masters make no distinctions. I could say a great deal upon this subject, but I dare not, for fear of accidents. In short I think the two parties are so angry, that to ruin each other they will make no scruple of venturing the whole."

The officious zeal of the duchess, was not, however, discouraged by this repulse. She renewed her importunities with her husband, offered her mediation with the whigs, and urged that their petulance would easily be restrained by proper representations. But Marlborough disdained an appeal, which he knew would be construed into an application for support, and followed by counter demands. In reply, he testified his concern with unusual feeling, renewed his former declarations with greater warmth, and concluded with expatiating on the fatal consequences which must result from the factious attempts of both parties to thwart and frustrate his military designs,

"Alderbeesten, Sept. 30, 1703.

"I see by this last letter, that you have mistaken my meaning in some of my letters, for though I may have complained of some you call your friends, yet it never entered into my thoughts that they should be spoke to in order to have a better thought of me; for I know they would be as unreasonable as the others in their expectations, if I should seek their friendship: for all parties are alike. And as I have taken my resolution of never doing any hardship to any man whatsoever, I shall by it have a quiet in my own mind; not valuing nor desiring to be a favourite to either of them. For in the humour I am now in, and that I hope in God I shall ever be of, I think both parties unreasonable and unjust. I am very sensible of several errors I have committed, but I must not endeavour to mend them by running into greater; so that I shall make complaints to neither, but endeavour to recommend myself to the world by my sincere intentions of governing all

my actions by what I shall think is for the interest of my queen and country. I hope in God this will agree with what you desire

and then I can have no uneasiness."

In addition to the information conveyed by Godolphin and the duchess, Marlborough received private intelligence from Harley, whose sentiments were congenial to his own. Equally trusted by the moderate whigs and tories, he was enabled to develope their views and wishes. He communicated to the duke the result of his conversations with Nottingham on one side, and with some of the whigs on the other. He stated their respective complaints to turn principally on the mismanagement of the fleet, and on the impolicy of an offensive war in Flanders, and conveyed an intimation which equally marks the spleen and resentment of both; namely, that they concurred in accusing Marlborough and Godolphin, of fostering designs hostile to the interests of the house of Hanover. To the opinion of Harley, which bore the appearance of candour and impartiality, Marlborough paid the utmost deference, and by his representations was encouraged to persist in the resolution of yielding to the whigs as little as to the tories.

The intelligence, however, made a deep impression; for in sending the letter of Harley to the duchess, he observes, "If both parties agree that the war must not be offensive in this country, I am very much afraid the dutch will not think themselves very safe in our friendship. However, I cannot but be much concerned; for if this country is ruined, we are undone, and then 10 (Sir Charles Hedges) and his friends may succeed, which otherwise is next to impossible. There are a thousand reasons for preserving our friendship with the dutch; for as we save them, so they must preserve us from the arbitrary power of 19 and 1, which must be entirely governed by 3.*

66

May God

preserve me and my

dearest love from seeing this come

*These ciphers cannot all be discovered, but they evidently convey the meaning that the ascendancy of the violent tories would lead to the restoration of the pretender, and consequently to a dependance on France.

The lines in italics are scratched out with the pen.

to pass, but if we should quarrel with 24 (the dutch) I fear it might happen."

Notwithstanding the objections of Marlborough to an union with the whigs, the duchess induced lord Sunderland to make overtures in the name of his party, as we learn from a letter of the duke, dated August 1.

"If this finds you at Althorpe, remember me kindly to them all, and tell lord Sunderland that I thank him for his letter, and that I hope I shall always continue in the humour I am now in, that is to be governed by neither party, but to do what I think is best for England, by which I shall disoblige both parties. But as long as I have quiet in my own mind, I shall not care; for as I had rather be without employments than have them, I shall need none of their protection."

The party feuds which agitated the british parliament and nation, spread with a still more detrimental effect into Scotland. Soon after the accession of Anne overtures had been made for an union between the two kingdoms, and commissioners had been finally named to carry the design into execution. But an arrangement, which was so likely to produce domestic tranquillity and public benefit, was violently opposed by the jacobites and many of the discontented tories, because it tended to weaken the interest of the Stuart family; and their opposition was fomented by the declamations of the same party in the english parliament. Among the various expedients, to which the enemies of the revolution resorted, for the purpose of embroiling the two kingdoms, was the proposal of a bill in the legislature of Scotland, which under the title of the Act of Security, was calculated to abridge the established prerogatives of the crown, to limit the choice of a successor, and to throw a vast additional power into the hands of the parliament. The discussions which took place on this act were marked by the utmost virulence; and when the royal assent was withheld by the queen's commissioner, the commotion almost rose to open rebellion. An act for settling the succession in the house of Hanover was rejected with contempt, and some of the more violent even threatened to move for committing the earl of

Marchmont, who had proposed it, to the castle. The instigators of these feuds appeared resolved to extort the assent of the crown to the act of security, by withholding the supplies, and the commissioner with difficulty succeeded in pacifying them, by relinquishing the right of the crown to make peace or war, and promising that they should resume the question in the ensuing session. These feuds contributed to aggravate the embarrassments which the treasurer and Marlborough encountered from the machinations of contending parties in England; and their correspondence is filled not only with complaints of the difficulties which consequently occurred in the management of domestic affairs; but of the injurious effects which resulted to the confederacy abroad, and particularly of the alarm, jealousy, and lukewarmness which were produced in Holland.

CHAPTER 19.

1703.

Reduction of Huy-New proposal of Marlborough to force the french lines-Capture of Limburg and Guelder-Plan of the french for the invasion of Austria-Defection of the duke of Savoy from the french to the allies-The archduke Charles proclaimed king of Spain at Vienna-His interview with Marlborough at Dusseldorf-Dissatisfaction of Marlborough with the conduct of the dutch-Arrives at the Hague-Lands in England-Receives the new king of Spain-His parliamentary conduct on the revival of the bill against occasional conformity.

AFTER this detail of the political feuds in which Marlborough

was involved during the labours of an arduous campaign, we resume the narrative of military operations.

On the failure of his brilliant designs to accelerate the termination of the war, nothing remained but the comparatively inglorious task of reducing the petty garrisons which clogged the navigation of the Meuse. Accordingly Huy was invested on the 16th of August, and the trenches opened the ensuing night. In a few days the forts surrounding the place were reduced; and batteries being raised against the castle, the governor was constrained to surrender, on condition that the garrison should be exchanged. After the capture of Huy, some hesitation prevailed in regard to ulterior operations. In a grand council of war held at the confederate camp of Val notre Dame, the commander in chief resumed his plan, and urged the policy of profiting by the superiority of the allies, to force the weakest part of the french lines, consisting of an accessible space of ground, two leagues and a half in extent, between the source of the Mehaigne and the Meuse. His opinion was warmly supported by the english generals, and those