CHAPTER 34.

1705.

Marlborough joins his army near Treves-Disappointed in his expectations from the german states-Preparations and plans of France-Villars appointed to the command of the army on the Moselle-His defensive position and arrangements on the heights of Sirk-Correspondence of Marlborough on his situation and disappointments Movements of Villeroy against Overkirk-Capture of Huy and investment of Liege-Delays and equivocal conduct of prince Louis-Want of horses and requisites for the siege of Saar Louis-Scarcity of provisions and forage-Rapid return of Marlborough to the Meuse-Recovers Huy, and compels the french to

retire behind their lines.

AFTER

FTER the unsatisfactory interview with the margrave, Marlborough hastened to. Treves, where he expected to receive intelligence of the artillery, draught horses, and part of the contingents, which were to be furnished by the german states. He arrived on the 26th, at the moment when his troops were filing into their destined camp near Triersweiler. He found the auxiliaries who had wintered on the Moselle, posted in the vicinity of Consaarbruck; and after spending two days in reviewing the different corps, he ordered the troops who had marched from the Netherlands, to advance to Igel. His army was there collected in two divisions, which were separated by the Moselle.

To his chagrin and mortification, however, even the limited hopes which he had conceived of the co-operation of the german princes and States were totally frustrated. Not a single draught horse appeared; and instead of an army amounting at least to 80,000 men, he could scarcely muster 30,000, and these only british troops, or subsidiaries in the pay of the maritime powers. As the season

t

was extremely backward, and the scanty resources of the country had been exhausted by the enemy, he caused an accurate scrutiny to be made into the state of the magazines, on which the army was reduced to depend for its subsistence; but to his additional mortification, the superintendant, instead of rendering an account, fled to the enemy, and he discovered that not half the quantity of the expected supplies had been collected.

His letters written during this period of suspense and anxiety

need no comment.

To LORD GODOLPHIN.

66

Tuesday, May 16-27, 1705. "At my arrival here yesterday, I had the favour of two of your's. I am to be on horseback all this day, so that I shall not be able to answer by this post the particulars of your's, believing you will be more desirous to know the posture our army is in. I gave you an account from Manheim, that the army of prince Louis was in so miserable a condition that he could not spare more troops to act on the Moselle than 12 battalions and 28 squadrons at this time, and that they could not march till the 28th, so that they cannot join me until the 10th or 12th of next month. The troops of Prussia cannot be here much sooner, and the 7,000 palatines in the english and dutch pay are to be here by the 6th. By all this you will see we want a third of our foot, and almost half our horse, which makes it impossible for me as yet to march. However, for want of forage and provisions, I shall be necessitated to march before all these troops can join me, so that I have sent orders to the several commanders to hasten their march all that is possible.

"The unreasonable heats of the parties make me pity you with all my heart; but you must, as I do, in spite of all the vexations we meet, serve her majesty, and when this war is well ended, we then may think of enjoying some quiet. In all conditions I shall be ever most sincerely your's, &c."

"Treves, May 22-June 2, 1705. "The detachment that is on its march from Alsace, will make

the marshal de Villars have a great many more battalions and squadrons than I shall have. However I do not apprehend his venturing a battle; but it will put him in a condition to act in such a manner as may make us want all sorts of provisions, which we ought to be more afraid of than fighting; for our men are in great heart, so that with the blessing of God we might expect good success. We have another contre-temps, for upon my giving orders to Vanderkaa, who is marched with the english from Holland, to take care of all that concerns Machado, to inform himself of the strength of our magazines for bread and forage, one Sentery, who has had the care of it all this winter, instead of giving him an account, is run away last Sunday, and we fear he is gone to the to the enemy. But I am but too sure that there is not near half the quantity in the stores that should have been, so that we are much more afraid of starving than of the enemy. But we have yesterday sent away expresses both to Coblentz and Mentz, to hasten with all speed corn or flour for one month, which we hope will give us time to replenish our magazines.

"I shall be obliged to-morrow to pass the Saar, notwithstanding the number of troops that are not yet come to me; for we have no more hay, and on this side the river there is very little corn in the fields, and the season here is so backward that we can cut no grass. All these misfortunes make me very uneasy, but we must struggle as long as we can. This condition of ours is fit to be known but by very few; but in a short time it would be very happy for us if the marshal de Villars would venture a battle, for in all likelihood that would put us at ease."

Unfortunately the preparations of the enemy were as mature and prompt as those of the allies were tardy and imperfect. The king of France instead of being astounded by the fatal blow which he received in the field of Blenheim, made unusual efforts to repair the disaster. During the close of the preceding year no means of redress or rigour had been neglected to tranquillise the Cevennes, and to suppress a commotion which not only threatened to spread into the very heart of the kingdom, but afforded an opening

to favour the aggressions of its foreign enemies. The agent employed on this occasion was no less a person than marshal Villars.

Such measures were also adopted to intercept the communication with the sea-coast, that the endeavours of the english fleet to furnish succours to the insurgents from the shore of the Mediterranean were frustrated: and even Marlborough, who was highly anxious to foment a commotion which diverted so large a portion of the enemy's force, considered all farther attempts as hopeless. The insurgents thus left to their fate, were unable to resist disciplined troops, led by so able a general; and partly by force, partly by address, the desultory hordes were dissipated, and the chiefs either reduced to accept the pardon of their sovereign, or to seek an asylum in foreign countries.

Relieved from these internal commotions, the king was enabled to redouble his efforts against his external enemies, and to bring efficient armies into the field, in every quarter of the theatre of war. The elector of Bavaria, assisted by Villeroy, was to act offensively in the Low Countries, with 75,000 men, as soon as Marlborough had marched to the Moselle; and in case of a reverse, the country was intersected with formidable lines, to check an invasion between the Scheldt and the Mehaigne. On the Upper Rhine, Marsin, with 30,000 men, was stationed to maintain the defensive, and to aid the efforts of the other armies, as either might be exposed to a superior force.

As the operations of the allies at the close of the preceding campaign, and the formation of magazines at Treves, indicated that the principal effort would be made on the Moselle, Villars, after his successful career in the Cevennes, was appointed to cover the frontier on that side, and to obstruct the siege of Saar Louis; but with positive orders not to risk an engagement, as a defeat would open so defenceless a part of the kingdom to an invading army. He had already taken the field, and engaged in some active skirmishes with the allied troops quartered near Treves; particularly in an attempt to obtain pos