and withdrawing to Lower Wavre, where he rejoined his baggage, concluded with a brief though pathetic postscript, a letter which he had written two days before to the duchess, in the full expectation of success.

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August 17. We shall march again to-morrow; for we cannot stay longer in this country than the bread we bring with us will give us leave. I hope in a weak or ten days I shall have more leisure than I have now, and then I am resolved to drink the Spa waters. I wish with all my heart those of Tunbridge may do you good; and then I am sure the first summer I am with you I shall desire to go thither with you, and then I believe the waters will do me good; for till I am pleased and at ease with you, no waters nor any thing else will do me good."

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August 19. When I had writ this far, I took the resolution of not letting the post go, believing I should have engaged the enemy as yesterday, which I certainly had done if it had been in my power. But all the dutch generals, except M. Overkirk, were against it, so that the deputies would not consent to our engaging, notwithstanding we were in battle, within cannon shot of the enemy; and I do assure you that our army were at least one third stronger than theirs. We are now returning; for we cannot stay longer than the bread we have brought with us will give us leave. It is impossible to make the war with advantage at this rate. I have sent a copy of my letter to the States to lord treasurer. I should have writ in a very angry style, but I was afraid it might have given the french an advantage."

To give additional poignancy to the grief which Marlborough felt at this unfortunate failure, he had soon afterwards the mortification to learn, that the enemy, instead of risking an engagement, would have fallen back on Brussels, had he advanced against them with his whole force.

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

"I did in my last send

"Corbais, August 24, 1705. you a copy of my letter to the States,

in which I was careful not to use any expression that might give

advantage to the french. Several prisoners whom we have taken since, as well as the deserters, assure us that they should have made no other defence, but such as might have given them time to have drawn the army towards Brussels, where all their baggage was already gone. By this you may imagine how I am vexed, seeing very plainly that the people I am joined with will never do any thing."

CHAPTER 38.

1705.

Letter of Marlborough to the States, against the conduct of the deputies and generals— Their counter manifesto—Sensation in England and Holland—Marlborough overrules the resolution of the british cabinet, to make a formal remonstrance with the States-His chagrin at the misrepresentations in the Gazette-Retrograde movement of the army to Meldert and Tirlemont-Capture of Leeuwe and rasure of the lines —Indisposition and recovery of Marlborough-Manifestation of public sentiment in his favour-New arrangements relative to the command, and dismission of Slangenberg-Overtures from France to the dutch-Letters of Marlborough on the

subject.

ON retiring to his quarters at Lower Wavre, the duke wrote

an official letter to the States, which displays the struggle in his mind, between his fear of injuring the common cause, by an incautious remonstrance, and his indignation at the disappointment he had undergone. After observing, that from the goodness of the troops he had flattered himself with the prospect of a glorious victory, and was confident the deputies would impart the arguments on both sides of the question, he added, "they will at the same time do M. Overkirk justice, by informing you that he coincided with me in opinion, and thought the opportunity too fair to be lost. However I submitted, though with extreme reluctance." In a postscript, giving farther scope to his feelings, he observes, " My heart is so full, that I cannot forbear representing to your high mightinesses on this occasion, that I find my authority here to be much less than when I had the honour to command your troops in Germany."

On the same evening in which he wrote his letter to the States General, and from the same place, the deputies issued what may §

be called a counter manifesto. In this document they justified their opposition to the proposed attack, by declaring that according to the unanimous opinion of all the dutch generals, except Overkirk, the nature of the ground and the superior forces of the enemy, presented insurmountable obstacles to so desperate an enterprise, as the attempt to force the passage of the Ische. They even extended their objections to such petty cavils, as the difficulty of establishing hospitals, or forwarding convoys of bread; and concluded their justification by an indirect censure on the commander in chief, for concealing from them the real object of his movements.

"And we hoping that we have fully satisfied the intentions of your high mightinesses, contained in your resolution of the 5th instant, to permit the duke of Marlborough, without holding a council of war, to make two or three marches, for the execution of some design formed by his grace; we therefore, for the future, shall regulate our conduct according to our instructions and your high mightinesses' resolution of the 26th of June last, except your high mightinesses should be pleased to send us farther orders. And we cannot conceal from your high mightinesses, that all the generals of our army think it very strange that they should not have the least notice of the said marches."

As on the former occasion, the french also naturally availed themselves of this official report, to laud the skill of their own generals, to magnify the valour of their own troops, and to reflect on the military talents of the british commander, as if he had been hurried by presumption into an enterprise, which was impracticable, or had been baffled by the superior tactics and activity of his opponents. In England, the enemies of Marlborough as well as the advocates for peace, adopted the language and sentiments of this document, although it was known to be both partial and false; and bitter censures were again lavished on the military conduct of the illustrious chief.

The letter of Marlborough being surreptitiously printed, before it was communicated to the States, produced a deep sensation in Holland. The english partisans, who had long deplored the timid

policy of their government, were roused to indignation; and at the Hague, in particular, the burghers held an assembly to remonstrate against the misconduct of their deputies and generals. From Holland, the same feeling spread into England: a deep sentiment of indignation was diffused through all ranks; the people warmly espoused the cause of their general; and in numerous publications, hawked about the streets, the severest reflections were cast on the dutch nation, and in particular on the deputies of the States, for not suffering the duke to engage the enemy. In the british cabinet the impulse derived from public opinion was strengthened by the indignant complaints of the commander himself, in his correspondence with Godolphin and Harley.

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To LORD GODOLPHIN.

August 19. You will see by the inclosed to the States, that after four days march, I found the enemy encamped as I expected, so that I thought we should have had a very glorious day. But as the deputies would not consent without first consulting the generals, who were all against it, except M. Overkirk, we have been obliged to retire from the enemy, notwithstanding we were at least one third stronger than they, which I take to be very prejudicial to the common cause, and scandalous for the army. I think this will shew very plainly, that it is next to impossible to act offensively with this army, so governed as they are ; for when their general and I agree, as we did in this, that it shall be in the power of subaltern generals to hinder the execution, is against all discipline. This last action of the dutch generals has given us great mortification; for the enemy will see very plainly that they have nothing to fear on this side, nor can I ever serve with them without losing the little reputation I have; for in most countries they think I have power in this army to do what I please. I beg you will give my duty to the queen, and assure her, that if I had had the same power I had the last year, I should have had a greater victory than that of Blenheim, in my opinion; for the french were so posted, that if we had beat them, they could not have got to Brussels.