I think however Madvig is unnecessarily fastidious in objecting to the phrase mod. in homines, cf. Invent. II 163 temperantia est rationis in libidinem moderata dominatio, and so with imperium, regnum and similar words. Dc. (4). It is no answer to say that de minimis non curat lex'. Life and civil status cannot be considered 'minima'. § 86.

§ 86. at enim minora: see II 167 n., Div. II 105, Philo p. 644 M. Tò προμηθὲς ἐπὶ τὰ τῶν ἐν κόσμῳ συνεκτικώτατα ἐφορᾶν ἀγαπᾷ, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς βασιλείαις καὶ στραταρχίαις ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὰ στρατόπεδα, οὐκ ἐπί τινα τῶν ἠμελημένων καὶ ἀφανῶν ἕνα τὸν προστυχόντα.

[agellos viticulas: cf. Plin. Ep. 1 24 §§ 1 and 4. J. E. B. M.]

persequuntur: 'examine minutely', 'follow out into minute detail', cf. II 159 persequi utilitates, 152 sollertiam persequi, 1 111 voluptates persequitur nominatim, Pis. 53 omnes solitudines persequi.

uredo: blasting'. Columella (III 20 § 1) and Pliny (N. II. XXVIII 68) agree that this is caused by cold. The latter identifies it with carbunculus. So uro is used of nipping cold.

omnia minima: see II 141 n., Orat. 11 162 omnes tenuissimas particulas atque omnia minima mansa-in os inserant, and Part. Orat. 60; so we find omnia summa, omnia ultima &c.

sic enim dicitis: i.e. you Stoics (as in the passage just quoted from Philo). This particular illustration is not given in Bk. II. See below § 90.

Formiano: Formiae, the modern Mola di Gaïeta, was a favorite site for villas. The ruins of what is supposed to be Cicero's villa are still pointed out. On Rutilius see above § 80.

amissa salute: refers to his exile, the interdict from fire and water, just as restitutor salutis meae (Mil. 39) is used of Lentulus, who proposed the law recalling Cie. from exile, cf. Pis. 34 nemini sit triumphus honorificentius quam mihi salus restitutioque perscripta. Like caput, salus implies the full enjoyment of the rights of a citizen.

Dc. (5). [If it be alleged that all external goods are trifles in comparison of virtue], it is just these external goods which are at the disposal of Heaven. Virtue is our own, and is therefore never made the subject of prayer. Men have deified virtue in the abstract, but in reality it is only a quality of their own nature. §§ 86-88.

(As the arguments which follow all relate to the general question of rewards and punishments, it seems better to suppose this to be connected with it in the manner suggested above, rather than to treat it as an independent argument, denying the doctrine maintained in the previous book, §§ 165, 167, that human virtue is derived from God.) Cf. Plut. St. Rep. c. 31 εἴπερ οὖν ὁ θεὸς ἀρετὴν μὲν οὐ δίδωσιν ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ τὸ καλὸν αὐθαίρετόν ἐστιν, πλοῦτον δὲ καὶ ὑγίειαν χωρὶς ἀρετῆς δίδωσιν, οὐκ εὖ χρησομένοις δίδωσιν, ἀλλὰ κακῶς, τουτέστι βλαβερῶς καὶ αἰσχρῶς καὶ ὀλεθρίως κ.τ.λ.

(h. XXXVI. [vineta: add to lexx. Stat. Silvae III 5. 100, Panegyr. 11 § 22, Aur. Vict. Caes. 37 § 3.

oliveta: also in Varro, Columella, Plin. H. N. XVII 245 and Sen. Ep. 86 §§ 14, 17, 18. From the vulgate the word has passed into the English bible. J. E. B. M.]

virtutem nemo umquam acceptam deo rettulit: 'none ever imputed his virtue to God', lit. 'credited God with it'. The metaphor is taken from a ledger, on one side of which we put the outgoings (expensa), on the other side the receipts (accepta), cf. Verr. 1 39 minus Dolabella Verri acceptum rettulit quam Verres illi erpensum tulit. The statement is very far from the truth: Homer (ll. XIII 730) gives the old Greek doctrine in the words ἄλλῳ μὲν γὰρ ἔδωκε θεὸς πολεμήια ἔργα, ἄλλῳ δ ̓ ἐν στήθεσσι τιθεῖ νόον εὐρύοπα Ζεὺς ἐσθλόν, and throughout his poenas any unusual display of courage or wisdom or self-restraint is attributed to the influence of a deity, cf. Pind. Isthm. III 4 Ζεύ, μεγάλαι δ ̓ ἀρεταὶ θνατοῖς ἔπονται ἐκ σέθεν, ib. frag. 85 Bergk θεοῦ δὲ δείξαντος ἀρχὰν ἕκαστον ἐν (Boeot. for es) πρᾶγος εὐθεῖα δὴ κέλευθος ἀρετὴν ἑλεῖν, τελευταί τε καλλίονες, Aesch. Αg. 901 τὸ μὴ κακῶς φρονεῖν θεοῦ μέγιστον δῶρον, Εur. Med. 635 σωφροσύνα δώρημα κάλλιστον θεῶν, and nn. above on II 165 and 167. In the time of Socrates the question 'how virtue is acquired' was a favorite subject for discussion: Protagoras professed to teach it, i.e. to make men good citizens, and in the dialogue called after him, Socrates is represented as saying ἐγὼ γὰρ ἐν μὲν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ἡγούμην οὐκ εἶναι ἀνθρωπίνην ἐπιμέλειαν ᾗ ἀγαθοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ γίγνονται, νῦν δὲ πέπεισμαι (Prot. 328); which, though expressed ironically in the particular passage, seems to have been his genuine belief. Yet this does not prevent him from praying to Pan and the other gods at the end of the Phaedrus δοίητέ μοι καλῷ γενέσθαι τἄνδοθεν· ἔξωθεν δὲ ὅσα ἔχω, τοῖς ἐντὸς εἶναί μοι φίλια· πλούσιον δὲ νομίζοιμι τὸν σοφόν. The question is expressly discussed in the Meno, concluding in the words θείᾳ μοίρᾳ ἡμῖν φαίνεται παραγιγνομένη ἡ ἀρετὴ οἷς παραγίγνεται (p. 100). In the Republic Plato recognized all the different factors which had been opposed by earlier disputants: the lower practical virtues of the Auxiliaries are mainly the result of discipline and habituation, the higher philosophic virtue of the Guardians is due in great part to learning and instruction, but deía poipa still plays its part in the original distinction between the gold and silver natures. Aristotle deals with the same question Eth. x 9 § 6 γίνεσθαι δ ̓ ἀγαθοὺς οἴονται οἱ μὲν φύσει, οἱ δ ̓ ἔθει, οἱ δὲ διδαχῇ. Τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς φύσεως δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἐφ ̓ ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ διά τινας θείας αἰτίας τοῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐτυχέσιν ὑπάρχει κ.τ.λ. and so in Bk. I 9 (of happiness which he makes to consist so largely in virtue) ἀπορεῖται πότερόν ἐστι μαθητὸν ἢ ἐθιστὸν ἢ ἄλλως πως ἀσκητόν, ἢ κατά τινα θείαν μοῖραν ἢ καὶ διὰ τύχην παραγίνεται· εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλο τι ἐστὶ θεῶν δώρημα ἀνθρώποις, εὔλογον καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν θεόσδοτον εἶναι...φαίνεται δὲ κἂν εἰ μὴ θεόπεμπτός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ δι' ἀρετὴν καί τινα μάθησιν ἢ ἄσκησιν παραγίγνεται, τῶν θειοτάτων εἶναι. Hippodamus, the Neo-Pythagorean, says that, of the two components of happi

ness, we obtain virtue διὰ τὴν θείαν μοῖραν, τὴν δὲ εὐτυχίαν διὰ τὰν θνατάν (Orell. Op. Mor. II p. 284). Horace (Ep. 1 18. 111) agrees with Cotta here, sed satis est orare Jovem quae donat et aufert, det vitam, det opes, aequum mi animum ipse parabo; and so Seneca (Ep. 41 § 1) bonam mentem quam stultum est optare, cum possis a te impetrare. Such a view seems to follow naturally from the Stoic doctrine of aurápketa and their distinction between things in our power and things not in our power; but there is the same inconsistency in their language, as there is in that of Christian writers, where they treat of Faith and Works, Free-Will and Grace. Thus Balbus above (11 § 79) mens fides virtus concordia unde nisi ab superis defluere potuerunt? Seneca (Provid. 6) quare bonis viris patitur aliquid mali deus fieri? Ille vero non patitur. Omnia mala ab iis removit, scelera et flagitia et cogitationes improbas et avida consilia et libidinem caecam : ipsos tuetur et vindicat; numquid hoc quoque a deo exigis, ut bonorum virorum etiam sarcinas servet? also Ep. 73 § 15 non sunt di fastidiosi, non invidi: admittunt (ad astra homines) et ascendentibus manum porrigunt. Miraris hominem ad deos ire? deus ad hominem venit, immo, quod est propius, in homines venit: nulla sine deo mens bona est, and Juvenal x 346 nil ergo optabunt homines? si consilium vis, permittes ipsis expendere numinibus quid conveniat.... Ut tamen et poscas aliquid...orandum est ut sit mens sana in corpore sano; fortem posce animum mortis terrore vacantem...qui ferre queat quoscumque labores, nesciat irasci, cupiat nihil &c.; and then shortly afterwards the other side, monstro quod ipse tibi possis dare, see Mayor on x 363. But by far the most interesting statements of the Stoic faith on this subject are to be found in M. Aurelius, as in the passage where he thanks the Gods for keeping him pure from the vices of youth (1 17); and in IX 40 "either the Gods have power or they have not. If they have not, why do you pray? If they have, why do you not rather pray that they would grant you freedom from fear and grief and desire, instead of praying for the presence or absence of the outward things which excite these feelings? ...But perhaps you will say en époì avrà oi beoì émoiŋoav...But who told you that the Gods cannot help us even as regards the things in our own power (rà ep' nuiv)? Begin at any rate to pray about these things, and you will see for yourself. This one prays 'grant me such and such an evil desire' or 'avert from me this danger'. Do you on the contrary pray 'take from me this desire and this fear' kaì Dewpeɩ ti yiverai" (shortened). St Paul gives both sides, the human and the divine, in Phil. 11 12 μerà þóßov xaì τρόμου τὴν ἑαυτῶν σωτηρίαν κατεργάζεσθε, θεὸς γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ἐνεργῶν ἐν ὑμῖν καὶ τὸ θέλειν καὶ τὸ ἐνεργεῖν. [Add Sen. Ep. 90 § 1, Max. Tyr. 11 § 8, Sil. XVI

83-86. J. E. B. M.]

§ 87. nimirum recte: 'doubtless with good reason'.

propter virtutem laudamur: so Arist. Eth. I 12 Tòv dikaιov Kai Tov ἀνδρεῖον καὶ ὅλως τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπαινοῦμεν διὰ τὰς πράξεις : virtues belong to the class érawerá as distinguished from Tíμa, ib. III 5 § 2, Rhet. 1 9, Eth. Eud. 1 6 ἐπεὶ δ' ἥ τε ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία καὶ τὰ ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἔργα τὰ μὲν

ἐπαινετά, τὰ δὲ ψεκτά (ψέγεται γὰρ καὶ ἐπαινεῖται...ὅσων αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι ἔσμεν, ὅσων γὰρ ἄλλος αἴτιος, ἐκεῖνος καὶ τὸν ψόγον καὶ τὸν ἔπαινον ἔχει), δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία περὶ ταῦτ ̓ ἐστὶν ὧν αὐτὸς αἴτιος, Cic. Or. II 343 virtus, quae est per se ipsa laudabilis et sine qua nihil laudari potest, Acad. II 39 ubi igitur virtus, si nihil situm est in ipsis nobis?

recte gloriamur: see n. on nulla re nisi immortalitate cedens II 153 and examples of the opposite side of Stoic teaching cited in my Anc. Phil. p. 169. For the Christian view cf. 1 Cor. IV 7 тí dè éxeis ô ovk ëλaßes; ei dè καὶ ἔλαβες, τί καυχᾶσαι ὡς μὴ λαβών ;

nostrae laudi assumptum: 'nothing has been gained for our glory'. The verb occurs with the same construction but a somewhat different sense in Sull. 85 dico illud quod...non auctoritati assumam sed pudori meo, Planc. 56 ut eorum reprehensionem vos vestrae prudentiae assumere, meae modestiae remittere debeatis.

quis quod bonus vir esset gratias dis egit: we have seen that M. Aurelius did this some two hundred years after Cicero wrote, but so did Cic. himself, (Sulla 40) O di immortales! vobis enim tribuo quae vestra sunt...vos profecto animum meum tum conservandae patriae cupiditate incendistis; vos me ab omnibus ceteris cogitationibus ad unam salutem rei publicae convertistis foll.; cf. also the saying attributed to Bias (Stob. Flor. III 6, Diog. L. 1 88) ὅταν ἀγαθὸν πράσσῃς, θεούς, μὴ σεαυτόν, αἰτιῶ.

optimus maximus: see on II 64.

salvos incolumes: 'safe and unharmed'. The word inc. means more than mere escape from destruction: we find it joined with salv. in Fin. IV 19, Verr. 1 72.

opulentos copiosos: the latter is rather the stronger word, bearing to the former the same relation as copia (co-opia) to ops. Compare Div. in Caec. 55 mulier copiosa et locuples.

§ 88. Herculi decumam: vowed to him as god of treasures. See Macrob. Sat. III 12 § 2 testatur Terentius Varro in ea satira quae inscribitur Teрì κeрaνvov majores solitos decimam Herculi vovere, nec decem dies intermittere quin pollucerent (i.e. give a public banquet in his honour); Plut. Sull. 35 ἀποθύων τῆς οὐσίας ἁπάσης ὁ Σύλλας τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ δεκατὴν ἑστιάσεις émolito tậ dýμw Toλvredeis, Macr. Sat. III 6 § 11 (quoting from the Memorabilia of Masurius Sabinus) M. Octavius Herrenus...bene re gesta decimam Herculi profanavit; Varro L. L. vI 54 hinc 'profanatum' in sacrificio, atque inde Herculi decuma appellata ab eo est, quod sacrificio quodam fanatur, id est ut fani lege sit: id dicitur 'polluctum' &c.; Plaut. Truc. 11 7. 11 de mina una deminui modo quinque nummos; mihi detraxi partem Herculaneam; Bacch. IV 3. 29 Herculem fecit ex patre: decumam partem ei dedit, sibi novem abstulit; Stich. II 1. 80 ut decumam partem Herculi polluceam; Pers. II 10 0 si sub rastro crepet argenti mihi seria dextro Hercule: Hor. Sat. 11 6. 10 foll., Plaut. Rud. 425, 1419, Curc. 193, Most. 24, 972, Festus p. 237 M., Diod. Iv 22, xx 14, Plut. Qu. Rom. c. 18, Crassus pp. 543 and 550, Dion. Hal. 111 45, Erasm. Adag. s. v. ‘Hercule

dextro', Beier on Off. II 58. [See the inscriptions on the temple at Reate erected by Mummius from the tithe of the spoils of Corinth, Corp. Inser. Lat. I no. 542, and compare 541 with Mommsen's comments (Wilmanns 27 a, b): also Corp. I. L. 1 1175 (Wilmanns 142), and 1113 (Wilmanns 43); ib. 1290, x 3956. R.]

si sapiens factus esset: the apodosis se daturum is understood, as in Liv. XXXI 21 praetor aedem Diovi vovit, si eo die hostes fudisset. See Roby § 1750.

Pythagoras: on his discovery of the proof of Euclid 1 47 (that the square on the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares on the lines containing the right angle), cf. Vitr. 1x praef. 7 id Pythagoras cum invenisset, non dubitans se a Musis in ea inventione monitum, maximas gratias agens hostias dicitur iis immolavisse. Diog. L. (vIII 12) cites Apollodorus as an authority for the statement and quotes an epigram on the subject; so also Athen. x p. 418. Plutarch (Mor. p. 1094, and p. 720 A) questions whether the offering was not made for a different theorem. Proclus in his Comm. on Euclid 1. c. cites Eudemus as his authority. See for other reff. Zeller I p. 294 n.

ne Apollini quidem Delio: Cic. forgets that the Delian Apollo was himself a vegetarian, so that Pythagoras had no choice in the matter; cf. Diog. L. vir 13 βωμὸν προσκυνῆσαι (Πυθαγόραν) μόνον ἐν Δήλῳ τὸν ̓Απόλλωνος τοῦ Γενέτορος...διὰ τὸ πυροὺς καὶ κριθὰς καὶ πόπανα μόνα τίθεσθαι ἐπ ̓ αὐτοῦ ἄνευ πυρός, ἱερεῖον δὲ μηδέν, ὥς φησιν ̓Αριστοτέλης ἐν Δηλίων Πολιτεία, Theophr. ap. Porphyr. Abstin. II 28 bewpĥσaι dè čotiv ék toû tepì Añλov ἔτι νῦν σωζομένου βωμοῦ, πρὸς ὃν οὐθένος προσαγομένου παρ' αὐτοῖς οὔτε θυομένου ἐπ ̓ αὐτοῦ ζῴου, εὐσεβῶν κέκληται βωμός, Censorin. 2 Deli ad Apollinis genitoris aram, ut Timaeus auctor est, nemo hostiam caedit; Clem. Al. Strom. VII 32, Jambl. V. P. § 25, Macrob. Sat. III 6 (citing Varro and Cloatius). The best authorities do not impute total abstinence from meat to Pyth., even Porph. V. P. 34 only says that he rarely partook of the sacrificial flesh, and (36) that he usually propitiated the gods with vegetable offerings, ἐμψύχοις δὲ ἥκιστα πλὴν εἰ μή ποτε ἀλεκτορίσι καὶ τῶν χοίρων τοῖς ἁπαλωτάτοις. He then continues, in reference to the offering here mentioned, ἐβουθύτησε δέ ποτε σταίτινον ὡς φασὶ βοῦν οἱ ἀκριβέστεροι (i.e. an ox of dough); so also Greg. Naz. Ep. 185.

6

quamvis licet...consecremus: we may dedicate temples as we will',

cf. Tusc. IV 53 quamvis licet insectemur istos, Leg. III 24 quamvis enumeres multos licet, Har. Resp. c. 9 quam volumus licet nos amemus, Lucr. vi 600, 620.

haec in nobis sita: the same division of these abstract divinities is found above § 61, also II 61, 79.

ut Diogenes: see above § 83.

Dc. (6). The truth is piety and impiety have no effect on our happiness. Witty answers of Diagoras on this point. § 89.