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I think however Madvig is unnecessarily fastidious in objecting to the phrase mod. in homines, cf. Invent. II 163 temperantia est rationis in libidinem moderata dominatio, and so with imperium, regnum and similar words.

Dc. (4). It is no answer to say that 'de minimis non curat lex'. Life and civil status cannot be considered minima'. S 86.

$ 86. at enim minora : see in 167 n., Div. II 105, Philo p. 644 M. tÒ προμηθες επί τα των εν κόσμω συνεκτικώτατα εφoράν αγαπά, καθάπερ εν ταις βασιλείαις και στραταρχίαις επί τας πόλεις και τα στρατόπεδα, ουκ επί τινα των ημελημένων και αφανών ένα τον προστυχόντα. .

[agellos—viticulas : cf. Plin. Ep. 1 24 §§ 1 and 4. J. E. B. M.]

persequuntur : 'examine minutely', 'follow out into minute detail', cf. 11 159 persequi utilitates, 152 sollertiam persequi, 1 111 voluptates persequitur nominatim, Pis. 53 omnes solitudines persequi.

uredo: 'blasting'. Columella (III 20 § 1) and Pliny (1V. II. XXVIII 68) agree that this is caused by cold. The latter identifies it with carbunculus. So uro is used of nipping cold.

omnia minima: see 11 141 n., Orat. 11 162 omnes tenuissimas particulas atque omnia minima mansain os inserant, and Part. Orut. 60; so we find omnia summa, omnia ultima &c.

sic enim dicitis : i.e. you Stoics (as in the passage just quoted from Philo). This particular illustration is not given in Bk. II. See below § 90.

Formiano: Formiae, the modern Mola di Gaïeta, was a favorite site for villas. The ruins of what is supposed to be Cicero's villa are still pointed out. On Rutilius see above $ 80.

amissa salute : refers to his exile, the interdict from fire and water, just as restitutor salutis meae (Vil. 39) is used of Lentulus, who proposed the law recalling Cie. from exile, cf. Pis. 34 nemini sit triumphus honorificentius quam mihi salus restitutioque perscripta. Like caput, salus implies the full enjoyment of the rights of a citizen.

Dc. (5). [If it be alleged that all external goods are trifles in comparison of virtue), it is just these external goods which are at the disposal of Heaven. Virtue is our own, and is therefore never made the subject of prayer. Men have deified virtue in the abstract, but in reality it is only a quality of their own nature. $$ 86-88.

(As the arguments which follow all relate to the general question of rewards and punishments, it seems better to suppose this to be connected with it in the manner suggested above, rather than to treat it as an independent argument, denying the doctrine maintained in the previous book, $$ 165, 167, that human virtue is derived from God.) Cf. Plut. St. Rep. c. 31 είπερ ούν ο θεός αρετήν μεν ου δίδωσιν ανθρώπους, αλλά το καλόν αυθαίρετόν έστιν, πλούτον δε και υγίειαν χωρίς αρετής δίδωσιν, ουκ ευ χρησομένοις δίδωσιν, αλλά κακώς, τουτέστι βλαβερώς και αισχρώς και όλεθρίως κ.τ.λ.

Ch. XXXVI. [vineta : add to lexx. Stat. Silvae ini 5. 100, Panegyr. 11 $ 22, Aur. Vict. Caes. 37 $ 3.

oliveta : also in Varro, Columella, Plin. H. N. XVII 245 and Sen. Ep. 86 SS 14, 17, 18. From the vulgate the word has passed into the English bible. J. E. B. M.]

virtutem nemo umquam acceptam deo rettulit: 'none ever imputed his virtue to God', lit. 'credited God with it'. The metaphor is taken from a ledger, on one side of which we put the outgoings (expensa), on the other side the receipts (accepta), cf. Verr. i 39 minus Dolabella Verri acceptum rettulit quam Verres illi expensum tulit. The statement is very far from the truth : Homer (11. XII 730) gives the old Greek doctrine in the words άλλο μεν γαρ έδωκε θεός πολεμήια έργα, άλλω δ' εν στήθεσσι τιθεί νόον ευρύοπα Ζεύς έσθλόν, and throughout his poems any unusual display of courage or wisdom or self-restraint is attributed to the influence of a deity, cf. Pind. Isthm. III 4 Ζεύ, μεγάλαι δ' άρεται θνατούς έπονται εκ σέθεν, ib. frag. 85 Bergk θεού δε δείξαντος άρχάν έκαστον εν (Boeot. for ες) πράγος ευθεία δή κέλευθος αρετάν ελεϊν, τελευταί τε καλλίονες, Aesch. Ag. 901 το μή κακώς φρονείν θεου μέγιστον δωρον, Εur. Med. 635 σωφροσύνα δώρημα κάλλιστον θεών, and nn. above on II 165 and 167. In the time of Socrates the question how virtue is acquired' was a favorite subject for discussion : Protagoras professed to teach it, i.e. to make men good citizens, and in the dialogue called after him, Socrates is represented as saying εγώ γαρ εν μέν τω έμπροσθεν χρόνο ηγούμην ούκ είναι ανθρωπίνην επιμέλειαν ή αγαθοί οι αγαθοί γίγνονται, νύν δε πεπεισμαι (Prot. 328); which, though expressed ironically in the particular passage, seems to have been his genuine belief. Yet this does not prevent him from praying to Pan and the other gods at the end of the Phaedrus δοίητέ μοι καλώ γενέσθαι τάνδοθεν έξωθεν δε όσα έχω, τοίς εντός είναι μοι φίλια πλούσιον δε νομίζουμε τον σοφόν. The question is expressly discussed in the Meno, concluding in the words θεία μοίρα ημίν φαίνεται παραγιγνομένη η αρετή οίς παραγίγνεται (p. 100). In the Republic Plato recognized all the different factors which had been op. posed by earlier disputants : the lower practical virtues of the Auxiliaries are mainly the result of discipline and habituation, the higher philosophic virtue of the Guardians is due in great part to learning and instruction, but Dela polpa still plays its part in the original distinction between the gold and silver natures. Aristotle deals with the same question Eth. x 9 και 6 γίνεσθαι δ' αγαθούς οίονται οι μεν φύσει, οι δ' έθει, οι δε διδαχή. Το μεν ούν της φύσεως δήλον ως ουκ εφ' ημίν υπάρχει, αλλά διά τινας θείας αιτίας τους ως αληθώς ευτυχέσιν υπάρχει κ.τ.λ. and s0 in Βk. I9 (of happiness which he makes to consist so largely in virtue) åttopeitai trótepóv éoti uaOntòv έθιστών ή άλλως πως ασκητών, ή κατά τινα θείαν μοίραν ή και διά τύχην παραγίνεται· ει μεν ουν και άλλο τι εστί θεών δώρημα ανθρώπους, εύλογον και την ευδαιμονίαν θεόσδoτoν είναι...φαίνεται δε κάν ει μη θεόπεμπτός έστιν, αλλά δι' αρετήν καί τινα μάθησιν ή άσκησιν παραγίγνεται, των θειοτάτων είναι. Ηippodamus, the Neo-Pythagorcan, says that, of the two components of happi

ness, we obtain virtue διά τήν θείαν μοιραν, ταν δε ευτυχίαν διά τάν θνατάν (Orell. Op. Mor. II p. 284). Horace (Ep. i 18. 111) agrees with Cotta here, sed satis est orare Jovem quae donat et aufert, det vitam, det opes, aequum mi animum ipse parabo ; and so Seneca (Ep. 41 § 1) bonam mentem quam stultum est optare, cum possis a te impetrare. Such a view seems to follow naturally from the Stoic doctrine of aútápkela and their distinction between things in our power and things not in our power; but there is the same inconsistency in their language, as there is in that of Christian writers, where they treat of Faith and Works, Free-Will and Grace. Thus Balbus abore (II § 79) mens fides virtus concordia unde nisi ab superis defuere potuerunt ? Seneca (Provid. 6) quare bonis viris patitur aliquid mali deus fieri? Nle vero non patitur. Omnia mala ab iis removit, scelera et flagitia et cogitationes improbas et avida consilia et libidinem caecam : ipsos tuetur et vindicat ; numquid hoc quoque a deo exigis, ut bonorum virorum etiam sarcinas servet ? also Ep. 73 § 15 non sunt di fastidiosi, non invidi: admittunt (ad astra homines) et ascendentibus manum porrigunt. Miraris hominem ad deos ire ? deus ad hominem venit, immo, quod est propius, in homines venit : nulla sine deo mens bona est, and Juvenal x 346 nil ergo optabunt homines ? si consilium vis, permittes ipsis expendere numinibus quid conveniat.... Ut tamen et poscas aliquid...orandum est ut sit mens sana in corpore sano ; fortem posce animum mortis terrore vacantem...qui ferre queat quoscumque labores, nesciat irasci, cupiat nihil &c.; and then shortly afterwards the other side, monstro quod ipse tibi possis dare, see Mayor on x 363. But by far the most interesting statements of the Stoic faith on this subject are to be found in M. Aurelius, as in the passage where he thanks the Gods for keeping him pure from the vices of youth (1 17); and in 1x 40 “either the Gods have power or they have not. If they have not, why do you pray? If they have, why do you not rather pray that they would grant you freedom from fear and grief and desire, instead of praying for the presence or absence of the outward things which excite these feelings? ...But perhaps you will say és' fuoi aŭrà oi Oroi étoinoav...But who told you that the Gods cannot help us even as regards the things in our own power (ép ruiv) ? Begin at any rate to pray about these things, and you will see for yourself. This one prays“grant me such and such an evil desire' or avert from me this danger'. Do you on the contrary pray "take from me this desire and this fear'kai Dempel ti yivera.” (shortened). St Paul gives both sides, the human and the divine, in Phil. 11 12 metà póßov kai τρόμου την έαυτών σωτηρίαν κατεργάζεσθε, θεός γάρ έστιν ο ενεργών εν υμίν και béAệte cai copy v. [Add Sen. Ep. 90 $ 1, Max. Tyr. 11 $ 8, Sil, xVI 83–86. J. E. B. M.]

$ 87. nimirum recte : 'doubtless with good reason ’.

propter virtutem laudamur: so Arist. Eth. i 12 Tòv dikalov kai tòn άνδρείον και όλως τον αγαθών και την αρετήν έπαινουμεν διά τάς πράξεις: virtues belong to the class éralverá as distinguished from Tiuia, ib. 111 5 § 2, Rhet. 19, Eth. Eud. ΙΙ 6 έπει δ' ή τε αρετή και η κακία και τα απ' αυτων έργα τα μεν επαινετά, τα δε ψεκτά (ψέγεται γάρ και επαινείται...όσων αυτοί αίτιοι έσμεν, όσων γάρ άλλος αίτιος, εκείνος και τον ψόγον και τον έπαινον έχει), δήλον ότι και η αρετή και η κακία περί ταύτ' έστιν ών αυτος αίτιος, Cic. Οr. ΙΙ 343 virtus, quae est per se ipsa laudabilis et sine qua nihil laudari potest, Acad. 11 39 ubi igitur virtus, si nihil situm est in ipsis nobis ?

recte gloriamur: see n. on nulla re nisi immortalitate cedens il 153 and examples of the opposite side of Stoic teaching cited in my Anc. Phil. p. 169. For the Christian view cf. 1 Cor. iv 7 ri exeus oủk haßes ; ei και έλαβες, τι καυχάσαι ως μη λαβών ;

nostrae laudi assumptum : ‘nothing has been gained for our glory'. The verb occurs with the same construction but a somewhat different sense in Sull. 85 dico illud quod...non auctoritati assumam sed pudori meo, Planc. 56 ut eorum reprehensionem vos vestrae prudentiae assumere, meae modestiae remittere debeatis.

quis quod bonus vir esset gratias dis egit: we have seen that M. Aurelius did this some two hundred years after Cicero wrote, but so did Cic. himself, (Sulla 40) O di immortales ! vobis enim tribuo quae vestra sunt...vos profecto animum meum tum conservandae patriae cupiditate incendistis ; vos me ab omnibus ceteris cogitationibus ad unam salutem rei publicae convertistis foll.; cf. also the saying attributed to Bias (Stob. Flor. III 6, Diog. L. Ι 88) όταν αγαθών πράσσης, θεούς, μη σεαυτόν, αιτιώ.

optimus maximus : see on II 64.

salvos incolumes : 'safe and unharmed'. The word inc, means more than mere escape from destruction : we find it joined with salv. in Fin. IV 19, Verr. 1 72.

opulentos copiosos: the latter is rather the stronger word, bearing to the former the same relation as copia (co-opia) to ops. Compare Div. in Caec. 55 mulier copiosa et locuples.

§ 88. Herculi decumam : vowed to him as god of treasures. See Macrob. Sat. III 12 § 2 testatur Terentius Varro in ea satira quae inscribitur Trepi Kepavvoû majores solitos decimam Herculi vovere, nec decem dies intermittere quin pollucerent (i.e. give a public banquet in his honour); Plut. Sull. 35 αποθύων της ουσίας απάσης ο Σύλλας το Ηρακλεί δεκατήν εστιάσεις étoleiro dua molutelcis, Macr. Sat. III 6 § 11 (quoting from the Memorabilia of Masurius Sabinus) M. Octavius Herrenus...bene re gesta decimam Herculi profanavit ; Varro L. L. vi 54 hinc 'profanatum' in sacrificio, atque inde Herculi decuma appellata ab eo est, quod sacrificio quodam fanatur, id est ut fani lege sit: id dicitur polluctum' &c.; Plaut. Truc. II 7. 11 de mina una deminui modo quinque nummos; mihi detraxi partem Herculaneam; Bacch. Iv 3. 29 Herculem fecit ex patre: decumam partem ei dedit, sibi novem abstulit; Stich. II 1. 80 ut decumam partem Herculi polluceam ; Pers. II 10 O si sub rastro crepet argenti mihi seria dextro Hercule: Hor. Sat. II 6. 10 foll., Plaut. Rud. 425, 1419, Curc. 193, Most. 24, 972, Festus p. 237 M., Diod. IV 22, xx 14, Plut. Qu. Rom. c. 18, Crassus pp. 543 and 550, Dion. Hal. 111 45, Erasm. Adag. s. v. ' Ilercule dextro', Beier on Off. 11 58. [See the inscriptions on the temple at Reate erected by Mummius from the tithe of the spoils of Corinth, Corp. Inscr. Lat. I no. 542, and compare 541 with Mommsen's comments (Wilmanns 27 a, b): also Corp. I. L. 1 1175 (Wilmanns 142), and 1113 (Wilmanns 43); ib. 1290, x 3956. R.]

si sapiens factus esset: the apodosis se daturum is understood, as in Liv. xxxi 21 praetor aedem Diovi vovit, si eo die hostes fudisset. See Roby $ 1750.

Pythagoras : on his discovery of the proof of Euclid i 47 (that the square on the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares on the lines containing the right angle), cf. Vitr. ix praef. 7 id Pythagoras cum invenisset, non dubitans se a Musis in ea inventione monitum, maximus gratias agens hostias dicitur iis immolavisse. Diog. L. (VIII 12) cites Apollodorus as an authority for the statement and quotes an epigram on the subject; so also Athen. x p. 418. Plutarch (Mor. p. 1094, and p. 720 A) questions whether the offering was not made for a different theorem. Proclus in his Comm. on Euclid l. c. cites Eudemus as his authority. See for other reff. Zeller i p. 294 n.

ne Apollini quidem Delio: Cic. forgets that the Delian Apollo was himself a vegetarian, so that Pythagoras had no choice in the matter; cf. Diog. L. VIII 13 βωμόν προσκυνήσαι (Πυθαγόρας) μόνον εν Δήλο τον Απόλλωνος του Γενέτορος...διά το πυρούς και κριθάς και πόπανα μόνα τίθεσθαι επ' αυτού άνευ πυρός, ιερείον δε μηδέν, ώς φησιν 'Αριστοτέλης εν Δηλίων Πολιτεία, Theophr. ap. Porphyr. Abstin. ΙΙ 28 θεωρήσαι δε έστιν εκ του περί Δήλον έτι νύν σωζομένου βωμού, προς ον ουθένος προσαγομένου παρ' αυτούς ούτε θυομένου επ' αυτού ζώου, ευσεβών κέκληται βωμός, Censorin. 2 Deli ad A pollinis genitoris aram, ut Timaeus auctor est, nemo hostiam caedit; Clem. Al. Strom. VII 32, Jambl. V. P. $ 25, Macrob. Sat. 111 6 (citing Varro and Cloatius). The best authorities do not impute total abstinence from meat to Pyth., even Porph. V. P. 34 only says that he rarely partook of the sacrificial flesh, and (36) that he usually propitiated the gods with vegetable offerings, εμψύχοις δε ήκιστα πλήν ει μη ποτε αλεκτoρίσι και των xoipwv toîs átalotátous. He then continues, in reference to the offering here mentioned, έβουθύτησε δε ποτε σταίτινον ως φασί βουν οι ακριβέστεροι (i.e. an ox of dough); so also Greg. Naz. Ep. 185.

quamvis licet...consecremus : 'we may dedicate temples as we will', cf. Tusc. IV 53 quamvis licet insectemur istos, Leg. III 24 quamvis enumeres multos licet, Har. Resp. c. 9 quam volumus licet nos amemus, Lucr. Vi 600, 620.

haec in nobis sita: the same division of these abstract divinities is found above $ 61, also II 61, 79.

ut Diogenes : see above $ 83.

Dc. (6). The truth is piety and impiety have no effect on our happiness. Witty answers of Diagoras on this point. $ 89.

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